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            ABSTRACT 
This dissertation identifies what may be done to overcome barriers to information sharing among 
federal, tribal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and emergency responders. Social, 
technical, and policy factors related to information sharing and collaboration in the law 
enforcement and emergency response communities are examined. This research improves 
information sharing and cooperation in this area. “Policing in most societies exists in a state of 
“dynamic tension” between forces that tend to isolate it and those that tend to integrate its 
functioning with other social structures” (Clark, 1965). Critical incidents and crimes today cross 
jurisdictions and involve multiple stakeholders and levels. Law enforcement and emergency 
response agencies at federal, tribal, state, and local levels, including private sector entities, gather 
information and resources but do not effectively share this with each other. Despite mandates to 
improve information sharing and cooperation, gaps remain perhaps because there is no clear 
understanding of what the barriers to information sharing are. Information sharing is examined 
using a multi-method, primarily qualitative, approach. A model for information sharing is 
presented that identifies social, technical, and policy factors as influencers. Facets of General 
Systems Theory, Socio-technical Theory, and Stakeholder Theory (among others) are considered 
in this context. Information sharing is the subject of the first work of the dissertation: a 
theoretical piece arguing for use of a conceptual framework consisting of social, technical, and 
policy factors. Social, technology, and policy factors are investigated in the second essay. That 
essay introduces a new transformative technology, "edgeware," that allows for unprecedented 
connectivity among devices. Social and policy implications for crisis response are examined in 
light of having technological barriers to sharing resources reduced. Human and other factors 
relevant to information sharing and collaboration are further examined through a case study of 
     
 
 
the Central New York Interoperable Communications Consortium (CNYICC) Network, a five-
county collaboration involving law enforcement, public safety, government, and non-government 
participants. The three included essays have a common focus vis-à-vis information sharing and 
collaboration in law enforcement and emergency response. The propositions here include: (P1) 
Information sharing is affected by social, technical, and policy factors, and this 
conceptualization frames the problem of information sharing in a way that it can be commonly 
understood by government and non-government stakeholders. The next proposition involves the 
role of technology, policy, and social systems in information sharing: (P2) Social and policy 
factors influence information sharing more than technical factors (assuming it is physically 
possible to connect and/or share). A third proposition investigated is: (P3) Social factors play 
the greatest role in the creation and sustaining of information sharing relationships. The 
findings provide a greater understanding of the forces that impact public safety agencies as they 
consider information sharing and will, it is hoped, lead to identifiable solutions to the problem 
from a new perspective. 
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I.  CHAPTER - INTRODUCTION 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE INFORMATION 
SHARING AND COLLABORATION:  
AN INSIDER PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
1. Introduction and Cohesion of Works 
 
 This dissertation of three essays examines factors related to information sharing and 
collaboration in the law enforcement and emergency response community, which may be 
referred to collectively as public safety. A contribution in this area comes in the form of 
describing and framing the broader issues, environment, and influences that operate across the 
law enforcement and emergency response community.  A framework for examination and study 
of information sharing is proposed in the first essay and utilized to organize the overarching 
problem, and as a means for investigating and proposing solutions to the other problems 
identified. The second essay introduces a new technology for collaborating across 
communication and electronics devices and investigates current technical, social, and policy 
factors related to information sharing in emergency response. A case study in the area of multi-
jurisdictional interagency collaboration and cooperation in the public safety area involving the 
emergence and activities of an emergency communications (E-911) radio consortium is included. 
This case is significant in that it is representative of the situation of many other law enforcement 
and emergency services providers across the United States, and lessons learned from this case 
will apply to other similar environments regarding information sharing and collaboration. 
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 The included essays have a common theme surrounding information sharing and 
collaboration in organizations with a current focus being on the law enforcement and emergency 
response community (public safety). A multi-method, primarily qualitative, approach is taken 
throughout. A model for information sharing is presented that identifies social, technical, and 
policy factors as influencers. Facets of General Systems Theory and Socio-technical Theory are 
considered in this context. The three essays included in this dissertation are: 
 
1) "A Framework for Conceptualizing Barriers to Intelligence Information Sharing in Law 
Enforcement: An Insider Perspective" 
2) "Towards More Rapid and Effective Communication Between Responders to Emergency 
Situations" 
3) "Identifying Factors that Support Collaboration in a Multi-jurisdiction Environment: A 
Case Study of the Central New York Interoperable Communications Consortium" 
 
 In this dissertation of three essays, each individual essay makes a contribution to the field 
of information science and together they collectively add to the knowledge in this area. The three 
essays described are included in the following chapters. At the end is a conclusion chapter that 
discusses the broader context, reflections and implications of the research, and proposes a 
direction and focus for future work. 
 
2.  Law Enforcement and Emergency Response Context 
 
Public safety agencies in the United States, as used in this dissertation, include law 
enforcement and emergency response entities at the federal, tribal, state, and local levels to 
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include special districts or functions. Emergency response entities include fire departments, 
ambulance, rescue services, and dispatch centers. Law enforcement agencies are considered 
emergency responders as well. Law enforcement agencies are responsible for upholding the laws 
of their jurisdictions and protecting people and property. They are information repositories, a 
source for documentation of incidents and events generally. Fire departments and rescue services 
are responsible for responding to fires, accidents, and other threats or incidents that may 
endanger life or property. Ambulance services are responsible for stabilizing injured or ill 
persons and transporting them to treatment facilities. Dispatch centers, which include 911 
centers, are responsible for communicating with emergency response agencies and the public 
during critical incidents. This includes anyone that is involved in a crisis event or incident. 
Dispatch centers typically are the intersection of most all of the public safety agencies and 
stakeholders. Dispatch centers coordinate with, but do not control, the individual actions of the 
emergency responders. 
Public safety agencies have varying roles and responsibilities in regard to crisis incidents or 
criminal activity.  When police, fire, EMS (Emergency Medical Services) and other municipal 
entities respond to crisis incidents that involve danger to life and property their interests and 
responsibilities converge. Public safety agencies have a history of separately gathering data and 
information relevant to their roles and purpose and have not, to date, combined or integrated this 
information resource in a way that can be universally shared and used for improving public 
safety. 
Although they share a common purpose of preservation of life and property, public safety 
agencies are autonomous, responsible to their local needs and interests, and there are many of 
them. There are 17,876 state and local law enforcement agencies operating in the U.S.: 12,766 
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local police departments, 3,067 sheriffs' offices, 49 state agencies, 1,481 special jurisdiction 
agencies, and 513 other agencies (BJS, 2007). Additionally, there are 26,464 fire departments 
registered with the US National Fire Administration as of February 9, 2011, with 23,120 of them 
volunteer or mostly volunteer agencies (USFA, 2011). In addition to those, there are an 
estimated 6,121 public safety answering points (PSAP), or communications centers that handle 
911 or emergency calls. There are 225 counties that have no 911 service (Dispatch, 2012). There 
are multiple layers of governance with overlapping jurisdictions, responsibility, and authority. 
These include village, town, city, county, tribal nation, and other special jurisdiction agencies 
such as the park police that further overlap with jurisdiction and authority (see Figure 5, p. 82). 
The United States is fairly unique with this structure. Each public safety agency has its own 
rules, policy, regulations, and cultural norms. The village, town, city, county, state, tribal, 
federal, and special jurisdiction agencies each have their own leadership, policies, procedures, 
and resources. Governance, coordination, and information sharing in this multi-interest and 
dynamic environment are difficult to say the least. 
Public safety agencies are responsible for defined geographical jurisdictions or areas where 
they have responsibility and control. The jurisdictions do not always follow municipal 
boundaries and many share or overlap in their jurisdiction. This is discussed in detail in later 
sections of this dissertation. For a given crisis incident, there may be multiple law enforcement 
agencies at different levels of government, multiple fire and rescue departments, several 
ambulance services, and more than one communications dispatch or 911 center involved in 
addition to other government and non-government stakeholders. Additional stakeholders are 
discussed in the second essay of this dissertation. 
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Historically, public safety agencies in many cases were formed and operated independently 
of each other. The law enforcement agencies dispatched themselves and created and maintained 
their own databases of information. Fire, rescue, and ambulance services did the same. Dispatch 
centers, communications centers, or 911 centers as they are commonly known, were formed as 
neutral entities or affiliated with law enforcement, fire or ambulance service providers. This 
independence created gaps in information collection and dissemination. Some example 
descriptions are provided below to aid in understanding this environment and the attendant 
conditions and issues created.  
In some states, the fire departments are responsible for investigating the cause and origin of 
fires and may conduct criminal investigations separate from, or in parallel with, law enforcement 
agencies. Determination as to which agency is responsible for follow up is typically linked to 
whether or not the fire or explosion is believed to be accidental or done with criminal liability. 
Law enforcement and fire departments in these cases overlap in their responsibilities and record 
keeping.   
Dispatch centers or 911 centers do not generally have control or authority over the agencies 
with which they communicate. 911 centers relay information that comes to them and provide 
information as requested. This does vary across the country. An example of how a dispatch 
center may have control over responders would be the case of a Metropolitan police department 
that operates its own 911 center. In that case, the dispatch center may have personnel with 
command authority over its responding department members. 911 centers are not generally in 
command during a crisis, even though they may be the ones with the most information and 
clearest view of the overall incident. Other public safety agencies control their individual forces 
through the 911 centers or directly through other means of communication. This creates an 
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environment where it is difficult to capture and retrieve all relevant information in a crisis or 
incident. 
Information comes from many sources to public safety agencies. People or agencies may call 
in complaints or provide information on crimes or incidents to the 911 centers, law enforcement 
agency, fire, or ambulance service. This data does not automatically get combined, related, or 
shared across agencies. One would think that the communications centers would act as a natural 
bridge for information across agencies. As not all calls for service or complaints go to a 911 
center, one cannot rely on that agency for an account of all complaints or requests for service in 
an area. Police gather a great deal of information on people, locations, incidents, and events 
when they respond to calls for service, or in the course of investigating offenses. Ambulance and 
fire crews respond to incidents and gather information on people, locations, and incidents as 
well. Law enforcement agencies do not always respond with fire and ambulance agencies on 
their calls for service. This potential information is missed. 
Each of the public safety agencies has different purposes for gathering information. Although 
it may be useful for the police to know where a particular person lives or who their associates 
are, the fact that the ambulance responded to the person’s residence does not mean that this type 
of information will be captured or even that it would be sharable with another agency due to 
privacy or other issues. In another example, the fire department may be called to a gas leak and 
then find evidence of a crime such as an illegal chemical laboratory. There are several 
possibilities in this example. The responders here may not recognize the information as 
significant for reporting to the law enforcement agencies and not capture or share it. The firemen 
may be intimidated or threatened by the participants to not disclose. Firemen may feel bad for 
the parties involved and not wish to get them into trouble. The firemen may even report the 
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information to the proper authorities. There is a disconnect between police, fire, and other 
emergency responders in the information that could be shared.  
Public safety agencies do not always work well together. There is an insider versus outsider 
atmosphere in many agencies. By way of example, an agency at the federal law enforcement 
level may not work well with a particular local-level agency. Law enforcement agencies may 
view non-agency personnel as outsiders and withhold information or simply choose not to 
interact. Law enforcement agencies, especially, are responsible for policing others and have 
sensitive and secret information, operations, and methods that cannot be shared, even with other 
government agencies. Other public safety agencies have sensitive and private information that 
must be protected as well. This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the sections following. 
It is important to understand the law enforcement and emergency response environment in 
considering the factors examined in this dissertation.  
 
3. Problem 
 
 
"To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law 
enforcement, and homeland security capabilities. … We are improving information 
sharing and cooperation by linking networks to facilitate federal, state, and local 
capabilities to seamlessly exchange messages and information, conduct searches, and 
collaborate." — President Obama’s National Security Strategy, May 2010.  
 
 According to the National Security Agency (NSA), barriers continue to impede 
information sharing, particularly between state and local agencies (United States, 2007, 2007c). 
The National Intelligence report concluded that the United States is currently facing persistent 
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and evolving terrorist threats (Lieberman, 2007). Crimes continue to proliferate across 
jurisdictions, and cyber investigations may be the largest challenge to modern law enforcement 
(Lee, 2008).  The government Information Sharing Environment (ISE) report states, "the 
biggest impediment to all-source analysis—to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots—is the 
human or systemic resistance to sharing information" (McMamara, 2006).   
Despite mandates to improve information sharing in the law enforcement and emergency 
response communities, gaps still remain perhaps because there is not a clear understanding of 
what the barriers to information sharing are that can be acted upon or changed by agencies and 
policy makers. Law enforcement and emergency response agencies in the United States are not 
yet effectively sharing information. This conclusion is reflected in a report to congress 
(Kshemendra, 2010).  
Law enforcement and Emergency management are complex environments where 
surprises occur. According to Longstaff, 2003, “systems are said to become ‘complex’ when they 
have intricate interdependencies among their various parts and many variables operating at the 
same time.” Taking action in one area can cause unpredictable effects on other areas due to the 
interrelatedness of the components (Longstaff, 2009).  
Research into understanding the dynamics will lead to identification of actionable 
barriers to law enforcement and emergency response information sharing and collaboration 
across the federal, tribal, state, and local levels, and ultimately lead to the creation of strategies to 
address the problem. By identifying a conceptual framework for understanding factors of 
information sharing in this environment, researchers may provide focus for discussion and 
research in this area. Much work has been done addressing technological aspects of the 
information-sharing problem (Akbulut, Kelle, Pawlowski, Schneider, & Looney, 2009; Akbulut, 
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2003; Gil-Garcia, Chengalur-Smith, & Duchessi, 2007; IT.OJP, 2010; Jacobs & Blitsa, 2008; 
USDOJ, 2004; 2006) and so there is a need to move beyond the technological aspects of the 
problem.  The issue of sharing involves factors including trust, governance, and participation for 
members and stakeholders. Trust and governance have significant meanings and contexts in this 
dissertation and in the three included essays; they are explained in detail in the sections 
following.   
Alternative approaches in these and other areas may be considered to improve 
information sharing behaviors among involved agencies and potentially extend the degree and 
quality of information sharing across the law enforcement and emergency response communities. 
Creating a shared conceptual framework, looking beyond the technological factors, and seeking 
out alternative and creative means for engaging and retaining participants in the information 
sharing processes, is necessary and an objective of this research. 
 Information sharing in this context involves the transfer of information obtained that 
relates to an actual or impending occurrence of any incident, criminal, or terrorist act.  This 
conceptualization includes the range of information that can be considered data related to events, 
activity, or resources to information that can be used for strategic decision making or new 
knowledge generation. Intelligence information, as used in this thesis, is a special set of 
information related to sensitive issues, resources, or other information related to decision-
making.  
Knowledge of people and other resources that are involved in crisis or natural disaster 
response is also information that must be shared. Included as intelligence information are 
suspicious activity reports regarding incidents or observations, which are of a less obvious nature 
but which may be supportive of, or related to, criminal or terrorist related activity. The term 
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knowledge may also be substituted here as a way to bridge across disciplines from outside the 
intelligence community (Forrest, 2006; Kulkarni, Ravindran, & Freeze, 2007).
1
 An incident of 
suspicious nature could be considered suspicious activity (intelligence information) or 
information, depending upon the circumstances. The determination as to whether an event is 
considered and captured as “suspicious activity” or “intelligence information” is subjective and 
often left to the discretion of the observer of the condition involved. 
 One aspect of the problem of agencies sharing information and collaborating – within the 
United States – may come from the structure of the political system, agency jurisdictions, and 
agency responsibility.  Law enforcement in the United States remains uniquely decentralized and 
does not operate under unitary command or control. Recent case studies on knowledge sharing 
within public sector inter-organizational networks confirm information-sharing difficulties across 
agencies (Jing & Pengzhu, 2007; Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006). Agencies 
overlap jurisdictions and responsibility, each with a duty to their own constituencies. There has 
been a top-down approach to implementation of information-sharing mandates, typically from 
the federal level down. The case study included in this dissertation provides support for the 
notion of a need for both top-level guidance and control, such as in the establishment of broad 
standards for interoperability as well as providing a degree of autonomy for involved entities at 
various levels.  The case provides evidence of the importance of acknowledging the individual 
sovereignty of agencies at various levels in cooperative engagements. There are successful 
alternative governance and collaboration arrangement models that may improve the success, 
participation, and, ultimately, the sharing of information in mixed-interest environments 
                                                 
1
 Knowledge is defined in the 2011 Merriam-Webster Dictionary as "the fact or condition of knowing something 
with familiarity gained through experience or association." 
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(Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006). Brafman and Beckstrom, in their book on leaderless 
organizations, point to examples such as the Apache Indians as a group that endured under 
hardship in a distributed fashion through a governance structure that was based on shared 
purpose and norms that were not tied to a central leader or hierarchy. Tribes are described 
working together for a common purpose without formal control mechanisms or power over each 
other. This is a situation similar to that of emergency responders and law enforcement agencies 
in the United States where there is considerable overlap in jurisdiction, distributed ownership, 
and control over resources, and a lack of unitary command and control. 
Identified below are some of the problems, as identified from the literature and observations 
in the field, which need to be addressed to improve information sharing and collaboration in the 
law enforcement and emergency response communities in the United States (Fedorowicz, 
Markus, Sawyer, Tyworth, &Williams, 2006; Pardo, Gil-Garcia, Burke, 2008; Treglia & Park, 
2009:  
 
 Agencies do not have sufficient trust established between them to share information. 
 Some information is time-sensitive and this affects the potential for sharing of the 
information in these situations.  
 Technical factors such as incompatibility, lack of standards, and system reliability must 
be overcome across the law enforcement community. 
 Policy is not consistent and, in some cases, may not have kept pace with technology or 
society and may conflict with sharing interests. 
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Personnel factors involving social and security concerns may interfere with the information 
sharing processes in organizations. 
4. Research Question 
 
 
Information sharing in law enforcement and emergency response consists of much more than 
gathering intelligence on terrorism-related issues. The sharing involved here encompasses 
sharing information across multiple levels of agencies to enhance the national security of the 
United States and the safety of the American people more broadly. What may be done to 
overcome barriers that hinder information sharing among federal, tribal, state, and local law 
enforcement and emergency response agencies? Could focusing on the problem through a 
common conceptual framework provide insights that help advance both theory and practice? If 
current technological barriers to information sharing are removed, what issues remain or 
emerge? Are there lessons to be learned from successful public safety collaborations that could 
be applicable to others?  
This dissertation suggests possible strategies that may be undertaken to improve appropriate 
information sharing and collaboration across the law enforcement and emergency response 
community. The identified propositions here are empirically investigated utilizing multiple 
research methodologies focusing on a combination of factors, internal and external to the 
systems studied (law enforcement and emergency response agencies).
2 
 
                                                 
2
“Internal” as used in this context has multiple implications which include, as cited from the Encarta North 
American Dictionary, 2011: "1.Self-contained or self-generating, existing, evident in, or arising from the nature, 
structure, or qualities that somebody or something has; 2. Mental, involving or existing within the mind or spirit; 3. 
Occurring within an organization, working at or carried out within an organization or institution." This 
conceptualization and understanding captures the broad social and other non-technical aspects that are the focus of 
this work. 
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 This dissertation examines factors related to information sharing in the law enforcement 
and emergency response community from an insider perspective. In this case, the researcher is a 
member of the public safety community and has access to personnel, information, and material 
that is not available otherwise. Information presented here has been vetted by this researcher and 
some of the participants in the case study for appropriateness to public dissemination.  
 The contribution in this area comes in the form of describing and framing the broader 
issues and describing the environment and influences that operate across the law enforcement 
community to include emergency services. The overarching question that this work will resolve 
involves achieving a greater understanding of the workings and dynamics currently involved in 
the information sharing and collaboration processes, with implications in both the business and 
government sectors. 
 This dissertation asserts that information sharing is affected by factors involving social, 
technical, and policy influencers. The research considers what may be done to overcome internal 
and external barriers that hinder information sharing among federal, tribal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies.  The dissertation as a whole addresses the following propositions:  
 
(P1) Information sharing is affected by social, technical, and policy factors and this 
conceptualization frames the problem of information sharing in a way that it can be 
commonly understood by government and non-government stakeholders. 
 
 Intelligence information sharing is the subject and focus of the first work of this 
dissertation: a theoretical piece identifying a conceptual framework for understanding 
intelligence information sharing and explaining its structure and use (see Figure 2). An 
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application of the framework is tested using data from a national survey of law enforcement 
agencies.  
The next proposition involves the role of technology in information sharing;  
 
(P2) Social and policy factors influence information sharing more than technical factors 
(assuming it is physically possible to connect and/or share). 
 
 Social and policy factors are investigated in the second essay. Here, implications of new 
solutions to technical barriers to information sharing are considered. By having issues 
surrounding connectivity and secure access accounted for the focus becomes more on the social 
and policy factors that impact information sharing systems. This work extends the present 
understanding of technical, social, and policy factors surrounding information sharing.   
A final proposition addressed is that: 
 
(P3) Social factors play the greatest role in the creation and sustaining of information 
sharing relationships. 
 
 Social factors in public safety information sharing, and their impact on the effectiveness 
of information sharing systems and practices, are examined through a case study of the Central 
New York Interoperable Communications Consortium (CNYICC) Network. The CNYICC is a 
five-county collaboration involving law enforcement, public safety, government, and non-
government participants.  
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 These identified propositions are empirically investigated using multiple methodologies 
including case study, interviewing, and policy analysis. The results to date are reported in this 
dissertation. The comic shown below depicts one of the assumptions in this research: that there 
are internal human interests and considerations involved in the process of information sharing 
that must be understood and addressed. The adage "after you" is a polite expression of human 
cooperation. This has another side that speaks to the underlying lack of trust in transactions and 
the belief that there are untold motives that shadow, through informal networks, and influence 
human interactions. These motives can make it less likely that any one party will be a first mover 
in a cooperative arrangement. 
The findings here will provide a greater understanding of the forces that impact the 
agencies under study as they consider information sharing, contribute to the academic and 
professional literature on information sharing and collaboration and will, it is hoped, lead to 
identifiable strategies to solve the problems from a new perspective. 
 
 
“I’ll show you mine if you show me yours” 
Figure 1: Illustrative Cartoon 
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5. Framework 
 
 
A multi-method approach was used in this study to identify major problem areas and 
factors that affect information sharing between law enforcement agencies. The process for this 
research involved literature review, field observation, and use of soft systems methodology. The 
methodology and rationale is described further in the methods section. The factor categories 
identified were chosen following a review the literature and through comments from contacts in 
the public safety field. Aspects of systems theory contributed to the created factor categories. 
Sub-categories included here were prominent in both the literature and mentioned frequently by 
practitioners. The sub-categories presented are not meant to exclusively represent all sub-
categories that may be included under a specific factor category.  The sub-categories within each 
major factor category help identify the concepts and types of activity that may be considered 
within each. 
The problems and issues were identified and ultimately grouped into specified areas or 
factors: Technical, Social, and Policy.  The factors influence information sharing individually 
and collectively.  The factors both affect and are affected by each other. This framework is 
consistent with elements of Socio-Technical Systems (STS) and General Systems Theory (GST), 
as described below and in the sections following.  Important elements include such concepts as 
the interdependence of the relationships between and across entities.  An organizational system 
described from this perspective is comprised of interrelated interacting parts and relationships 
that cannot be correctly described without considering their relationship to the whole or larger 
environment that they operate in (Von Bertalanffy, 1972).   
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Systems models from the business and management fields also shaped the selection and 
formation of the three factor categories.  Information systems in business and organizational 
studies typically identify information systems as being comprised of people, procedures, data, 
software, telecommunications, databases, and hardware that are utilized in combination to 
support a business purpose (Stair & Reynolds, 2011; O’Brien & Marakas, 2008). Additional 
sources from Operations management and information systems similarly identify these, or 
related categories, for system components such as plants, equipment, control procedures and 
policies (Lewis & Slack, 2003; Gupta, 2000).  
The various schemas for categorizing components were considered in consultation with 
fellow researchers and practitioners and ultimately the three factors of Social, Technical, and 
Policy were determined to be inclusive of all system components and descriptive enough to 
provide for a more complete understanding and examination of information sharing systems and 
processes in the public safety realm. The rationale and descriptions of these are provided in 
further detail with cognitive maps depicting the concepts and interrelationships in the sections 
following. 
 Systems models from the business and management fields also shaped the selection and 
formation of the three factor categories.  Information systems in business and organizational 
studies typically identify information systems as being comprised of people, procedures, data, 
software, telecommunications, databases, and hardware that are utilized in combination to 
support a business purpose (Stair & Reynolds, 2011; O’Brien & Marakas, 2008). Additional 
sources from Operations management and information systems similarly identify these or related 
categories for system components such as plants, equipment, control procedures, and policies 
(Lewis & Slack, 2003; Gupta, 2000). The various schemas for categorizing components were 
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considered in consultation with fellow researchers and practitioners and ultimately the three 
factors of Social, Technical, and Policy were determined to be inclusive of all system 
components and descriptive enough to provide for understanding and examination of information 
sharing systems and processes in the public safety realm. 
 Other researchers separately proposed structures for considering the factors in public 
sector information sharing.  Research by Dawes (1996) and Zhang et al. (2005) identify three 
primary influential factors as technology, management and policy.  These are similar to the 
framework created in this dissertation; technical, social, and policy. Yang and Maxwell (2011) 
created a model consisting of three identified perspectives (Technological, Organizational and 
Managerial, and Political and Policy) that influence public sector information sharing. Additional 
perspectives and factors influencing inter-organizational information sharing in the public sector 
are shown in Figure 9.  
 This section provides a detailed identification of the problems that exist in the area of 
information sharing in law enforcement and the proposed means for addressing these factors 
through a coordinated plan of research. The conceptual framework is shown in Figure 2 below.  
The developed framework for information sharing illustrates the identified problem areas, 
or conceptual areas, for research focus. The final framework that was produced includes 
technical, social, and policy factor categories.  
These three identifiable factor categories were identified as each having a role in 
influencing whether or not information is ultimately shared. Technical factors include 
interoperability issues, responsiveness, and control. Social factors involve trust, informal 
networks, culture, and importance. Policy factors involve concerns over what can be shared and 
under what governance model or structure are activities allowed or restricted and include 
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legal/policy considerations. Each area operates in its own sphere and the three spheres 
independently and collectively impact information sharing. Their relationship and impact on 
information sharing is being depicted here, and not all of the interrelationships across the 
identified factors.  
Information
SharingSocial
Trust
Culture
Informal Network
Criticality
Policy
Regulation
Policy Conflict
Governance
Technical
Interoperability
Availability
Control
 
Figure 2: Information Sharing Problem Areas and Research Map 
(Treglia & Park, 2009) 
 
Social factors impact and are influenced by technical capability and constraints and 
policy, social factors, and technology each shape are shaped by one another.  A more 
comprehensive, expanded, version of this framework would depict those influences as well, 
having bi-directional connections between and across all three factors. A goal here was to create 
a simple framework that would organize the issues and problems in a way that creates a common 
ground for discussion and research in this area.  
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II. CHAPTER - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide an overview of relevant theoretical and empirical literature and 
research pertinent to the studies in this dissertation. The focus here is on selected theories and 
topic areas that pertain to aspects of information sharing and collaboration in public safety and to 
the three essays that are included in this dissertation. This chapter consists of eight major 
sections: introduction, definitions, research on information sharing, selected theories and 
concepts, social factors, technical factors, policy factors and a summary of the literature review.  
 
2. Definitions 
 
2.1 Information 
 
Information as used in this dissertation refers to any data, observation or activity, that 
may be captured and shared for a public, business, or individual purpose. Information is defined 
here in three parts.  The United States Department of Defense defines information as:  
 
1. Any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, data, or opinion in any 
medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, or 
audiovisual forms. 
2. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 
21 
 
 
3. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in 
their representation. (U.S. DOD, 2007, p.24) 
 
Information is related in this conceptualization to evidence. Evidence, in the law 
enforcement community and as taken from the Harvard Law Review, includes “all the means by 
which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is established 
or disproved” (Thayer, 1889, p142). This is a definition that has been effective to the present 
day. The definition is meant to be broad and all encompassing. 
2.2 Intelligence Information 
 
 Intelligence information is defined as any gathered facts or data that relate to an actual or 
impending occurrence of any incident, criminal or non-criminal. Information such as suspicious 
activity reports or observations of a less-obvious nature but which may be related to criminal or 
other activity, and which may be cause for concern are included in this definition. Intelligence 
information also includes knowledge about resources that an agency or community may have 
that may be important to crisis responders or criminal investigators. These could be physical, 
such as the location of alternate fuel resources for emergencies, or non-physical, such as the 
contact information for important human services providers. This may include what is 
considered sensitive information by Thompson and Kaarst-Brown (2005). Knowledge and 
intelligence cross disciplines such as those from outside the intelligence community (Kulkanni, 
Ravindran, & Freeze, 2007). An incident of suspicious nature could be considered “suspicious 
activity” or “information” depending upon the circumstances. Deciding whether something is 
considered and captured as “intelligence information” is subjective. It is up to the discretion of 
the officer or person involved.  
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2.3 Collaboration 
 
Collaboration, as used in this dissertation, involves an interaction where two or more parties 
work together towards a common purpose.  Parallel work without an intentional or knowing 
connection is not considered collaborative work. Individuals and entities may collaborate with 
each other and across levels.  This is consistent with the Miriam-Webster dictionary definition 
for the term: “1) to work jointly with others or together especially in an intellectual endeavor; 2) 
to cooperate with or willingly assist an enemy of one’s country and especially an occupying 
force; 3) to cooperate with an agency or instrumentality with which one is not immediately 
connected” (Merriam-Webster, 2012).  In this dissertation, collaboration is argued to be an 
element affiliated with cooperation and information sharing. 
Collaboration in business has been well studied in the literature (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; 
Mattessich, Murray-Close, & Monsey, 2001). As used in this dissertation collaboration and 
cooperation have similar meaning and application. Axelrod posits regarding cooperation that 
reciprocity in interactions between persons creates positive relationships over time that is durable 
when fully established (1981). The term “Tit for tat” is used in describing this reciprocal 
interactive relationship that is observed to occur between persons in cooperative activity. 
Positive cooperation evolving in such an environment would be subject to change where one 
party defects or acts out of self-interest or taking an advantage, therefore breaking established 
trust and commitment. These relationships can be repaired (Rocco, 1998). The establishment of 
behavioral norms among those working together can act as a control measure even where no 
central authority or structure is in place (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Axelrod, 1986; Brafman & 
Beckstrom, 2006). 
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Collaboration has been described as a process where “autonomous or semi-autonomous 
actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures 
governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; 
it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions (Thomson, Perry, & 
Miller, 2011). This conceptualization of collaboration is one of the few in the literature created 
through consideration of nine separate studies.  It describes collaboration as a multidimensional 
and variable construct comprised of five dimensions: governance and administration, which are 
structural in nature, mutuality and norms, which involve social capital dimensions, and 
organizational autonomy, which involves agency. 
Collaboration success can be difficult to quantify or describe. Several studies and approaches 
have been taken to measure and describe collaboration outcomes and activity (Westphal, 
Thoben, & Seifert, 2008).  Kothari, MacLean, Edwards and Hobbs (2011) note that traditional 
mechanisms and indicators for measurement of cooperation are not well established.  Thomson, 
Perry and Miller developed a multidimensional model of collaboration using data from a survey 
of national service program participants (2009). From that study five key dimensions are 
described that form an overall construct of collaboration. Collaborating with partners is an 
essential competency for business entities. This is no different in the public safety realm. 
Kuenzel  and Welscher report that there are eight factors important to “Public Safety 
Collaboration Success” (2009). The eight success factors are explained below and serve as an 
essential frame-work for analyzing and regulating collaboration processes: 
1. Relevance and Sense of Urgency: The need to collaborate can emerge from political 
strategy; improvement in services; civil society and media exerting pressure on the public 
sector to change the policies.   
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2. Incentives and Benefits: The reciprocal benefit from partnership can arise from the 
interest of each member. 
3. People & Roles: The success in collaboration depends directly on establishing a social 
system wherein the individuals must have interpersonal relationship and a mindset for 
collaboration. 
4. Organizational Structure: It is because of the organizational structure that collaboration 
from the individuals, having political and social relationships, is mostly sought. 
5. Reflection & Learning: It is the changing environment which makes the collaboration 
process to take place. Collaboration thus demands that all the partners must have a great 
deal of reflection and knowledge. 
6. Skills and Capabilities: A variety of skills are needed for the collaboration to be feasible. 
These skills pertain management, strategic aptitude, negotiating and communicating 
capabilities. 
7. Resources: The more the resources the more the collaboration. The scope and duration of 
collaboration determines the amount of resources required. 
8. Outside Support & Supervision: when collaboration has admittance to external support it 
can easily achieve its targeted goals.       
The authors suggest that the eight identified success factors (above) must be made part of the 
design and operation of a collaboration to have the highest probability of achieving its desired 
public safety objectives (Kuenzel & Welscher, 2009). 
 Current thinking in the area of cooperation, and it is argued here collaboration, involves 
extending the basis of cooperation from being focused on longer term relationships and gain than 
the short term or individual gain focus (Axelrod, 1997). Participants in public safety agencies 
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must cooperate under varied conditions that involve discontinuities of information regarding the 
other parties they interact with and their degree of control.  They may work together for a single 
incident or have ongoing relationships where they must share information and cooperate in an 
ongoing basis.  
This dissertation proposes to expand the conception of collaboration to involve governments, 
non-governmental organizations, communities, and individuals in response to crisis incidents.  
The current conception of resilience
3
 includes “inclusive strategies that integrate both resistance 
(prevent, protect) and resilience (respond, recover) in the face of disasters” (Longstaff, 
Armstrong, Perrin, Parker, & Hidek, 2010). This is consistent with the notion of involving the 
“whole community” in preparation and response activities. 
 
2.4 Formalization 
 
Formalization refers to the extent to which tasks or obligations are structured within an 
organization or entity, and the degree to which these activities are governed by identifiable rules 
and procedures. Other, early, definitions of the concept of formalization include “ … statements 
of procedures, rules, roles, and operation of procedures which deal with (a) decision seeking 
(applications for capital, employment, and so on), (b) conveying of decisions and instructions 
(plans, minutes, requisitions and so on), and (c) conveying of information, including feedback" 
(Hall, Johnson, & Haas, 1967; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, Macdonald, Turner, & Lupton, 1963). 
Measurement of organizational formalization has been operationalized as "… the proportion of 
codified jobs and the range of variation that is tolerated within the rules defining the jobs, the 
                                                 
3
 Resilience as used here is consistent with the definition used by the multi-disciplinary Resilience Alliance: “the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, undergo change, and retain the same essential functions, structure, 
identity, and feedbacks” (Longstaff, et al., 2010, p. 3). 
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higher the proportion of codified jobs and the less the range of variation allowed, the more 
formalized the organization” (Aiken & Hage, 1966, p. 499; Hage, 1965, p. 295). Change 
processes become legitimized over time and become stabilized (Kaarst-Brown, 1999). 
Sales (2010) suggest that formalization of policy has positive effects on the organization 
and can improve information sharing.  Others see formal systems as potentially less effective in 
facilitating information sharing than informal ones (Hall & Tolbert, 2004; Kim & Lee, 2006; 
Willem & Buelens, 2007). It may be that having informal policy leads to increased openness and 
greater interaction and communication in an organization (Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2000; Kim & 
Lee, 2006). The case of the CNYICC demonstrates operation of a collaboration having less 
formal structures in its development stages. For longer term mature operation of collaborations 
the need for greater formalization may arise.   
 
2.5 Information Sharing 
 
In this dissertation, information sharing, intelligence information sharing and collaboration 
are discussed. Federal, state, and local enforcement and emergency response agencies have a 
number of ways to share intelligence and other information: electronically, through paper 
systems, and through formal and informal personal contacts so the goal of this research is to 
discern why this does not happen.  
The term information sharing in public safety gained popularity as a result of the 9/11 
Commission hearings and report of the United States government's lack of response to 
information that was known about planned terrorist attacks on the New York City World Trade 
Towers prior to the events. This led to the enactment of several executive orders by President 
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George W. Bush mandating agencies implement policies to "share information" across 
organizational boundaries (United States, 2007).   
Information sharing can be defined as “making information available to participants (people, 
processes, or systems)” (USDOD, 2007).  The leveraging of this information by parties involved 
is also included in this broad, simple, conceptualization. Information sharing, in the public 
sector, has been defined generally as “exchanging or otherwise giving other agencies access to 
information” (Zheng, 2009, p.27). Researchers clarify that information sharing refers to tacit 
knowledge as well as to explicit artifacts and codifiable information (Yang & Maxwell, 2011). In 
the fields of business and marketing, information sharing is defined as “the extent to which the 
supplier openly shares information about the future that may be useful to the customer 
relationship” (Cannon, & Homburg, 2001). This indicates a value potential for information, 
which is sometime paralleled in public safety where agencies share information that may help 
them solve a case or apply for a funding opportunity. Information sharing is also defined as the 
degree to which partners proactively provide critical and confidential information to each other 
(Phan, Styles, & Patterson, 2005). This means that information is provided without one side 
having to ask for it. 
 
3. Research on Information Sharing 
 
 There is a great deal of research that has been done in the area of information sharing and 
law enforcement since 1990.  Prior to the 9/11 tragedy there were fewer than 100 academic 
articles produced in this area, according to a search conducted through Harzing's Publish or 
Perish. Publications with "information sharing" and "law enforcement" were tracked from 1990 
to 2011 using this same resource (Publish or Perish) resulting in figures showing a steady 
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increase in these publications per year from 99 in 1990 to 1710 in 2009. There is a significant 
amount of time and resources being devoted to research in this broad area, as the Figure 3 below 
attest. Within this larger topic area, there are segments of targeted attention and interest, which 
attract less attention and there remains much work to be done.  
 
 
Figure 3: Information Sharing and Law Enforcement Articles 
(Created using Harzing's Publish or Perish, January 15, 2011 - Treglia, 2011) 
 
 The study of Information Systems "deals with the deployment of information technology 
in organizations, institutions, and society at large” (Ciborra, 2002). Another definition claims 
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that "information systems are also social systems whose behavior is heavily influenced by the 
goals, values and beliefs of individuals and groups, as well as the performance of the 
technology" (Angell & Smithson 1991, p.17).   
 Identified problems and recurrent themes related to information sharing are grouped here 
into distinct areas or factors; Technical, Social, and Policy.  These factors influence information 
sharing both individually and collectively, and both affect and are affected by one another. The 
information-sharing framework described in this dissertation derived from a broad initial focus 
on information sharing in the law enforcement and public safety communities. This framework is 
consistent with elements of Socio-Technical Systems (STS) and General Systems Theory (GST), 
as described in the sections following.  Important elements include such concepts as the 
interdependence of the relationships between and across entities.   
 Systems models from the business and management fields shaped the selection and 
formation of the factor categories.  Information systems in business and organizational studies 
typically identify information systems as being comprised of people, procedures, data, software, 
telecommunications, databases, and hardware that are utilized in combination to support a 
business purpose (Stair & Reynolds, 2011; O’Brien & Marakas, 2008). Sources from Operations 
management and information systems identify related categories for system components as 
plants, equipment, control procedures, and policies (Lewis & Slack, 2003; Gupta, 2000). Various  
factor categories were considered in consultation with fellow researchers and practitioners and 
ultimately Social, Technical, and Policy factors were determined to be inclusive of all system 
components and descriptive enough to provide understanding and examination of information 
sharing systems and processes in public safety. 
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 Interestingly other researchers have separately proposed similar structures for considering 
factors in public sector information sharing.  Interagency information sharing research by Dawes 
(1996) and research on knowledge sharing in e-Government by Zhang et al. (2005) identify three 
primary influential factors as technology, management and policy.  These are constructively 
similar to the framework created and presented in this research; technical, social, and policy. 
Yang and Maxwell (2011) have recently proposed that three identified perspectives 
(Technological, Organizational and Managerial, and Political and Policy) influence public sector 
information sharing and they created a model using those three perspectives (shown in Figure 8). 
 
4. Selected Theories and Concepts 
 
4.1 General Systems Theory 
 
 General Systems Theory (GST) is interdisciplinary and involves examining and 
understanding phenomenon as a system of interrelated components that contribute to overall 
outcomes (Ackoff, 1971). GST is alternatively referred to as Systems theory, Open systems 
theory, and as Systemic theory.  Ludwig von Bertalanffy is credited with founding this theory 
(Von Bertalanffy, 1972).  In GST, the emphasis is on the interaction of the identified elements of 
a system with their situated environment. Research is most typically done at the system level of 
analysis. GST is a holistic approach that recognizes action or influence as specific to a given 
environment where multiple forces interactively affect outcomes. 
The systems approach is described by Churchman as “a set of parts coordinated to 
accomplish a set of goals” (Churchman, 1979). He identified five basic considerations for 
conceptualizing the meaning of a system:  
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1. The total system objectives, and more specifically, the performance 
    measures of the whole system. 
2. The system’s environment; the fixed constraints; 
3. The resources of the system; 
4. The components of the system, their activities, goals, and measures of 
    performance; 
5. The management of the system. (Churchman, 1979, p. 29) 
 
He also emphasizes that systems are always embedded within larger systems and that the 
entirety is encompassed within or situated in an identifiable environment. The environment is not 
under the control of the systems within it.  Systems are also viewer and problem-dependent in 
the view of Churchman. Various observers may describe a system and each interprets it 
differently, possibly due to their individual purposes. This is not to say one is more correct than 
another (Alter, 1999). 
In regards to systems, Kuhn identifies a common element as the relationship of any given 
part to the others. Kuhn notes that “knowing one part of a system enables to know something 
about another part" (Kuhn, 1974).  He adds as well that, "the information content of a 'piece of 
information' is proportional to the amount of information that can be inferred from the 
information" (Walonick, 1993; Kuhn, 1974). It is anticipated that this interrelatedness will be 
found as well in the law enforcement and emergency response information sharing realms. 
 Systems are generally studied following cross-sectional or developmental approaches: 
looking at the interaction between two systems and looking at systems over a period of time 
(Walonick, 1993).  
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This dissertation involved comparing systems to known or other entities as well as 
looking at the operation of these systems in the law enforcement and emergency response arenas 
over time.  Public safety agencies interact as a group with many interrelated parts and 
interdependent elements in response to crises. They have a shared or common purpose. They can 
act and be observed as a complex whole.  Later in this dissertation this behavior is also described 
as stigmergic. Approaches for evaluating subsystems include using a holistic approach, looking 
at the entire system and relationships, which in this case involve social, technical and policy 
implications. The law enforcement and emergency response community is well entrenched with 
technology and that relationship is worthy of additional special attention. 
 
4.2 Socio-technical Systems Theory 
 
 Socio-technical Systems Theory looks at systems in organizations as comprised of people 
using tools, processes and knowledge to create something of value or for a defined purpose 
(Bostrom & Heinen, 1977; Mumford, 2000; Trist, 1981). An important consideration in this 
theory is recognition that "every socio-technical system is embedded in an environment that 
affects the way it behaves" (Mumford, 2003). The emphasis is on understanding the two-way 
relationship that exists between the technology and users, recognizing that each impact or 
influence one another. This includes technology and society (Bijker, 1997). This is a critical 
distinction in STS. 
 Many authors are associated with writings in this area. Bostrom and Heinen (1977) wrote 
on Management Information Systems (MIS) problems and failures: A socio-technical 
perspective. Cherns provides principles of sociotechnical design in “The principles of 
sociotechnical design” in 1976 and updated this work in “Principles of Sociotechnical Design 
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Revisited,” in 1987.  Bijker (1997) describes his theory of sociotechnical change , including that 
technology and society are both human constructs, in ‘Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward 
a Theory of Sociotechnical Change (Inside Technology).  
Other authorship includes Davenport (2008), Social informatics and sociotechnical 
research—a view from the UK; Lamb, Sawyer, & Kling (2000), A Social Informatics 
Perspective on Socio-Technical Networks; Emery (1997), The next thirty years: Concepts, 
methods and anticipations. Social informatics involves interdisciplinary study of the creation and 
use of information technology while taking into account its interaction with institutional and 
cultural contexts (Sawyer & Rosenbaum, 2000; Lamb, Sawyer, & Kling, 2000). 
Additional early authors include Heller (1997), Socio-technology and the Environment; 
Leavitt (1965), Applied organization change in industry: Structural, technical, and human 
approaches; new perspectives in organizational research; Mumford and Hawgood (1980), 
Training the Systems Analyst of the 1980's: Four New Design Tools to Assist the Design 
Process; Trist & Murray (1993), The Social Engagement of Social Science: A Tavistock 
Anthology (vol. II).  This is not comprehensive, but does identify some associated authors and 
works in the area of socio-technical systems and related perspectives such as social informatics.  
 Under the heading of socio-technical theory task, technology, structure, and people are 
critical components of a work or information sharing and communications system.  Bostrom and 
Heinen identified this as a matrix of interaction with the people and work or organizational 
structures as the social system interacting with each other and with the Technical system, 
including the technology and tasks as shown in Figure 4 below (Bostrom & Heinen, 1977).  
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Figure 4: The Interacting Variable Classes within a Work System 
(Bostrom & Heinen, 1977) 
  
 This early conceptualization is relevant today although, in the time of its origin, they may 
not have conceived of the vast technological linkages and capacity of today. Still, the interplay of 
people, technology and process were becoming evident then and there is, perhaps, a more 
common understanding of this now.  
 Dawes investigates governance in the digital age and includes in this work consideration 
of socio-technical principals in the e-government sector (Dawes, 2008). Dawes proposes that 
borders will be less defined and that "technological aspects become embedded in a more organic 
notion of governance" improving service delivery through a "more holistic understanding and 
better informed policies and decisions" (Dawes, 2008). 
 What is notable here is the specific identification by Uzzi (1997, 2007) that critical 
transactions depend on social connections and relationships. Social aspects of information 
sharing are an important part of the conceptual framework referred to in Part IV this dissertation 
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(Treglia & Park, 2009).  This is but one study that acknowledges this element in the context of 
information sharing.  Technology alignment with the organizations structures and individual 
roles has been examined (Barley, 1990). Collective capability for information sharing was 
studied by Orlikowski (2002). More recently socio-material practices in the workplace were 
investigated by Orlikowski in 2007. As previously identified, the social impacts on actual 
practice and use of information and communication technologies is important in this 
investigation. This is consistent with the socio-technical notion of both technology and humans 
simultaneously exerting agency over the system (Rose & Jones, 2005). Researchers must look 
not only at the processes and structures in law enforcement and emergency response, but include 
the technology and individual’s reaction to or changes based on it. 
In the law enforcement and emergency response area, one can expect to gain a richer 
understanding of information sharing issues by looking at the environment through this 
perspective and GST. 
4.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Stakeholder theory is a paradigm for understanding the operation of business, or 
organization, as it relates to various stakeholder interests. This was initially proposed by R. 
Edward Freeman in Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984) (Freeman, Harrison, 
Wicks, Parmar, & De Colle, 2010). Stakeholder theory has a managerial focus looking at how 
one understands what goes into decisions, and thereafter actions, by people in organizations. 
Stakeholders are an expanded group that includes owners, employees, investors, customers, 
suppliers, communities and others (Hosseini & Brenner, 2009). The inclusion and participation 
of stakeholders and stakeholder groups in solving system-wide problems has been recognized 
and important and proposed in the literature (Freeman, 1984 & 2010). The self-interests and 
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motivation of the participants and stakeholders in an organization, or a system as argued here, 
impact the operation of the organization but are not well predicted. The organization seeks to fill 
the needs of the stakeholders.  Looking at “the relationship between a business and the groups 
and individuals who can affect or are affected by it” is an approach of Stakeholder theory 
(Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, & Colle, 2010, p.4). Individual interests may not always 
align with overall organizational goals. A broadened view encompasses the notion of humans, 
institutions and organizations as stakeholders in humanity, the natural environment being a 
stakeholder as well (Waddock, 2011). 
 The Integrated Non-Filer Compliance System used by the State of California Franchise 
Tax Board was used to study barriers to inter-organizational information sharing. In that study 
researchers drew upon stakeholder theory (Fedorowicz, Gogan, & Culnan, 2010). They proposed 
a four stakeholder group typology including: data controllers, data subjects, data providers, and 
secondary stakeholders that they used to mitigate participant concerns about privacy. Authors 
posit that privacy concerns act as a barrier to information sharing and that by improving the 
perception of the systems fairness greater adoption will be achieved. Accounting for stakeholder 
concerns over things such as perceived fairness was identified as impacting system success 
(Fedorowicz et al., 2010).  
Other studies examine government agencies and public safety agencies as points of 
interest. A case study of the New York State Department of Public Service was conducted that 
investigated regional telecommunications incident response, which produced a model of 
coordination that recommends new business and communications processes be established that 
better account for stakeholder needs (Canestraro, Pardo, Raup-Kounovsky, & Taratus, 2009). 
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4.4 Knowledge Networks 
 
A combined study of multiple public management projects in New York State was 
conducted that focused on identifying information sharing and knowledge network problems and 
issues. Authors identify and describe creation of “public sector knowledge networks” (PSKNs) 
that “treat information and knowledge sharing across traditional organizational boundaries as a 
primary purpose as they try to address public needs that no single organization or jurisdiction can 
handle alone” (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009, p.392). 
PSKNs are also sociotechnical systems having mutually influential human, 
organizational, technical, and institutional aspects related to processes, practices, software, and 
other information technologies. Knowledge networking, as a form of information sharing, 
requires particular skills and attitudes. Findings from the literature include that network 
development processes emphasizing an interactive dialog with stakeholders are likely to succeed 
(Dawes et al., 2009). The system development processes should be free from the bias of having a 
pre-defined solution. In the case study of the CNYICC included in this dissertation, it is also 
argued that social factors are most important to collaboration relationships. In addition to those 
factors having innovative leadership, access to resources, and authority for the action was found 
to lead to greater sustainability. Again, these are social characteristics. PSKN’s involved in the 
study by Dawes, Cresswell, and Pardo included those for: homeless shelters, real property 
assessment, geographic information coordination, central accounting, justice information sharing 
(several state-level justice agencies – police, corrections, parole, and central coordinating agency 
- developing e-Justice New York – information portal), and municipal finance oversight (Dawes, 
Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009). 
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4.5 Cross Boundary Information Sharing 
 
 A specialized research area within information sharing known as cross-boundary 
information sharing is significant to understanding collaboration activity.  This conceptualization 
involves law enforcement, emergency response personnel, government, and non-government 
entities sharing information across their respective domains with each other. Having the 
capability to access, digest, and apply data and knowledge from the multitude of potential 
sources during critical incidents and crisis has been called paramount for decision makers and 
responders. According to Steven Ramage, Executive Director, Open Geospatial Consortium 
(OGC), cross-boundary information sharing is about overcoming various boundaries between: 
"Industry, government, academia and the public; Disciplines, professions and industries; Levels 
of government, local jurisdictions; Nations, languages and regions; Different technologies and 
different vendor products; Legacy systems and new components and solutions." 
Improving information sharing across agencies is cross-boundary information sharing.
4
 
The U.S. Department of Justice created a series of podcasts in 2010 through the Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (BJA) which includes a video on information sharing across agencies and 
boundaries: "The Role of Information Sharing in Counter-Terrorism Investigation and 
Prevention."  The multi-media presentation includes a discussion on federal, state, and local anti-
terrorism activities (IT.OJP, 2010). From 2008, international level efforts were underway at the 
Center for Technology in Government, together with the University at Albany, to create an 
"International Research program in Cross-boundary Information Sharing" (Mulki, Lei Zheng, 
Yang & Pardo, 2008).  This program is focused on gaining new knowledge regarding cross-
                                                 
4
 Works that may be considered in this area include: Gil-Garcia et al., 2010; IT.OJP, 2010; Pardo, 2006; Pardo & 
Tayi, 2007; Pardo, Gil-Garcia & Burke, 2008; Zheng, Dawes & Pardo, 2009. 
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boundary information in international contexts, and draws on current research in this area with 
an aim towards new theory development.  
Trust is a concern in cross-boundary information sharing.  Here, three types of trust are 
observed by researches: calculus-based, identity-based, and institution-based (Dawes, Cresswell, 
& Pardo, 2009; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998).  For calculus-based trust, the 
participant must have the means to assess trustworthiness of the other party to make a decision. 
This is not always possible in transactions.  Identity-based trust is based on having established 
relationships with the other party. Institution-based trust is based on the organizational culture, 
norms, policy, and institutional structures of the entity itself that form the basis of trust or 
distrust. Actions based on trust are affected by personal and organizational influences and 
perception.  Other aspects of trust are identified and examined in the section following below.  
The well-respected MITRE research corporation is exploring technical aspects of cross-
boundary information sharing. The Cross-Boundary Information Sharing (XBIS) Laboratory at 
MITRE provides an unclassified integration and demonstration lab capturing state-of-the-art 
technologies and processes in the field of cross-boundary information sharing. The goal of the 
Lab is to show what can be done presently with a focus on the future potential (MITRE, 2009) as 
social and technical factors in cross-boundary information sharing initiatives are investigated. 
Ultimately, the goal is to improve information sharing across the law enforcement, emergency 
response and other communities. 
 Most scholars recognize the great potential rewards that use of information and 
communication technologies for integration of information across organizational boundaries can 
provide (Pardo & Tayi, 2007). According to Pardo & Tayi (2007) true interorganizational 
information integration and networking has the potential to radically transform organizational 
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structures and communications channels across agencies and geography; it does, however, entail 
human and organizational, technical, and organizational process and behavior changes (Pardo & 
Tayi, 2007). Doing so includes benefits, such as improved information sharing and decision-
making, as well as presents new challenges.  
 "Information integration as well as information sharing offers organizations a greater 
capacity to share information across organizational boundaries, to discover patterns and 
interactions, and to make better informed decisions based on more complete data" (Dawes,1996). 
Dawes (1996) described a three-category classification of benefits: technical, organizational, and 
political (Pardo & Tayi, 2007). Gil-García et al. created what they call an Information Integration 
Complexity Matrix to look at issues and complexity in cross-boundary information sharing 
initiatives (Gil-García & Pardo, 2005). Network measurement, quantification, political, 
economic, and other benefit analysis has been investigated (Milward & Provan, 1998; 
Rethmeyer, 2005; Young-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999). These studies provide different means or 
tools for measuring and reporting the value or contribution of information sharing within 
organizations.  They also provide a method for assessing complexity so that decisions regarding 
system implementation or use may be better informed. 
4.6 Interorganizational Networks 
 
 
 Interorganizational networks can play a critical role in the response to crises and are 
essential to law enforcement and emergency operations.  "When government, communities, 
foundations, or regional industry groups think about how they can improve their economy, 
disaster preparedness, competitiveness, health and well-being of citizens, and so on, 
collaboration through an interorganizational network is an approach that is increasingly utilized" 
(Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007).  Public safety networks operate similar to interorganizational 
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networks. Anticipated outcomes are more encompassing than that which could be achieved 
through independent action.  
4.6.1. Public Safety Networks 
  
 The formation of Public Safety Networks (PSNs) as information sharing networks was 
studied (Sawyer et al., 2007; Williams et al., 2009). That study focused on Public Safety 
Networks (PSNs) created for use at the state-level in the United States and involved a mix of law 
enforcement and other emergency response and support agencies. Using factors derived from 
both rational choice and institutional theories, the authors describe the size and maturity of state-
level PSNs and propose a set of factors that may predict public safety collaboration (Williams et 
al., 2010).  
Preliminary work exploring conditions for cooperation between emergency management 
agencies has been done where perceived information assurance of others and having information 
sharing standards were found to be more strongly related to information sharing than were 
cultural norms in emergency contexts (Lee & Rao, 2007). Aspects of Public Safety Network 
(PSN) formation and continuation, as collaborations that share information at the state level, 
were studied (Sawyer, Schrier, Fedorowicz, Dias, Williams, & Tyworth, 2012). A finding 
regarding PSN development included that institutional factors provided the most significant 
coefficient indicating a state’s culture of endorsing technological advances, collaboration, 
transparent sharing of data, or other administrative reforms (Williams, Fedorowicz, & Tomasino, 
2010; Sawyer & Fedorowicz, 2012). Some reasons various level (local or regional) public safety 
networks formed include: a galvanizing critical incident or public safety need, governmental 
order or mandate, and an identified funding source supporting the initiative (Sawyer, 
Fedorowicz, Tyworth, Markus, & Williams, 2007; Williams, Dias, Fedorowicz, Jacobson, 
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Vilvovsky, Sawyer, & Tyworth, 2009).  A finding of this dissertation includes that at least in one 
North American case study public safety officials formed a consortium for interoperable 
communications based not on those reasons but for higher-order interests such as the public good 
(Treglia, 2012).   
These proposed factors do not directly address information sharing issues solely within 
the law enforcement community; rather they pertain to public safety networks which have law 
enforcement participants. The PNSs are important to consider as they represent collaborations 
that involve several types of agencies, structures, and cultures.  Lessons learned on collaboration 
and information sharing apply to the law enforcement and emergency response communities.  
 
5. Social Factors 
 
Social factors as a focus area is comprised of sub-categories of trust, social issues, 
culture, informal or "shadow" networks, criticality, and quality.  The categories elaborated on in 
this section were chosen following a review the literature and through comments from contacts 
in the public safety field. The sub-categories were prominent in the literature and mentioned 
frequently. The sub-categories help identify the types of activities and concepts that fit within 
this category. The categories do not exclusively represent all of the sub-categories that could be 
focused on in the social category.  The categories identified are further elaborated on in the 
following section. 
5.1 Trust 
 
 Trust is placed within the Social factor category. Trust literature “distinguishes 
trustworthiness (the ability, benevolence, and integrity of a trustee) and trust propensity (a 
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dispositional willingness to rely on others) from trust (the intention to accept vulnerability to a 
trustee based on positive expectations of his or her actions)” (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007, 
p.909).  
Trust is a significant factor in information sharing and collaboration. It has special 
meaning in the context of public safety.  As used here, trust manifests itself in agencies through 
human action. Persons can trust, or not trust, agencies or individuals.  It will be identified later as 
well that trust can apply to a process.  A user’s sense of trust is not strictly binary and can be 
understood as involving levels of greater or lesser trust (Rasavi & Iverson, 2009). Trust can be 
earned and in the case of emergency responders it is also the case that trust can be an essential 
attribute that is attached to a person or agency by nature of their being a “fellow” officer or 
department that may have to work together in a critical event or investigation at present or in the 
future. Reciprocity describes trust as a social exchange process where, even though a 
contribution may be provided by one party without an identified return, there is an implicit 
understanding that there will be some (reciprocal) reward in the future (Ostrom & Walker, 2005, 
p. 232).  A more detailed consideration of trust, trust categories, and its use in this dissertation is 
included in this section, as well as in different contexts in the individual essays. It should be 
noted that in this dissertation trust is also looked at specifically within and across law 
enforcement and emergency response practitioners. 
Members of agencies may refuse to share information because they do not trust other 
participating agencies who may gain access to or control over the information (Carter, 2005; 
Drake, Steckler, & Koch, 2004).  This can be a bias due to reputation of the organization or of 
one or more individuals within the organization. Issues of trust and acceptance of existing or 
proposed information sharing systems are continuing concerns for organizations (Cresswell, 
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Pardo, & Hassan 2007; Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007). At the organization level, different 
agencies may not individually trust other agencies that participate and have access to the 
information that is shared on a collaborative information system. Agencies may choose not to 
submit their data into an information system, or to participate meaningfully in its governance, 
where they do not trust or approve of the owners of the system.  Agencies may not trust one 
another as they compete for recognition, funding, or other resources and this has an impact on 
their motivation for information sharing as they each may be looking out for their own 
constituencies and special interests. This competitive aspect of trust is discussed in greater detail 
in later sections. 
 The problem of trust may stem in part from instances of corruption that have been shown 
to occur at all agency levels (Butterfield, 2009; Fjeldstad, 2004; Newburn & Webb, 1999; 
O’Neill, 2006).  Agencies maintain confidential and personal information both in their systems 
and employees. Agencies also maintain and share information as to who their undercover 
officers are and where they operate so various agency investigations and enforcement activities 
do not overlap or interfere with one another.  Information such as locations of sting operations or 
law enforcement fronts for illegal operations is shared at appropriate agency and organizational 
levels to ensure officer and operational safety and reduce the possibility for overlaps. 
Information such as this can have the gravest of consequences if not properly protected. A 
Sheriff (Chief Law Enforcement Officer for the county) in the state of Virginia was one of 
several officers engaging in corrupt behavior that included a department captain, three sergeants, 
and other agency personnel. According to the indictment, the Sheriff tipped off targets of the 
investigation, lied to investigators, and helped the suspect in the investigation launder drug 
profits (O'Neill, 2006).  Another public example involved John J. Connolly Jr., an FBI Agent 
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convicted for secretly aiding organized crime leaders in Boston. This became the subject of the 
2006 crime film "The Departed” and became well known to all levels of law enforcement.  In the 
area of the country where Connolly worked, other law enforcement agencies suspected a source 
in the FBI was disseminating information when wiretap operations against certain targets 
consistently failed. As a result of those suspicions poor relations developed between the Boston 
office and other law enforcement agencies (Butterfield, 2009). In another case, a top official of 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Harold Nicholson, was charged with selling United 
States secrets to the Russians; in 1994, another CIA official, Aldrich Ames, was convicted of 
selling secrets to Russians, which may have resulted in the execution of persons inside the Soviet 
Union (Nicholson, 1996). These are but a few representative examples of the misuse of 
information by members of the law enforcement community. It is naive and unrealistic to build 
policy on a foundational notion that all law enforcement agencies should automatically be trusted 
simply because they are public safety entities. 
Some agencies may not trust the security of the information systems available to them or 
the networks that support those systems. The security of a system as used here is taken from the 
United States Code (44 U.S.C. § 3542) and refers to (Zargar, Weiss, Caicedo, & Joshi, 2009): 
 
"Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, 
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide; (A) 
integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or 
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity; 
(B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and 
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary 
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information; and (C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable 
access to and use of information. " 
 
 Trust is a significant factor in regards to information sharing and collaboration. It has 
been introduced here as an identified problem area. The range of factors that affect trust and the 
various forms of trust are examined in greater detail in the literature section.  
 
5.1.1 Trust Described 
 
 Trust is a key influencer of sharing behavior. Trust, in various forms, is well recognized 
in academic and professional literature as a major component to building and sustaining sharing 
relationships among agencies (Gil-Garcia, Guler, Pardo, & Burke, 2010; Akbulut et al., 2009; 
Canestraro et al., 2009; Dyer & Chu, 2003). Trust at the personal and agency levels was 
identified as one of the most significant factors related to successful collaboration by public 
safety partners (Treglia, 2012). In this dissertation, trust refers to the degree in which a person 
with information is willing to share this directly or indirectly with another. This 
conceptualization includes transfer both within the agency and outward to another. Indirect 
sharing would involve such things as making data available through a system that is accessible to 
others.  
Trust has been identified as an area of concern in much of the information systems and 
management research.
5
 Trust works that were made part of this research include those 
                                                 
5
 A list of trust works considered in this research include: Gao, 2005; Humenn, Chin, Kosiyatrakul, Older & 
Northrup, 2004; Ostrom & Walker, 2005; Jing & Pengzhu, 2007; Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa, 2004; Lee, 2006; Lee, 
Huynh & Hirschheim, 2008; Xiong & Liu, 2004; McKnight, Choudhury & Kacmar, 2002; Niu, 2007; Razavi & 
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focusing on user-level issues, organizational considerations as well as models for technology 
adoption such as Task Technology Fit (TFF) and theory on Individualism and Collectivism 
(Gao 2005; Goodhue 1995; Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa 2004; Lee 2006; Niu 2007; Pardo et 
al., 2006; Sass 2006; Vaughn, Henning, & Siraj, 2003; Xiong 2005; Zhang 2005). Terms of 
interest in these works included trust, individual, user, fit, initial trust, and individual 
relationships. The works cited include those from the fields of social science, social 
psychology, public administration, policy studies, management information systems (MIS) 
and computer science. They investigate and report on aspects of trust. 
 Recent work that addresses different aspects of trust in business and government 
interactions points to trust as having a greater influence than was previously typically accepted 
(Booth & Wheeler, 2007; Colquitt et al., 2007; Gerdes, 2010; Morris, Tanner, & D’Alessandro, 
2010; Staples & Webster, 2008; Venezia, 2010). In these publications, trust is identified as a 
factor that is considered in the process of sharing information. Trust is also identified as a critical 
element for collaborative work, especially in information technology development projects, 
where it was determined to depend on the rate of knowledge sharing among those involved 
(Luna-Reyes et al., 2008). 
Trust is conceptualized in many ways. The definition is problematic due to the wide 
variety of approaches to the concept. Risk is but one construct in the conceptualization of trust 
(Boon & Holmes, 1991).  The concept of interdependence is also at the functional core of 
understanding trust.  Interdependence is described as “the extent to which a person’s outcomes in 
an interaction are contingent on or determined by another’s actions” (Boon & Holmes, 1991, p. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Iverson, 2006; Ruppel, Underwood-Queen & Harrington, 2003; Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007; Zhang, 2005; 
Rocco, 1998; ISAC, 2004; Li et al., 2008; Ray & Chakraborty, 2004; Chakraborty & Ray, 2006; Park, Suresh, An & 
Giordano, 2006; Park, An & Chandra, 2007. 
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191). It is the degree of interdependence between parties that impacts the relevance of trust for 
the encounter such that the greater the interdependence the more critical is the need for and 
impact of faith in the expected outcome. This is to say that when the interests of the parties 
involved are in harmony the level of trust is less of an issue than where each has different 
preferences or expectations for the outcome. 
5.1.2 Risk and Trust 
 
A risk-based method to considering trust is finding increased acceptance among theorists. 
Trust includes accepting the attendant risk and vulnerability inherent in participating in an 
information sharing system, personal, or interorganizational exchange, which is not your own 
(Luna-Reyes, Black, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2008; Zaheer et al., 1998). Trust is differentiated from 
other risk because it involves beliefs regarding the motivations of others.   
In the public safety arena, multiple agencies are separately responsible for their 
information and physical resources. Agencies do not have direct control over what happens to 
their assets or information after it is transferred or accessed by others and this can be a source of 
distrust. Having external forces such as a third-party enforcement capability can improve 
perceived trustworthiness among businesses (Raiser, 2008). Such an arrangement may be useful 
to consider in the public safety case. 
Trust has predicted risk taking and counterproductive behaviors in organizational settings 
(Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007).  It remains unclear whether the risk is “antecedent to trust, is 
trust, or is an outcome of trust” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p.711). Trust itself is 
imperfect and generally necessary for cooperation to occur. Cooperation as used in this 
dissertation involves agents, to include individuals, firms and government entities, agreeing on 
rules, which are then observed across their interaction (Binmore & Dasgupta, 1986).  Gambetta 
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asserts that “Trust uncovers dormant preferences for cooperation tucked under the seemingly 
safer blankets of defensive-aggressive revealed preferences” and that being wrong about a 
particular choice is always a possibility (Gambetta, 2000). Progress depends on taking these 
chances in some cases.  
Trust also involves issues of agency. Reliance on others or turning over control regarding 
an action or decision involves risks.  The principal-agent problem, also known as agency 
problem or principal-agency problem, is a concern in economics, business, political science, and 
public safety. It relates to the conflict that arises where agents (people or an entity) responsible 
for looking after the interests of principals (others) use their power for their own interests ahead 
of the interests of the principals (Gailmard, 2010; Miller, 2005).  The focus of positivist 
researchers has been on governance, identifying situations where a principal and agent may have 
conflicting goals and describing oversight or control mechanisms that mitigate the self-interested 
actions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  This principal-agent role conflict can be a source of tension over 
information sharing and shared management of resources in public safety. In public safety 
especially, command personnel must depend on agents who may or may not directly report to 
them to complete tasks. There is risk that responders will act autonomously where there is 
limited contact or control with the supervisors, where there is conflicting information such as the 
stated condition at a scene versus the firsthand observations, and where individual interests may 
conflict with those of the command personnel (Rauchhaus, 2009). Agencies use measures such 
as monitoring technologies, providing incentives for good behavior, punishing non-compliant 
behavior, promoting their goals and objectives clearly to regulate employee action. Providing for 
effective accountability and control mechanisms remain issues to be addressed in the law 
enforcement and emergency response context.  
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5.1.3 Trust and Context 
 
The meaning of trust varies by situation or context. According to Ross and LaCroix, trust 
may be considered according to one of three orientations: cooperative motivation, patterns of 
predictive behavior, or having a problem-solving focus. They also identify that individual 
predisposition to trust or not trust influenced behavior. In negotiation, those with higher trust 
were more likely to give the benefit of the doubt to the other party absent clear evidence of 
untrustworthiness (Ross & LaCroix, 1996). In the legal community, internalized notions of 
trustworthiness, versus external market forces, are found to be important in corporate sharing 
relationships (Blair & Stout, 2001). Predisposition and context are important to considering trust 
behavior (Sales, 2010; Winkler, 2008). In the public safety realm, it is typical for the first 
reaction to be towards trust in another agency, absent evidence that it should be otherwise.  
Jeffries observed that perception of others’ behavior has significant influence on trust 
following a time of interaction between participants (Jeffries, 2002). The role of attributions in 
shaping employees' trust in their supervisors was also investigated. Findings include that when 
employees make sense of negative events, they consider whether the supervisor's behavior was 
appropriate based on the context in which it occurred (Krosgaard, Brodt, & Whitener, 2002). 
This has implications as to actions that seem harsh but are necessary at the time. In emergency 
response, and law enforcement especially, there are times when direct action is necessary and 
little time is available for introduction or explanation by those in charge. 
 
5.1.4 Trust Level 
 
 Trust occurs at the individual and organizational level. It includes other law enforcement 
officers and extends to the other staff or persons who may gain access to information, were it 
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made available to them and assumes that there is a means for sharing this information (Scott, 
2006). Individual agencies may handle information security differently. One agency may require 
a higher standard than another and not share information based on that. It is also a fact that 
corruption in a given agency may occur and at any level (Ivkovic & Shelley, 2005). The person 
responsible for sharing intelligence information may have personal knowledge of individual 
employees who they do not trust or a general impression or bias, correct or not, of the security 
within the agency in general terms. Personal impression does influence their decision to share 
information on the unified system or not. Trust may weigh heavily on the decision to provide 
information as well (Niu, 2007; Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006). In the case of a 
very trusting person, he or she is more likely to freely provide information to the system than 
someone who is more apprehensive or who has some specific concerns as above. 
 Trust was identified as a contributing factor to user adoption of new technology 
systems in a study by van de Wijngaert and Bouwman (2009). In their study of potential 
adoption of new wireless grids, communications technology, willingness to share, and potential 
use of the technology, was found to be related to trust. Authors were referring to trust in the 
partner, trust of the social context, and trust in the technology itself. This same study provided 
some of the initial support used in the creation of the information sharing framework. It 
identified here that in emergency situations people are more willing to share information (van de 
Wijngaert & Bouwman 2009).   
Trust as it relates to information sharing was investigated as well by Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema (1999). The authors were able to model the weight of the influence of trust in 
interactions across organizations.  They suggested that in accordance with social exchange 
theory communication, attachment, and having shared values had a significant influence on trust. 
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5.1.5 Trust and Sharing 
 
 Trust and a reason to share are required for information sharing to occur.  An obvious 
comment comes up regarding the need for a channel or means for sharing if, in fact, the decision 
is made to share information. This is addressed in the framework as a hygiene factor, the 
capability to share, as well as time to do so, are important factors, but not controlling ones, 
regarding the decision to share or not to share.   
 In the process of information sharing, the actor is posited to follow an order of operation 
in thought that considers trust of the other party involved and the criticality or significance of the 
information and its potential result, either good or bad, on the actor or another party or group, in 
determining whether or not to share the information. Without this preceding process to actually 
share the information, issues of time sensitivity or ability to share, or channel, are not relevant.  
If an actor has chosen not to share information, there is no meaningful consideration for channel 
availability or time constraint.  Time and channel impact the actions, but do not play the 
prominent role in the decision itself. 
5.1.6 Determinants of Trust 
 
Three determinants of trust– having clear roles and responsibility, knowledge of the 
other organization, and the way in which authority is exercised– were identified as important 
determinants of trust relative to cross-boundary information sharing (CBI) initiatives in 
government.  The study involved one county and two state-level criminal justice as well as five 
state and local public health agency initiatives (Gil-Garcia, Guler, Pardo, & Burke, 2010).  
Having clear roles and responsibilities speaks to limiting what authority or scope of action one 
may be giving over by trusting in a transaction. That is consistent with the understanding and 
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context of how trust is expressed in this dissertation. Personal factors that include the way in 
which authority is exercised are observed in the CNYICC case study and in the literature. This 
further supports the assertion that observed actions and behaviors influence trust. 
5.1.7 Legitimacy and Trust 
 
Legitimacy building in business networks, which is much related to trust studies, is the 
focus of a study by Human and Provan (2000). Legitimacy is described as referring to “the 
status and credibility of the network and network activities as perceived both by member firms 
and outside constituents like funders and customers” (Human & Provan, 2000, p.328). In that 
study, three dimensions of legitimacy formation are identified: network as form, as entity, and 
as interaction. These dimensions of legitimacy are reported to be related to future success or 
failure of a cooperative business network, operationalized as achieving sustainment or demise.  
That study reported that “achieving success and sustainment depends on a long process of 
building legitimacy across three conceptually distinct dimensions and being able to overcome 
significant challenges based on critical legitimacy deficiencies” (Human & Provan, 2000, 
p.361). Agencies networking in the public safety community build legitimacy over time and 
may not automatically endow each other with complete trust. That being said, there are also 
many times in the public safety context where the urgency of a situation demands blind faith in 
another officer or agency.  Officers or responders who do not know each other do help each 
other in life-and-death situations unquestioningly when necessary. The notion of a 
“brotherhood,” in this way, among law enforcement and firefighters is real and necessary in 
situations where urgency and teamwork are essential. There are times where “blind faith” is 
needed to get a job done. 
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 Interorganizational networks include interaction in dyads. Dyads, defined here as a 
group of two, are also considered networks. They involve exchange of information or 
resources between two or more participants (Arino & Reuer, 2006). The need for legitimacy 
establishment in larger networks applies to these more intimate interactions as well.  
5.1.8 Reciprocity and Trust 
 
It is common in public safety for personnel to extend favors in the form of information, 
services, or use of resources as professional courtesy. According to Ostrom and Walker “all 
reciprocity norms share the common ingredients that individuals tend to react to the positive 
actions of others with positive responses and to the negative actions of others with negative 
responses” (2005, p.42). This type of exchange may be part of doing one’s job or outside the 
standard operating procedure or protocol.  This may not always occur without expectation of a 
return of some value or reciprocity. Oakerson explains that, “in a reciprocal relationship, each 
individual contributes to the welfare of the other with an expectation that others will do 
likewise, but without a fully contingent quid pro quo” (Oakerson, 1993, p. 143).  An example 
may involve a person from a state agency providing information on a subject’s address without 
having the requestor complete the formal written request protocol. These exchanges, which 
typically do not involve a pre-identified favor in the future, occur based the notion that there is 
an unstated but understood reciprocal treatment return favor in the future.  
Different agencies typically have related activities and investigations at times. This type 
of reciprocity of trust is a social exchange process without necessarily an identified future 
return (Ostrom & Walker, 2005, p. 232).  This type of social capital is defined as “shared 
knowledge, understandings, norms, rules, and expectations about patterns of interactions that 
groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity” (Dasgupta & Serageldin, 2000, p.177). This 
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understanding is prevalent in the public safety community (although there remains distrust 
across some agencies and individuals as well).  In the public safety community, this is a shared 
norm. Ostrom notes that a group with more evolved generalized reciprocity, that without a 
specific quid pro quo relationship, can achieve more than when such developed social capital is 
not present (Ostrom, 2009). Information sharing and collaboration in public safety is therefore 
improved where these relationships are fostered. 
5.1.9 Trust and Assurance 
 
 
Consistent with the use of information assurance in this dissertation, assured information 
sharing is defined by Thuraisingham (2008) as information that is shared between organizations 
while enforcing security and integrity policies.  Research on emergency services reported that 
technical environments, such as other agencies’ information assurance level and having technical 
standards, seemed to encourage information sharing systems use (Lee & Rao, 2007). This is 
consistent with findings in the CNYICC case study; agency personnel are more comfortable with 
information that is known to be “vetted” through an established technical or policy system. 
Having established standards for systems was said to make them more acceptable and trusted. 
The first essay addresses additional categories that relate to information systems assurance. 
5.1.10 Trust and Technology 
 
Trust has been identified as an area of concern in much of the information systems and 
management research as it relates to the technical systems as well as in the personnel, cultural, or 
social aspects of interaction and exchange (Dawson, Reid, Salim, & Burdon, 2010; Gil-Garcia, 
Chun, & Janssen, 2009; Headayetullah & Pradhan, 2009; Levin & Cross, 2004; Zaheer, 
McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). On the technical side, information systems must be adequately 
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trustworthy and available to the agencies that wish to collaborate (Zargar, Weiss, Caicedo, & 
Joshi, 2009). As used here, trustworthy refers to physical or structural characteristics of the 
system such that it is considered accurate, available as needed, free from intrusion or alteration 
of data, and that access is restricted to appropriate entities. There is related work from the field of 
organization science that identified the importance of access and safety as features impacting on 
sharing information. Access is related to availability and safety to concerns over the security of 
the system (Cross, Parker, Prusak, & Borgatti, 2001). Trustworthiness is said to reduce 
transaction costs in information exchange (Dyer & Chu, 2003).  
5.2 Culture 
 
 In this study culture is used to describe the accumulated experience, knowledge, values,  
beliefs, attitudes, meanings, structures and concepts acquired by an identifiable group of people 
and expressed through their actions. While there is no universally accepted definition of culture 
there are elements that are commonly accepted. Culture is socially constructed, holistic, 
historically determined and difficult to change (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, & Sanders, 1990). 
Public safety personnel, such as law enforcement and fire fighters, have a history of being 
strongly socialized. Culture in this distinctive area of public safety has been studied at various 
bureaucratic and operational levels (Paoline, 2003, Farkas & Manning, 1997). 
5.2.1 Social Factors 
 
  Socially, the culture within a particular organization will influence the degree of 
information sharing that occurs.  Presently, distrust and lack of knowledge of the other parties 
involved may hinder information sharing (Glomseth, Gottschalk, & Solli-Saether, 2007). This 
involves agency culture and even personal ties or connections with other involved agencies, 
57 
 
 
which includes informal or shadow networking ties outside the workplace to include family and 
friends or other associations that involve one member having some other contact or relationship 
with someone associated with another agency. A ready example is family, friends, or 
participation in clubs or activities that involve others apart from the work environment. External 
contacts can have a positive influence on the likelihood of information sharing. Shared training 
and joint operations such as the U.S. Marshals fugitive roundup with local agencies in Florida 
can have positive effects on sharing (Clark, 2008).  
5.2.2 Cultural Factors 
 
Research has been conducted on cultural influences on information sharing behaviors in 
the public sector (Dawes et al., 2009; Treglia & Park, 2009; Wilson, 2010). Agency culture will 
impact whether or not a person working within a particular agency shares information or not 
(Drake, Steckler, & Koch, 2004).  Apart from the policy of the agency, each agency has a 
recognizable organizational culture (Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006). There are 
unwritten rules for behavior in organizations, and they may restrict or encourage the sharing of 
information across agencies. A study by Dawes identified three subcultures within the public 
sector (scientist, politician, and bureaucrat) as a framework to examine benefits and barriers 
associated with interagency information sharing. Additionally, four types of systems (social, 
constituency, technical, and organizational) that influence information-sharing processes within 
and across agencies have been identified (Drake et al., 2004).  Making changes to organizational 
culture is difficult as elements that cause the formation of culture occur over time and emerge 
from a variety of sources within, and outside, the agency (Doney, Cannon, & Mullen, 1998).  
A culture fearful of information technology may be overly cautious or avoid innovation 
that could improve communication (Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999). Research done in 2003 
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using the Rocheleau Data Sharing Model on North Carolina Law Enforcement agencies found 
that respondents shared data with those organizations having shared goals and common interests, 
which supported their core functions. Rocheleau (1996) developed nine hypotheses about public 
sector information sharing from management literature on both the private and public sectors. 
The hypotheses are organized into three main categories: facilitating forces, internal facilitators, 
and inhibiting forces with 13 independent and two dependent variables developed from the 
hypotheses (Rocheleau, 1996; Vann, 2005). The study by Vann (2005) used an instrument 
developed to measure correlations between variables (Vann, 2005). Six independent variables 
were found to have significant correlation with computerized data sharing in the law 
enforcement agencies here:  "common goals, core functions, organizational survival, top 
management, Internet applications, and organizational autonomy (Vann, 2005)." A further 
finding from this work was that although top management support is important to sharing, it was 
influence by top managers within law enforcement that mattered to a greater degree than 
management or political leadership outside the agency.  These findings are especially significant 
in relating this work to the information sharing factors model of the first essay and the case study 
of the CNYICC, both in this dissertation.  Facilitators and detractors as applied to information 
sharing and collaboration are discussed in the first essay.  In the CNYICC case study, factors 
such as common goals, autonomy, and top management influence were found to be important to 
establishing cooperation in emergency communications projects. 
Examples of studies done on information sharing in agencies outside the United States 
include those by Glomseth et al., 2007 and Jing and Pengzhu, 2007. Glomseth found knowledge 
sharing relative to police investigations, which is a form of information sharing, was affected by 
the extent of team culture in an agency. Team culture was described as a dimension of 
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occupational culture. In a team culture, members share a group orientation over individualism 
and tend to cooperate with each other. This study, however, was conducted in Norway. The law 
enforcement culture in Norway is not necessarily consistent with agencies in the United States. 
Jing and Pengzhu studied information sharing behaviors of eight agencies in China that 
had responsibility for identifying unlawful business activity such as false accounts, forged trade 
documents, money laundering, and tax evasion. Findings include that inconsistency of policy 
hindered government-to-government information sharing in China. They note that the 
government in China is more vertical, with more clearly defined leadership, whereas the U.S. is 
observed to have a more horizontal structure without common executive leadership.  In the 
Chinese cases, organizational compatibility was found to be more of an issue negatively 
affecting information sharing than were technical factors. The government environment and 
culture are not the same as the U.S.; however, the finding that culture and policy factors matter 
more than technical factors are consistent with the propositions and findings of this dissertation: 
that social and policy factors matter more than technical factors in information sharing 
relationships. Such studies may not generalize to the U.S. environment in many respects as 
culture and policy differ significantly. 
There is work done in the U.S. on social and cultural influences of information sharing 
behaviors in the public sector (Luna-Reyes, Andersen, Richardson, Pardo, & Cresswell, 2007). A 
dynamic theory of the socio-technical processes involved in defining problems in integrating 
information was created. The study involved a Criminal Justice Information Technology group at 
the state level.  The created model shows the importance of social accumulations such as trust, 
understanding, commitment, and engagement in managing information-sharing projects. This 
process is in line with the approach taken in this dissertation.  Social factors, which include trust 
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issues, are important to understanding information sharing behaviors in law enforcement and 
emergency response (Treglia, 2012). 
 Police agencies were the subject of a study on patterns of informal communication ties 
between agencies and the influence of the network contacts on adoption of innovations and 
change in agency practices (Roberts & Roberts, 2006). Findings there included that agencies 
tended to choose agencies larger than themselves and agencies of the same type for contact and 
guidance (Roberts & Roberts, 2006). The preferred networking in that study occurred at or above 
the level (relative size) of the initiating agency. Larger agencies, according to the study, 
generally do not communicate as readily with those considered smaller. 
5.2.3 Interorganizational Networks 
 
 Literature in the area of interorganizational networks includes findings relevant to the 
interest here in information sharing problems, especially as they pertain to risk and trust in 
information sharing exchanges. Most conceptualizations of interorganizational networks refer to 
themes of social interaction, relationships, connections, collaboration, trust, collective and 
cooperative action (Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). The significance and role of trust is discussed 
in (Ekbia & Kling, 2005; Uzzi, 1997).  Podolny and Page (1998) include varying forms of 
cooperation, strategic alliances, collaboration, joint ventures, and consortia within their definition 
(Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007).   
5.2.4 Informal Networks 
 
 Informal networks (also referred to here as shadow networks) involve the situation where 
a personal or agency connection, in or outside of the workplace, creates a conflict of interest and 
the organization or individual may not act in a non-biased, objective manner. This may involve 
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personal friendships, affiliations or family ties and connections through other activities or 
interests outside the workplace. This can have positive and negative effects for organizations 
(Ingram & Lifschitz, 2006). Information that may negatively impact an agency or key 
individuals or associates may be withheld and not shared by the organization involved. This is 
where conflicts of interest are at play. The stigma or interpersonal links behind the scenes plays a 
role in interaction and sharing decisions (Kulik, Bainbridge, & Cregan, 2008).  
 Observers must account for these interpersonal connections that may exist in the law 
enforcement environment; there are times where sensitive information comes too close to home 
for those involved to remain non-biased (Huijboom, 2007). A law enforcement officer is not 
going to give his or her own mother a ticket, and similarly agencies and officers may have 
personal and other ties that influence or bias their information-sharing behavior. Threats to the 
security and assurance of information sharing systems that are driven by even adversarial or 
other ulterior motives must be anticipated and understood. Edward Norris, who served as New 
York City Deputy Police Commissioner, Superintendent of the Maryland State Police and 
Baltimore Police Commissioner, was indicted for corruption in 1993, which included allegations 
of thefts of money from secret funds (Levitt, 1993). The fact that humans are imperfect is not in 
question; the concern is that systems must be in place that account for such a condition and 
which can still be effective in this environment. 
5.3 Criticality 
 
 Criticality relates to the potential harmful impact of the information and its urgency. It 
can also include a potential scarcity of a resource such as something key to an activity or 
operation (Yound-Ybarra & Wiersema, 1999). Information that, if not acted upon, may cause 
specific harm, plays a critical role in the likelihood that it will be shared. Studies show that 
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officers are more likely to share information where there is a clear and present danger to life or 
property (Lee & Rao, 2007).   
 The criticality of the information itself, and its potentially harmful impact if not 
disclosed, is a key influencer of action in sharing information. The rules and expectations seem 
to be different where exigent circumstances come into play. On a day-to-day basis, the 
information and collaborations must be effective and rehearsed so that when the emergency does 
occur and the various agencies must come together and collaborate, there are channels, systems, 
data, and other resources readily available for this, which cannot happen effectively without prior 
preparation. 
 In a direct way, there is no sharing of information without a channel or technological 
means to do so.  If there is no possible way to share information then there is no constructive 
value to considering whether or not to share the information; it is a moot point.  If the actor 
knows in advance that there is no way to share information, the activity of making the sharing 
determination is not necessary. The two events are separate; the decision as to share or not share 
information itself, and the other, whether or not this is possible or not, due to physical capability 
and time. 
 The matter of time playing into the decision process is more complex. Criticality may 
involve the pressure of time playing into the decision of whether or not to share information.  An 
actor may have information to share regarding an incident, but hold off and, as a deadline 
approaches, feel pressured to act because the situation did not change or no other person stepped 
in to provide the information. In this case, it appears that time played a role in the decision to 
share or not share. A more fine-grained analysis reveals this scenario not to be accurate. Time is 
forcing the decision process but is not directly involved in the equation of trust and criticality as 
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those elements have been described. Criticality is separate from but related to the issue of time. 
Criticality involves consideration of things such as importance or danger to others as well as 
potential benefits that may come from the sharing of the information, among other things 
previously reported on.  In this instance, a person holding off a decision, hoping for some other 
intervention, is only delaying making the decision. The decision itself of whether to share or not 
share information remains based fundamentally on trust and criticality.  The decision described is 
based on the possibility of another solution becoming available or not; time affects the dynamic 
as a deadline for making the decision but not as an element of the decision.  
5.4 Quality as Assessed by User  
 
 The quality of information is also determined by the user's perspective and role. 
Information that is of high quality for one user's purpose may be considered of low quality to 
another (Singh, Park, Lee, & Rao, 2009). Information needs for law enforcement at a terror-
related explosion may be different than for the responding ambulance crews; both will be 
concerned with aid to victims and the law enforcement may further have interest in identity and 
affiliation of victims who may also be participants. It is standard practice for police to investigate 
all "hostages" that are released or rescued to determine both well-being and affiliation. By its 
nature, the dimensions of quality information are difficult at times to observe, capture or measure 
(Singh, Park, Lee, & Rao, 2009). 
6. Technical Factors 
 
 The Technical domain consists of factors such as interoperability, availability, and 
control. These are further identified in the following sections. 
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6.1 Interoperability 
 
 Interoperability is a critical issue facing public sector entities that must access 
information from multiple information systems and sources. Establishing semantic 
interoperability among heterogeneous and distributed information sources remains a critical issue 
in research and practice (Park & Ram, 2004). There are many disparate information systems 
currently being used by law enforcement agencies for data management and communication, 
such as COPLINK, OneDOJ, N-DEX, ALECS and others (Bulman, 2008; Chen, Zeng, 
Atabakhsh, Wyzga, & Schroeder, 2003). This lack of standardization creates obstacles for 
resource sharing and innovation adoption. Having uniform standards in hardware and software 
would allow for greater innovation and product development (NIST, 2005). Even at the data 
collection point, problems arise. A 1921 quote from a text on American Police Administration 
(Graper, 1921), which was written prior to the technology boom, but informative even today, 
illustrates this issue: 
 
"Unless the facts upon which information is desired are definitely outlined 
there will be great variety in the methods of reporting and in the 
information given.  Formerly it was customary for members of the force to 
make reports much as they pleased." (Graper, 1921, p.287) 
 
 This is further complicated by the fact that, as time goes on, agencies become engaged 
with and invested in different technologies and procedures. This is a technology and process 
legacy issue. As such, more will be at stake in the future when these agencies are asked to make 
a change to more universal or standardized method of operation, and the transition costs may be 
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too high (Powner, 2008; Scott, 2006). There are technological solutions emerging that address 
this need in different ways.  Improved security and networking technologies may address some 
of the current barriers identified.  
6.1.1 Wireless Grids and Edgeware 
 
There are alternate means for improved networking. Wireless grids as a new sharing 
technology and innovation has application potential in the area of law enforcement and 
emergency response (Treglia, et. al., 2011). Wireless grids are defined as providing “flexible, 
secure, and coordinated resource sharing among dynamic collections of individuals, institutions, 
and resources” (McKnight, Howison, & Bradner, 2004, p.26). This includes electronic enabled 
sharing of voice and data. Resources shared in this context include technological devices and 
services that are accessible through wired or wireless communication channels. Institutions and 
individuals that have or use these devices are the users. The public safety arena involves a 
variety of devices for communication and data access including radios, cell phones, PDA’s, 
alarms, sensors, WiFi networks, and other wired and wireless networks. Services include things 
such as internet access, databases, public and private networks, and other information resources.  
A new class of open standards software that facilitates activity across wireless grids, 
called edgeware, enables ad hoc connection of people, services, software and services in a 
personal cloud, is becoming available (Treglia, Ramnarine-Rieks, & McKnight, 2010). Many 
aspects of the technical barriers to information sharing can be largely set aside in an environment 
such as that provided through wireless grids edgeware, allowing us to concentrate on other 
important issues.  
This is different from the traditional conception of a shared computational processing 
resource grid for parallel computing or combining high-end processing resources for computing 
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large tasks. The form of grid computing described here offers a solution to the challenge of 
"flexible, secure, and coordinated resource sharing among dynamic collections of individuals, 
institutions and resources"(Foster, Kesselman, & Tuecke, 2001). The grid here allows for the 
cooperation and coordination of varied devices and platforms that may be wired or wireless. The 
ultimate vision of the grid is as an adaptive network providing secure, inexpensive, and 
coordinated real-time access to dynamic, heterogeneous resources (services, application, 
information, and computational power), that can traverse geographic, political, and cultural 
boundaries and still maintain the desired characteristics of simple distributed systems, to include 
stability, transparency, scalability, interoperability, and flexibility while maintaining security and 
integrity. 
 Wireless grid applications may be considered in three categories of applications, those 
that: 
 
(1) Collect or aggregate data; 
(2) Take advantage of their location or where they can move to and; 
(3) Take advantage of cooperation among a mesh of mobile devices. 
 
 Some authors suggest that this emerging infrastructure for a wireless grid will 
fundamentally change the way society thinks about and uses computing (McKnight & Kuehn, 
2011). A broader understanding regarding the nature of the capabilities and options grid 
computing allows for, as well as the technology necessary to realize the new opportunities, is 
required (Fichman & Kemerer, 1997). The grid-computing concept provides for the creation of 
virtual workspaces as configurable execution environments that are created and managed by 
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describing client requirements (Fichman & Kemerer, 1997; Lyytinen & Rose, 2003). Recent 
work regarding wireless grids includes research on: user and socio-technical perspectives and 
challenges (Dillinger & Buljore, 2003; McKnight, Katz, & Vaaler, 2001); coordination of user 
and device behaviors (McKnight, Lehr, & Howison, 2007; van de Wijngaert & Blondia, 2004); 
future internet applications and bridging communicative channels (Jin, 2002; McKnight & 
Kuehn, 2011; Rogers, 1995). Wireless grids and edgeware may benefit law enforcement 
agencies and emergency responders by providing an alternate means to bridge different devices 
and communication resources.  
 In the field of radio, wireless distributed computing networks (WDCNs), as wireless grid 
networks, can transform a group of resource constrained low-cost nodes into a high-performance 
computing/platform. This area has application to connecting detection equipment and sensors to 
first responders and investigators in the field. Within each WDCN, the resource requesting node 
distributes its computing workload to service nodes through a wireless link (Chen, Newman, 
Datla, Bose, & Reed, 2009). These service nodes compute the allocated workload and send it 
back to the requesting node. Virginia Tech leads the effort to develop gridlets that structure 
WDCNs over common wireless devices improving efficiency and stability. Areas of application 
for this work are related to military scenarios, emergency and disaster response, and mobile 
gaming. 
6.2 Availability 
 
 Availability means that the systems must respond in a timely manner and have a 
sufficient quality for user interface that the users in a given situation will accept them. These 
systems must have a high degree of survivability and function in mission-critical environments 
where parts of the network may be compromised but accurate service must be continued 
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(Schooley, 2007). Network availability impacts acceptance and use of systems (Chan & Teo, 
2007; Koroma, Li, & Kazakos, 2003). Information must be kept up to date and in accordance 
with the users’ changing interests and needs. System performance and reliability become taxed 
as these systems attempt to integrate with the variety of new technologies and protocols that are 
being used. Systems become more prone to delays or failures as they must incorporate legacy 
and other protocols into their core programming and functions. Increases in the sophistication of 
security and authentication processes add to the workload and potential for system delay or 
failure.  Systems that are considered slow or non-responsive according to the expectations of the 
users will have a hard time being adopted (Chan & Teo, 2007). 
6.3 Control 
 
 Control over access, use and manipulation of the system and the data as perceived by 
users is most important for information sharing and systems adoption. Losing control over the 
information or data, or allowing it to be altered, after it is transferred to another party is a 
concern for those providing their data. In addition to actual control over resources, it is expected 
that their perception of having such control is important.  Systems must be capable of monitoring 
and managing all usage and dissemination of information, as well as provenance. This 
accountability is for tracking purposes and a feeling of assurance, which is required for trust 
(Powner, 2008). There is no one accepted formula to produce a sense of control. There is no 
broadly accepted set of minimum security and access control standards and protocols for 
information systems that have been uniformly adopted for use across federal, tribal, state, and 
local agencies (Cresswell, Pardo, & Hassan, 2007).  Distributed workflow control tasks in these 
integrated and grid environments become complex and may require both local and remote 
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executions (da Cruz, Chirigati, Dahis, Campos, & Mattoso, 2008). Provenance and user control 
tasks and capabilities must be suitable to these varied environs. 
 Acceptance is based on the terms of the individual users and agency culture. Each agency 
may have different perspectives or requirements for what is considered acceptable (44 U.S.C. § 
3542). Issues of broad-based system trust involve identifying and communicating minimum 
standards for reliability, network security, and program security that can be accepted by all 
members of the law enforcement community at all levels. There is a range and diversity of 
confidence needs here from low to high. The problem mimics the initial development of the 
National Criminal Intelligence Center (NCIC), which began in 1967, and the National Law 
Enforcement Telecommunications System (Nlets), which links state and many federal agencies 
for exchange of criminal justice information (Dempsey, 2000). The problem entailed finding a 
way to meet the needs of multiple and diverse interests in an environment characterized as one of 
control over resources. Much work was done to identify a minimum set of security protocols, 
which would be understood and accepted by the greatest number of participants.  
 There have been a number of agencies looking to address information sharing standards, 
none of which have garnered universal consensus and some of which are no longer operating. 
Standards are proposed from agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the 
United States Department of Justice as well as through groups such as the Law Enforcement 
Information Technology Standards Council (LEITSC, 2009, 2012). LEITSC was comprised of 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Organization of Black Law 
Enforcement Executives, the National Sheriffs' Association, and the Police Executive Research 
Forum, but has been discontinued. The Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM) is part of the 
Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative's (Global) Infrastructure and Standards Working 
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Group (ISWG). The ISWG looks to standardize the data sharing of justice organizations through 
standards specification. Other organizations like the National Center for State Courts Joint 
Technology Committee, American Probation and Parole Association (APPA), and the 
Corrections Technology Association (CTA) are also working on shared universal standards 
(Hicks, 2004). There is still no communitywide consensus. 
  The most widely known of the United States’ information sharing initiatives is the 
National Information Exchange Model (NIEM).  This is an effort to standardize content (data 
exchange standards), provide tools, and manage sharing processes across entities. The exchange 
development methodology supports a common semantic understanding across participating 
organizations striving for data to be formatted in a semantically consistent way. NIEM was 
created through a partnership of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to develop, 
disseminate, and support enterprise-wide information exchange standards and processes to better 
share critical information in emergency situations and in day-to-day operations (NIEM, 2011). 
Examples of NIEMS implementations include: 
 
"Colorado Integrated Criminal Justice Information System (CICJIS) - The CICJIS 
program facilitates the sharing of critical criminal justice data among five state-level 
agencies at key decision points in the criminal justice process. It created the first 
technical enterprise sharing architecture in the state and is driven by the business 
information needs and business process requirements of Colorado's state criminal justice 
agencies. CICJIS moved forward criminal justice data sharing using the Justice Reference 
Architecture (JRA) and NIEM" (NIEM, 2011a).  
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"Emergency Operation Center--Interconnectivity (EOC-I) - The EOC-interconnectivity 
(EOC-I) project defined a set of data exchanges for requesting and responding to incident 
and resource information enacted and acquired during the incident. The NIEM-
conformant exchange and prototype system is based on emerging Internet technologies 
and designed to improve information sharing, situational awareness, and collaboration by 
regional EOCs during multijurisdictional emergencies to maximize the situational 
awareness for first responders. The EOC-I project was developed through interactions 
with state, regional, local, and tribal first responders in the Seattle and Cincinnati regions 
as well as in coordination with FEMA and NIMS multiple working groups" (NIEM, 
2011a). 
 
 Recent crises and scenarios such as those referenced above demonstrate that immediate, 
secure, enterprise-wide information sharing and interoperable communications are required to 
facilitate tightly coordinated response across multiple agencies, domains, and jurisdictions, and 
agencies cannot oftentimes securely share critical information in "real time" (NIEM, 2007; 
NIEM 2011). The NIEM process is designed to create efficient and effective sharing of 
information using robust information exchange standards (NIEM, 2007; NIEM, 2011). 
Technological solutions for improving information sharing between criminal justice 
agencies have been investigated extensively. The effects of data quality and privacy on limiting 
information sharing between criminal justice agencies was studied through use of a technological 
software solution, Entity Analytics Software (EAS). The two cases studied showed that use of 
technology improved identification of duplicated data across their records systems, thus 
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improving information quality. The study proposes that having better data quality leads to 
information being more readily shared between criminal justice agencies (Plecas, McCormick, 
Levine, Neal, & Cohen, 2010). This dissertation posits that agencies are more willing to share 
information that they trust to be accurate. In another study addressing technology improving 
information utility, Yang used partial information from shared resources of separate criminal 
justice agencies to conduct terrorist or criminal social network analysis. A finding here was that 
even where incomplete information was provided due to security concerns, social network 
analysis was improved where additional agency information was provided for the system (Yang, 
2008). Technological solutions such as described here can enhance available information and 
improve the sharing of information. 
Research conducted at major universities investigated issues of cooperation, information 
sharing and tools for law enforcement, and emergency response. Roundcount at Saint Louis 
University demonstrated that county sheriffs and school superintendents found value in use of 
information sharing through Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in crisis response 
(Roundcount, 2010). Supporting that conclusion, yet separate from that study, was a 2011 
incident in upstate New York involving a shooter near an elementary school.  Having GIS 
information could have been useful to responders there in assessing the situation for containment 
and evacuation. 
 In 2009, the White House established the Information Sharing and Access Interagency 
Policy Committee (ISA IPC) of the predecessor interagency body (the Information Sharing 
Council) established by IRTPA. It is section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), P.L. 108-485, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664 (2004), as 
amended, that directs the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to improve the sharing of 
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Terrorism and Homeland Security Information (ISE, 2011). The IRTPA definition of “terrorism 
information” includes any terrorism-related information “whether collected, produced, or 
distributed by intelligence, law enforcement, military, homeland security, or other activities,” 
and amended in 2007 to include Weapons of Mass Destruction Information (ISE 2011). Partners 
include: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, Department of Justice - Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, Department of Defense, Department of State, state, local, territorial and 
tribal governments, Department of Homeland Security, and the National Maritime Intelligence 
Center. The current ISE is to combine policies, procedures, and technologies linking resources 
(people, systems, databases, and information) at all levels, tribal entities and the private sector; 
the primary focus is "... any mission process, anywhere, which has a material impact on 
detecting, preventing, disrupting, responding to, or mitigating terrorist activity" (ISE, 2011). In 
2010, the Department of Justice created the "National Suspicious Activity and Reporting (SAR) 
Initiative" (NSI - National SAR Initiative) to assist participants at all levels in sharing and 
compatibility. Today information sharing involves more than terrorism-related threats and issues, 
but encompasses sharing information to improve the national security of the United States and 
safety of the American people more broadly.  
There are initiatives sponsored by the federal government that directly impact 
information sharing efforts at all levels (ISE, 2011). These issues involve federated or delegated 
control over assets and resources. Detailed information on these entities and activity is provided 
in Appendix A (Federal Initiatives on Information Sharing).  
 It is important to have accepted technical standards for information sharing and exchange 
if there is to be an environment of resource sharing, albeit difficult with so many competing 
standards and entities involved.  
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6.4 Technical Quality of Information 
 
 The quality of information remains an important consideration in law enforcement and 
critical incident response. "Information quality" can be generally defined as the degree to which 
the information meets the needs of the user, “fitness for use,” in both individual and 
communal/societal uses (Stvilia, Gasser, Twidale, & Smith, 2007). Quality is a technical factor 
in relation to the framework of Figure 2 (Treglia & Park, 2009). There has been limited work 
specifically addressing this area as it relates to emergency response.  The relationship between 
information quality dimensions and challenges of coordination in information management 
activities for interagency crisis response was investigated through a framework by Gonzalez and 
Bharosa (2009). Other models have been proposed and there is guidance to U.S. agencies from 
the federal level. 
 From the knowledge management field, Kulkarni, Ravindran and Freeze (2007) argue 
that Information Quality measures semantic success, System quality measures technical success, 
and User Satisfaction measures effectiveness success.  Further, the authors see Information 
Quality and System Quality as independent variables. The information quality measure of the IS 
success model is focused on relevance of information and precision while information quality 
itself is comprised of multiple attributes. According to the authors, a more comprehensive 
approach in this same area assesses quality based on the ability for information to be presented, 
visually, auditorily, through text or graphics, and in the way most useful to those in need of the 
information, as it pertains to their specific situation. Value determination is more related to 
usefulness in the field or tactically. 
 Quality information is crucial to law enforcement and emergency responders as decision 
quality can be linked directly to availability of crucial information. Quality information has been 
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identified as having the following characteristics: timeliness, accuracy, completeness, 
consistency, relevance and fitness for the needed use, format, compatibility, security, and 
appropriate amount (Kulkarni, Ravindran, & Freeze, 2007). This accounting speaks to the need 
for the information to be understood by the user, a significant point that must be addressed in 
cross-boundary and inter-cultural environments. Availability is an important consideration where 
too much information may be coming in to digest or where communication bottlenecks may 
occur, hindering the flow of the most needed information.   
 
7. Policy Factors 
 
 
7.1 Regulation and Legal Factors 
 
 The laws and policies governing information security, dissemination and use vary across 
local, state, tribal, and federal agencies.  Where agencies do not have clear guidance on whether 
or not information may be shared, they may choose to take the safer path of not sharing to 
protect them from potential liability.  
 Policy, Regulation and legal factors surrounding information sharing are complex 
(McKay, 2008). This presents a problem for those wishing to share as much information as they 
can (Carter, 2005). The concerns over privacy and violation of individual rights of citizens must 
be addressed (German & Stanley, 2008). There is no clear standard or ready guideline for 
agencies that addresses information sharing issues at the federal and local levels in a readily 
usable way (Swire, 2006). Civil liberties issues must be addressed (Martin, 2004). If agencies 
had this resource, they would be in a better position to actively share information and address the 
concerns over privacy and sharing (Carter & United States, 2004). The notion of these barriers to 
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information sharing acting as a “wall” has been proffered for some time yet arguments can be 
made that it is lack of knowledge about current statutes and policy and not the statutes 
themselves that are hindering agencies from sharing (Martin, 2004).  
 
7.2 Governance 
 
 The governance systems regarding law enforcement collaboration may be a source of the 
sharing and collaboration problem. Historically, there has been a top down approach to 
implementing information sharing mandates. Law enforcement agencies in the United States, 
however, share overlapping responsibilities and jurisdiction with no one unitary command; this 
creates problems over control and authority in investigations and information sharing and access. 
Edwin Meese III, 75th Attorney General of the United States and Ronald Reagan fellow for the 
Heritage Foundation wrote:  
 
"Federalizing crime undermines the idea that the states should be free to experiment with 
their own systems, to be in effect laboratories of government effectiveness. Furthermore, 
it shifts accountability, and as I mentioned, certainly confuses the citizens as to who is in 
charge" (Meese, 1998).  
 
Agencies independently act in the interests of their constituencies as well as for the broader 
collective good. Agencies may participate by providing their data in a shared information system 
or not based on which agency owns or operates the system.  The governance structure itself plays 
a role in how agencies choose to participate in jointly operated or controlled systems or activity. 
Walker and Ostrom write that “institutions and context play a key role in creating assurance”, 
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building trust (2007, p.33). Having appropriate governance structures can foster better 
cooperation (Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom, 1994). This is to say that there is a fit between the 
controlling structure and the individual environment and circumstances that it is operated in. 
Effective Structures and governance systems for the public safety realm are likely to be different 
than in education, for example. Governance is sensitive to context. 
The Law Enforcement-Private Security Consortium conducts research on and supports 
development of effective law enforcement-private security collaborations in the U.S.  A finding 
of this consortium is that cooperation between private security and law enforcement is hindered 
by a lack of an accepted coordinating entity (LEPSC, 2009). Additional factors related to 
governance include findings that governance structures influence cross-boundary information 
sharing in criminal justice agencies at the state and local levels. Determinants of effective 
governance structures supportive of cross-boundary information sharing include having the 
following: knowledge of information needs, knowledge of the environment, a diversity of 
participating organizations and their goals, knowledge of participating organizations, enabling 
legislation, and executive involvement (Pardo, Gil-Garcia, & Burke, 2008).  
 
7.3 Levels 
  
 
There is research that focuses on interagency information-sharing issues in the law 
enforcement sector that was done in the United States that involved looking at agencies sharing 
information at the same levels (Pardo, Gil-Garcia, & Burke, 2008), and sharing information 
generally (Akbulut, 2003; Fedorowicz et al., 2010; Randol, 2009). Other studies were not 
conducted with law enforcement agencies and do not differentiate intelligence information from 
other information gathered and shared (Pardo et al., 2006). 
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A case study through Rutgers University explored perceived efficacy of fusion centers 
(formal collaborations between multiple agencies within a state for information sharing), and 
found the fusion centers continue to struggle with many process, analysis, and other challenges 
(Graphia, 2010). The study at Georgetown University addressed homeland security collaboration 
issues among state-level players, using survey data from the Council of State Governments 
(Rabbit, 2009). They found that having state-level participation in terrorism-related 
investigations with federal agencies enhanced state-federal collaboration. Research conducted by 
Thatcher at the University of Arizona investigated individual and organizational antecedent 
factors to use of knowledge-sharing technologies. In particular, their study highlights that 
information sharing is affected by organizational context. A finding included that "given the 
characteristics of a police organization, an increase in the use of the knowledge sharing 
technology to communicate with external groups results in decreased productivity and job 
perceptions" (Hauck, 2005). Officers must take time out from other activity to input information 
into knowledge-sharing systems.  Officers in many cases are rewarded or recognized more for 
individual achievement and passing on information that others could use for their own gain (such 
as closing a case by arrest) can be seen as counterproductive by individuals. The study supports 
the notion that law enforcement and other entities must be aware of context and possible 
unintentional effects of using knowledge-sharing technology.  
 At the federal level in the United States, the Secret Service (USSS) is one example of an 
agency, which deals with information sharing policy across all federal, tribal, state, and local 
agencies and which looks to engage with non-government entities and citizen groups. One of 
their roles is to participate in "the planning, coordination and implementation of security 
operations at special events of national significance" (USSS, 2011). Where an event is 
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designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security a "National Special Security Event (NSSE)", 
the Secret Service takes on a mandated role as lead agency for design and implementation of the 
operational security plan (the Presidential Protection Act of 2000 became law in 2000 and 
included in the bill an amendment to Title 18, USC § 3056, which codified Presidential Decision 
Directive PDD-62 regarding combating terrorism).  In this role, the USSS has established policy 
and procedure for engaging with established and created partnerships between law enforcement 
and public safety officials as well as other entities to provide a safe environment for all 
participants and the general public. This entails enormous coordination and contact with formal 
and informal stakeholders as noted and published in the After Action Report of the National 
Capital Region (NCR) Project Team "2009 Presidential Inauguration Regional After-Action 
Report (AAR) Summary" (NCR, 2009). Lessons learned from this and similar experiences 
provide valuable information on communication and cooperation in mixed environments.  Due to 
the nature of action and agencies involved, much of this is not for public disclosure or outside 
dissemination. This is an area where is should be noted that not all resources and data that may 
be available can be shared even across law enforcement entities or other emergency responders. 
7.4 Jurisdiction and Overlap 
 
 Additional concerns are raised regarding factors of control, governance, and 
responsibility over information and incidents. As identified previously, the governance structure 
of law enforcement and emergency response agencies in the United States is primarily 
decentralized, not operating under a unitary command and control structure.  
 The problem of shared responsibility and overlapping jurisdiction affects the ability of 
law enforcement entities to cooperate effectively.  At the federal level, there are crimes that are 
clearly violations of specified Federal statutes, yet they may have State, Tribal, or local 
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equivalents. This makes jurisdiction unclear in many cases. Across federal agencies such as the 
FBI, DEA or others, they too may have overlapping jurisdiction and/or responsibility for a crime 
or the accompanying co-occurring incidents or offenses. 
 Crimes surrounding acts involving illegal drug (or controlled substances) possession, 
creation, and smuggling by an organized gang is a fair example of crime that may cross several 
federal and local agencies authority. Local law enforcement has clear authority in this regard 
where the incident, or part of it, occurs in their designated geographical jurisdiction, but they are 
not alone. By way of example, if this incident took place on the railroad track of a town within a 
county in a state, the town police, railroad police, county and state police may all have similar 
authority to investigate it. There are other agencies such as the DEA and/or FBI who could also 
be involved.  The Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) mission is to: 
 
 "...enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring 
to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent 
jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of organizations, involved in the 
growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined 
for illicit traffic in the United States; and to recommend and support non-enforcement 
programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the 
domestic and international markets" (USDEA, 2011). 
 
The FBI mission is to "to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign 
intelligence threats and to enforce the criminal laws of the United States" (FBI, 2011). The FBI 
priority areas include: organized crime, violent crime, and major thefts.  There would need to be 
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a discussion as to whose resources and responsibility would ultimately be used. Other examples 
include crimes having specific federal statutes that apply, but these, too, may have local level 
legislation in place that can be applied. Larceny is defined generally as stealing property or 
service, which has broad application, including things such as cash, drugs, animals, plants, and 
phone service. 
 One observes that state and local government entities and other law enforcement 
agencies have clearly defined borders and jurisdiction, albeit overlapping.  The overlap refers to 
both geographical jurisdiction and authority to act regarding a particular event. Such is the case 
where village, town, county, and state police share authority for investigation and arrest where 
the incident occurs in a location such as a village. Agencies do have defined geographical 
boundaries that they may be responsible for, such as the city limits, fire protection district, or a 
school district (which may cross village, town, and county boundaries) with legally defined 
boundaries. The model provided below shows states having jurisdiction and responsibility that 
overlaps with lower-level units of government. This is in regard to their geographical jurisdiction 
and authority to investigate incidents. It impacts their ability to intervene in crisis situations and 
make arrests among other tasks. The cities are separate from towns or villages although they are 
located within a county and state. The figure is broadly representative. Not every state has all of 
these layers or contains this specific structure. The Figure below useful to understanding the 
relationships and environment that law enforcement, emergency response, and other 
governmental officials operate in. It is organized to depict in a visual way the responsibility and 
interest various entities have in responding to an incident or event.  
The dynamics involved in this environment of shared responsibility are complex.  
Creating a better understanding of the forces and motivations of the various entities involved will 
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help practitioners and policy makers better understand the forces and influences involved in 
achieving cooperation and service provision in multi-agency emergency response events. 
Identifying policy and practice insights and recommendations that can be effective in this 
environment are important goals in this research. 
 
 
Figure 5: Overlapping Responsibility and Jurisdiction in United States 
(Treglia, 2010) 
 
  Law and policy may be enacted at each of these levels by various governing bodies. 
Other issues such as “home rule” states, “Dillon’s Rule,” and the “Cooley Doctrine” grant or 
propose varying powers to the local governments (Barron, 2003). A town ordinance may prohibit 
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something, such as smoking in public, and the village within the township may not a have law 
for or against this. In this case, as the village is within the town, the town's prohibition applies in 
the village as well. A fire-protective district may include sections of several town or village 
boundaries. Other levels interact in a similar fashion.  
7.5 Financial Factors 
 
 
Agencies at the federal-to-local levels are political entities and must justify their budgets 
to their constituencies and oversight entities. Many of these agencies are directed by elected 
officials such as Sheriffs or other municipal leaders. This makes them accountable to their 
constituents. As such, they have interests that are localized and perhaps not congruent with 
interests of other jurisdictions or the broader, higher interest or needs elsewhere. To hold their 
positions, they must be responsive to their own constituents and higher ups. Others in authority 
may be hired or appointed to positions of leadership.  In any case, these persons become 
responsible to the agency they work for and whose mission and purpose they are to represent. 
They all must report on their activities and demonstrate that they are doing the job effectively. 
These agencies also compete for limited financial resources and, again, must respond to 
the interests of their individual constituencies (Drake, Steckler, & Koch, 2004; United States, 
2007). There is limited funding for programs and support for disaster preparation, response and 
recovery – and agencies compete with each other for access to these resources. As competitors, 
there is reason for them to consider not sharing such things as information on programs, services, 
and how to apply for grants or resources, because that might reduce the chance that their own 
agency will get the award. By way of a state-level example, a request for proposals went out in 
New York State to provide funding for implementing tele-conferencing for county agencies. 
There are 62 counties in New York State and it was announced that there would be funding for 
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up to 10 of these projects. In this case, counties directly compete with each other. The incentive 
to not help the competition, or to look for ways to show your application, is the most worthy of 
support is high. Agencies were to include quantitative figures and qualitative arguments to justify 
their projects in terms of return on investment (ROI) and need (Cresswell, 2004). This created an 
environment where each agency must show that they were the one doing the most work. The 
implication here is that there is a risk to the competitive advantage of an individual agency if 
they fully share information with their counterparts.  This may result in an agency choosing to 
not make their processes and data available to others or to agencies making competing claims 
over activity figures such as arrests stemming from joint or shared investigations or response to 
incidents. A federal report from the U.S. Government Accounting Office acknowledges that 
these figures are considered by funding agencies when making award decisions: 
 
“In general, agencies use investigation and arrest statistics as indicators of agency 
work and as output measures in performance plans, budget justifications, and 
testimonies. In some cases, these data are considered in making promotion, bonus, 
and award determinations. However, investigation and arrest statistics are not 
emphasized in any of these activities, but are one of many factors that are 
considered.” 
 
“All of the agencies GAO reviewed counted the same investigations and arrests 
when more than one of them participated in the investigative and arresting 
activities. This practice seems appropriate because many investigations and 
arrests would not have occurred without the involvement and cooperation of all 
85 
 
 
the agencies that participated. If agencies were not allowed to count investigations 
and arrests in which they participated, agencies would be less likely to work 
together, cases would be much smaller, and the desired disruption of high-level 
criminal organizations would be hampered.”  
(United States, 2004) 
 
 Under the present policy structure, many law enforcement agencies are put in a position 
of being in competition for statistics and resources with other agencies. As described above, 
“statistics” such as arrest figures can lead to greater funding and agencies seek to claim 
ownership of arrests and incidents that make them score higher in some state and federal 
formula-based funding programs. The Department of Justice alone distributed $2.396 billion 
dollars of assistance to law enforcement and other agencies based on formula and competitive 
grant requests and other programs (USDOJ, 2008).  
 
7.6 Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) 
 
 
Most law enforcement agencies report on selected incidents and arrests to the Department 
of Justice through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. This program began in 1927 
and has now grown to include about 17,000 agencies voluntarily participating. The Local Law 
Enforcement Block Grants, of the Department of Justice, provide formula-based funding to 
agencies as determined by crime rate voluntarily reported through the UCR system (USDOJ, 
2008). The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant, or "JAG" program, merged the 
Edward Byrne Memorial Grant Program with the formula-based Local Law Enforcement Block 
Grant (LLEBG), follows a formula for funding eligibility and distribution (USDOJ, 2011).  BJS 
86 
 
 
calculates the JAG award amounts based on a formula calculating allocations for states and 
territories based on violent crime as reported in the UCR and their census reported population.  
Not all agencies report to the UCR. The information reported through the UCR, although 
instructions provide much detailed guidance, have room for discrepancies in local interpretation 
of the status of the crime and for matters such as who is able to report ownership of a statistic 
where multiple agencies or jurisdictions are involved. In this environment, reportable Part I UCR 
crimes, called "index crimes," and include: murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible 
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson have 
value as agency statistics. One example of potential subjectivity or ambiguity in reporting is 
shown in the case of a motor vehicle theft, which may be recorded as a stolen vehicle (UCR Part 
I crime), not entered at all by the agency, or entered as Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle 
(not a UCR Part I crime).  
Where joint or overlapping investigations into crimes occur, there is not clear guidance as 
to who gets to report the statistics as their own (who gets the credit for the work). Optimally, the 
agency that solves the crime gets the statistics, which leads to competition.  Anecdotally, state, 
county, and local agencies have raced each other to the scene of a robbery in part because 
robbery is a high visibility crime, UCR Part I, and usually has a high solvability rate; in short, a 
good "stat" or statistic to report as ones responsibility and activity. These statistics are a valuable 
commodity for a given agency in competing for these funds. Final amounts are distributed 
through individual state governments split as 60% to the state and 40% to the local agencies 
within the state; about $.5 billion dollars were set aside for this in 2010. This is a source for 
conflict over who takes the credit for incidents and arrests. 
Sharing of information on things such as how to complete forms and the use of created 
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templates or research into an area that can be used as justification in a grant proposal may not be 
readily shared across public safety agencies under this system of financial incentives. By helping 
others who do not have experience or information, they are decreasing their own chances of 
being selected. There is at least an incentive to keep this explicit and tacit knowledge closely 
held to maintain advantage for those the agency is most accountable to. A finding in the case 
study of the CNYICC, included in this dissertation, is that members in the consortium state that 
they would share all of their information with their members more readily than with those not in 
the consortium. Being part of a consortium encouraged members to act with a greater sense of 
trust and willingness to cooperate with each other. This finding  was shown through that case 
study. 
7.7 Organizational Capability 
 
  Research has emerged on organizational capability assessment for information systems 
development, which involved criminal justice agencies. This research identified 16 dimensions; 
Business Model & Architecture Readiness, Collaboration Readiness, Data Assets & 
Requirements, Provisions for Governance, Information Policies, Leaders & Champions, 
Organizational Compatibility, Performance Evaluation, Project management, Resources 
Management, Secure Environment, Stakeholder Identification & Engagement, Strategic 
Planning, Technology Acceptance, Technology Compatibility, and Technology Knowledge with 
associated indicators that essentially describe the readiness or success potential for information 
systems development in a given agency (Cresswell, Pardo, & Hassan, 2007). The dimensions 
identified may be further categorized as social, technical, and policy factors, in accord with the 
information-sharing framework described in this dissertation (see Figure 2).  
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8. Summary of Literature Review 
 
This chapter provided an overview of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, 
concepts and research that is pertinent to the study and understanding of information-sharing and 
collaboration in the public safety area. Eight major sections: introduction, definitions, research 
on information sharing, selected theories and concepts, social factors, technical factors, policy 
factors, and this summary were included.  Definitions were specified for information, 
intelligence information, collaboration, formalization and information sharing in this context.  
Theories and concepts applicable to the three essays in the dissertation included: General 
Systems Theory, Socio-technical Systems Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Public Choice Theory, 
Institutional Analysis, Knowledge Management, Knowledge Networks, Cross- Boundary 
Information Sharing, Interorganizational Networks and included specifically Public Safety 
Networks.  Within Social Factors, Trust, Culture, Criticality, and Quality Issues were discussed. 
Trust included areas of: Risk and Trust, Context, Levels, Sharing, Determinants of Trust, 
Legitimacy, Reciprocity, Assurance, Technology and Interorganizational Networks and Trust. 
Cultural factors examined included: Social Issues, Cultural Issues and Informal Networks. The 
last major factor section, Technical Factors, included discussion of: Interoperability (which 
included an example of new sharing technology options and their potential application), 
Availability, Control, and Technical Quality issues.  
Research into understanding these factors and dynamics will lead to identification of the 
actionable barriers to law enforcement information sharing across the federal, tribal, state and 
local levels and ultimately potential solutions to the problem. 
An outcome of this review and examination is the awareness of the need for further 
research into the factors surrounding information sharing and collaboration in public safety. 
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Research has been done, and is being done, that seeks to organize the problems and factors as 
well as create models for understanding the problem. Different aspects of the research and 
findings that has been done in this area are incorporated into essays of this dissertation.  
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III. CHAPTER - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
1. Introduction  
 
 This exploratory dissertation collectively examines factors related to information sharing 
and collaboration in the law enforcement and emergency response community. This is done 
through the presentation of three separately prepared essays. Multiple research methodologies 
are used across the essays. The methodologies are described both in this section and individually 
in the essays themselves. This section includes discussion of grounded theory, soft systems 
methodology, policy analysis, interviews, Delphi technique, case studies, threats to validity, and 
ethical considerations. This dissertation uses multiple methods and a mixed methods approach 
because the focus area of this study involves law enforcement and emergency response agencies 
at a variety of levels and the issues and problems are complex. 
The first essay involves the creation of a framework for examination and study of 
information sharing derived from the literature and field experience. It is exploratory and utilized 
to describe and frame the problem and as a means for proposing solutions to the problems 
identified. The second research article includes a descriptive essay examining implications for 
information and device sharing in the realm of emergency services where technology is 
controlled for such as through the use of wireless grids edgeware (or middleware). This work 
looks beyond the current limitations on connectivity and security so that other issues, such as 
social and policy factors, can be investigated absent current technological constraints. The last 
essay involves an exploratory case study investigating interagency collaboration and cooperation 
in the emergency services area involving the emergence and activities of a public safety radio 
consortium, the Central New York Interoperable Communications Consortium (CNYICC) 
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Network, a five-county collaboration involving law enforcement, public safety, government, and 
non-government participants. The methodology and application across the essays is shown in the 
figure below. 
 Essay 1: 
A Framework for 
Conceptualizing 
Barriers to Intelligence 
Information Sharing in 
Law Enforcement: An 
Insider Perspective 
Essay 2:  
Towards More Rapid 
and Effective 
Communication 
between Responders 
to Emergency 
Situations 
Essay 3: 
Identifying Factors that 
Support Collaboration in 
a Multi-jurisdiction 
Environment:  A Case 
Study of the Central 
New York Interoperable 
Communications 
Consortium 
Soft Systems Method  
(Checkland) 
   
Grounded Theory 
(Glaser & Strauss ) 
   
Literature Review    
Case Study    
Document Analysis    
Policy Analysis    
Field Observation    
Interview     
 
Figure 6: Summary of Research Methodology 
 
The research includes activity conducted from an insider perspective.  The data collected 
is from both public and non-public sources. Researchers’ accounts here may be considered emic, 
including accounts from insiders and being observed by an insider. Idiographic research looks to 
understand a phenomenon in its own context (Franz & Robey, 1984). Idiographic and emic 
approaches can lead to the development of category systems by investigating a particular context 
(Headland, Pike, & Harris, 1990). The case study of the CNYICC has a focus on reporting the 
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interpretation and considerations from those within the public safety culture. The factor model of 
the first essay and various issues identified in the second essay were derived inductively and in 
part from an insider perspective.  The intent is not to limit findings strictly to the public safety 
context, but to also identify factors and recommendations that have broader impact such as to 
public and private entities more generally. 
2. Multi-Method 
 
To investigate the factors surrounding sharing of information within and across these 
sensitive organizations a multi-method approach using a research design including literature 
review, empirical investigation, case studies, interviews, surveys, and mixed-method studies is 
used. Mingers and others suggest that “research results will be richer and more reliable if 
different research methods, preferably from different (existing) paradigms, are routinely 
combined together” (Mingers, 2001, p.240; Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2007; Green, 2008). To 
understand information sharing and collaborative behavior in this environment, which is 
impacted by many variables and influences, a multi-method approach is appropriate. Using this 
methodology, the researcher is able to concentrate on the unique effects of the identified 
variables in otherwise complex causal environments. The result will provide support for and 
explain the analytical framework and fundamental concepts proposed within this area.  
 As previously indicated, this dissertation uses multiple methods for research. These 
include grounded theory, soft systems methodology, policy analysis, interview, Delphi 
technique, case study, and interview. Qualitative and quantitative research approaches are 
undertaken in the conceptualization, data collection and analysis phases. This approach is 
suggested by several mixed methodology researchers (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998; Creswell, 
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1994; Greene, Caracelli, & Graham,1989). The application of the methods used are summarized 
Figure 6.  Methodologies used are described in greater detail in the sections following.   
3. Grounded Theory 
 
 A grounded theory approach is undertaken in this dissertation to explore factors and 
themes surrounding information sharing in the law enforcement and emergency response 
community. Using this approach, data is gathered and concepts, themes, and propositions based 
on consideration of the data emerge and evolve throughout the study. The goals include 
exploration, understanding, and identification of themes, refinement of concepts, and 
interpretation of meaning for the area of interest (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Padgett, 2004; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Patterns or possible explanations emerge. As an 
investigation progresses, theory, propositions or hypotheses may be proposed and evaluated 
against the available facts and evidence to support or nullify them. 
 The information sharing framework of the first essay in this dissertation was inductively 
derived through a process of literature review, and included soft systems methodology, initially 
focused broadly on information sharing in the law enforcement and public safety communities.  
 In the second essay, the framework of the first essay is taken as a starting point for 
exploring factors related to crisis response. Social and policy related factors are explored in light 
of technology capability that mitigates prior concerns and barriers to sharing. Problems are 
explored and new ways of understanding the issues are proffered.  
 The case study, the third essay, used grounded theory and an inductive approach to 
investigate information sharing and collaboration and to describe the problems, draw attention to 
the prevailing dynamics in the public safety community, and propose actions that can be taken in 
this particular scenario.  
94 
 
 
 The CNYICC case is significant in that it is representative of the situation of other law 
enforcement and emergency services providers across the United States and lessons learned from 
this case have application in other similar environments. The use of the theory and framework, 
investigating the technical, social, and policy aspects (Treglia & Park, 2009), allows for these 
essays to deliver coordinated findings across these different situations and environments and 
therefore provide researchers with data that can be assessed for broader impacts and more 
universal meanings. Methods of case study, interviews, field work, literature review, and policy 
analysis are utilized to thoroughly examine the problems attending information sharing in the 
law enforcement and emergency services realm. 
  Grounded theory, interview, case study, and policy analysis as research methods have 
characteristics not unlike criminal investigation. Patent evidence is gathered and other latent 
evidence or materials are uncovered through technical means, which may include forensic 
analysis, interview and observation techniques. These methods share the activity of sifting 
through the available data to interpret and understand its meaning in the context of the matter 
under investigation. Criminal investigation involves solving something that has actually occurred 
and, in a positivist way, there is a concurrent belief, therefore, in the ability to attribute the result 
to identifiable causative factors.  It is an assumption in science research that one can identify 
causative factors and develop supportable theories regarding some phenomenon if the research is 
conducted in a cautious and rigorous way. 
4. Soft Systems Methodology 
 
 In the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), the main dependent construct is a problem 
solution and the independent construct remains context specific.  Soft Systems Methodology is 
action-oriented and problems are categorized as being either “hard” or “soft,” with unique 
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characteristics and distinct approaches for resolution. Hard problems are defined where the 
“What” and “How” can be determined in the research or system design methodology early on 
(Checkland, 1981). Here a solution is expected to exist and specific objectives can be defined in 
accordance with a positivist orientation.  
 Soft problems, according to this theory, contain social and political elements that make 
problem definition and resolution difficult. The question of “How to improve information 
sharing across law enforcement agencies in the U.S.?” represents a soft problem. The focus of 
this research involved finding what the constraints to information sharing between the federal, 
tribal, state, and local enforcement agencies actually are using the soft systems methodology as 
created by Peter Checkland (Checkland & Scholes, 1999). The soft systems methodology 
typically involves seven stages (Couprie, Goodbrand, Li, & Zhu, 2007): 
 
1.  Find out about the problem situation.  
2.  Express the problem situation through rich pictures.   
3.  Select how to view the situation and produce root definitions. 
4.  Build conceptual models of what the system must do for root 
     definitions.  
5.  Compare the conceptual models with real world. 
6.  Identify feasible changes.  
7.  Recommend actions to improve the problem situation.  
 
 The figure below is a diagram of process steps and principles used in Soft Systems 
Theory. 
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Figure 7: The Inquiring/Learning Cycle of Soft Systems Theory 
(Checkland, 2000) 
5. Policy Analysis 
 
 Policy research is different than many of the other disciplines because it is action oriented 
and focuses on action-oriented recommendations to fundamental social problems. Karl Marx 
may have described this best in saying that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world the 
point is however to change it” (Cohen, 2000).  Policy analysis can be divided into two major 
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fields. Analysis of policy is seen as analytical and descriptive; it attempts to explain policies and 
their evolution and development. Analysis for policy making is prescriptive, involved with 
formulating policies and proposals such as to improve social welfare (Buhrs, 1993).  Another 
description comes from Ann Majchrzak’s book on “Methods for Policy Research.” She defines 
policy research as “the process of conducting research on, or analysis of, a fundamental social 
problem to provide policymakers with pragmatic, action-oriented recommendations for 
alleviating the problem” (Majchrzak, 1984).  The  motivation in this dissertation is to inform and 
incite actual change. 
 Policy research typically begins with a social problem, such as lack of communication 
between law enforcement agencies; this evolves through the research process wherein alternative 
policy actions for alleviating the problem are developed and communicated as alternatives to 
policymakers (Majchrzak, 1984). Developing universal principles is more difficult using this 
kind of research, which is typically directed towards solving a specific problem or set of issues 
within a specific social and cultural environment.  
 Policy research is done to produce usable and implementable options for a particular 
social problem.  In addition to the need for scientific practice, researchers must have an 
understanding of the policymaking arena in which the results will be utilized (Braman, 2008).  
The results of policy research are but one piece in the mechanism for change. Additional inputs 
include preconceived attitudes, existing policies, and the views and wishes of constituencies, 
stakeholders, other experts, superiors, and outside interests. The context of policy research 
consists of competing inputs, complex problems and may include seemingly irrational decision-
making styles. 
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 Eugene Bardach developed an eight-step model for policy analysis that has gained 
respect in the policy studies and social sciences communities (Weimer & Vining, 1992):  
 
1. Define the Problem  
2. Assemble Some Evidence  
3. Construct the Alternatives  
4. Select the Criteria  
5. Project the Outcomes  
6. Confront the Trade-offs  
7. Decide  
8. Tell Your Story 
 
 Bardach considers a ninth step could be to simply repeat the process as needed.  
 These are process steps and different models such as the eight-step model outlined above 
will include these activities. A common methodology is to: define the problem; establish the 
evaluation criteria; identify all alternatives; evaluate the alternatives, and recommend the best 
policy option. 
 Policy research and analysis can be a multidisciplinary approach and involves many types 
of data collection and discovery. Policy research can use qualitative and quantitative methods, 
including, but not limited to, interviews, critical incident, case studies, survey research, and 
statistical analysis. There are a variety of types of data and information developed in policy 
research and the choice is up to the researcher in trying to match the discipline and tools to the 
problem at hand. 
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 Interpersonal and people skills of the researcher are paramount to success, as much of the 
work will involve working with and understanding diverse interests (Mintrom, 2003). An 
interesting implementation example related to this area is seen in "Privacy and Information 
Sharing in the War on Terrorism” (Swire, 2006). The premises offer a useful summary of the 
context for recent policy debates about information sharing. The author describes the support for 
increased information sharing and goes on to identify an Information Sharing Paradigm. The 
premises support expanding information sharing practices to counter terrorism.  
 Policy analysis is not really a research method in itself but rather, makes use of any of the 
methods in the sciences, which can help in explaining and solving a real-world problem. Because 
of this, policy analysis has the broadest application to problem solving and as such is appropriate 
for this case. 
 Public policy research typically involves complex social problems, which have, or are 
composed of, a number of dimensions, causes and effects at various levels.  The empirical 
inductive approach of policy research attempts to empirically induce concepts and causal 
theories as the study of the social problem progresses.  Referred to as empirical inductive, this 
contrasts with traditional scientific hypothesis testing. The policy research approach has been 
termed by some as the Grounded Theory approach to research (Majchrzak, 1984). Grounded 
Theory was first presented in Glaser and Strauss's book, The Discovery of Grounded Theory 
(1967) and is an inductive approach to studying social activity that tries to create theory from 
active and compared observations.  
 It is fair to say that because, in many cases, the process begins with some sort of notion 
about the end there is a built in bias. By looking for something, a researcher may be less likely to 
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be open to other interpretations or possibilities. As one with experience in law enforcement, there 
is also a risk of personal bias influencing the research. 
 The purpose of this research is to identify factors, and problems, regarding information 
sharing in law enforcement and emergency response organizations and to provide a better 
understanding of them. This type of environment and problem is well suited to policy research. 
6. Interview 
 
 Interviewing is a purposive process of finding out what others think and feel about their 
experiences. The goal is to elicit and understand the meaning of the interviewee without skewing 
their response. Interviewers must be exceptional conversationalists and listeners as well as 
possess a great deal of patience (Rubin & Rubin, 1995; Nordin, Pauleen, & Gorman, 2009). 
 Qualitative research, using in-depth interviews, is suited to the study of organizations 
(Schutt, 2004). The design is meant to promote candor and provide for a richer understanding of 
phenomena. This method is effective for gaining insider knowledge from a small number of 
individuals regarding their actual experience. Explanations have a heuristic function, 
“stimulating and guiding further inquiry” (Kaplan, 1998). The goal during interviews is to situate 
the respondents in a prior experience that is known to them which involved, for example, the 
potential for sharing of information. Retrospective data has been used reliably in social science 
research (Homey, Osgood, & Marshall, 1995).  In this work, the respondents reflect on sharing 
and collaboration situations and activity which they were part of or personally familiar with to 
gain insights. 
 A threat to validity in qualitative interviewing involves the potential for investigator bias 
(Schutt, 2004). Prior experience of the researcher, here having served law enforcement for many 
years, would suggest a potential for bias in the collection and interpretation of data (Homey et 
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al., 1995). This is a source for potential subjective validation, expectancy, and bias in the 
interview and observation process. Triangulation is a process used to verify results that increases 
validity by incorporating three different viewpoints or by using different research techniques 
(Blaikie, 1991; Homey et al., 1995). Triangulation, awareness, careful preparation and 
compliance with interview protocols address concerns regarding issues related to bias and 
validity. 
7.  Delphi Technique 
 
The Delphi technique is a process that can be used to obtain a consensus of professional or 
expert opinion on a particular topic or issue. Linstone and Turoff (1975) define the Delphi 
technique as "a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem." It can 
be used “to correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines” 
(Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). It is a technique that is used to gather a consensus of 
opinion from a group of professionals, or experts, in a given area such as for law enforcement 
officials or emergency communication center directors.  
By definition, the technique is a group process that involves interaction between the 
researcher and the participant experts engaging with a topic, problem, or issue. One version uses 
a series of questionnaires to gather data from a panel of professionals in a given area. The 
method may employ multiple iterations of survey, review, and comment to discover a consensus 
of opinion regarding the topic. The iterations each become part of the feedback process. It may 
involve a series of rounds where each participant contributes to the data and feeds the results 
back to the researcher for further examination (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Linstone & Turoff, 
1975; Young & Jamieson, 2001). 
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The feedback process encourages participants to reevaluate their judgments and responses 
from previous submissions. Participants may see their results as well as those of the other 
participants. This allows for continuous reflection and refinement through the study. 
 
8. Case Study 
 
 The Case Study method is valuable for examination of social, policy, and socio-technical 
factors attending information systems and user behavior. The Case Study method is a widely 
used method for investigating technology adoption at the organizational level (Choudrie & 
Dwivedi, 2005).  
 There is not yet one singularly adopted definition of case study. Robert Yin provides a 
two-part definition as: "empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth 
and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident"  and that inquiry "copes with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as one result relies on 
multiple sources of evidence with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion and as 
another result benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis" (Yin, 2008, p.18). 
  This has relevance here. Presented below is a similar definition drawn collectively from 
Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987), Bonoma (1985) and  Stone (1978). The Case Study 
method examines phenomenon in the native setting, making use of multiple methods for data 
collection and gathering of information from one or more entities: people, group, or organization. 
Clear boundaries of the phenomenon are not necessarily apparent in the early stages of the 
research. Experimental controls and manipulation are not used. The figure below summarizes 
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key elements of case studies (Benbasat, Goldstein, & Mead, 1987; Cater-Steel & Al-Hakim, 
2009, pp. 17-18).  
 
 
 Phenomenon is examined in a natural setting. 
 Data are collected by multiple means. 
 One or few entities (person, group or organization) are examined. 
 The complexity of the unit is studied intensively. 
 Case studies are more suitable for the exploration, classification and hypothesis 
development stages of the knowledge building process; the investigator should 
have a receptive attitude towards exploration. 
 No experimental controls or manipulation are involved. 
 The investigator may not specify the set of independent and dependent variables 
in advance. 
 The results derived depend heavily on the integrative powers of the investigator. 
 Changes in site selection and data collection methods could take place as the 
investigator develops new propositions or hypotheses. 
 Case research is useful in the study of "why" and "how" question because these 
deal with operational links to be traced over time rather than with frequency or 
incidence.  
 The focus is on contemporary events. 
 
Figure 8: Case Study Elements 
 
 Other important considerations involve such things as case or site selection, single-case 
versus multiple-case designs, saturation, and representativeness (Benbasat et al., 1987). Means 
for data collection here involve interviews, documentation, archival records, direct observation, 
and physical artifacts. The goal here is to obtain the richest data surrounding the research issue 
and to capture the complexity in context (Benbasat et al., 1987).  Site selection is important. The 
case should have potential to yield rich and informative data.  Having the ability to gain research 
access to a site, resources or community, is critical (Kaarst-Brown & Guzman, 2008). The 
researcher here is a public safety insider with access to insider information and contacts.  
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 The CNYICC was chosen for this study because it has relevance to the current problems 
of coordination and interoperability for law enforcement and emergency responders, and it is 
representative of a critical case in this field. Strategies to identify use cases include processes of 
random or information oriented selection purpose (Flyvbjerg, 2006). In this case to maximize the 
utility of data gathered from a case, the CNYICC case was chosen based on an expectation that 
there is rich content available here that relates to other similar activities and broader impacts. 
Technical, social, and policy aspects of this collaboration are investigated and include trust 
considerations. Strategies for selecting samples and cases vary and what seems to fit this 
situation, looking at law enforcement and emergency response collaboration in communications, 
is not a random or stratified sample model.   An information-oriented focus with the consortium 
existing as a critical case is the aim. The purpose for an information-oriented focus is to 
maximize the utility of information from small samples and single cases based on expectations 
about the potential information content. In this case, the expectation is to achieve information 
that permits logical deductions, which fits the critical case definition clearly. The case study of 
the consortium is not the most or least likely case but rather a critical case that has important 
elements that include the disparity of partnerships that are brought together, the range of 
agencies that are involved, and the stage in development that this particular consortium is acting 
in where tremendous change in telecommunications policy, practice, and technology, for 
emergency responders is under way. This case involves federal, state, local, tribal, non-
governmental and other participants as well as being a typical case where interoperability prior to 
this time was not achieved, tensions between and across agencies existed, and where lack of 
cooperation between agencies was the case– similar to other places across the nation and in other 
countries. This case stands out as well because the group appears to be successful and well 
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organized. One expects to learn and share what is valuable and successful in these collaborations 
through this process. 
 Analysis of case study data depends heavily upon the skill of the researcher in 
identifying, collating, and integrating this data. This is certainly an area where there is potential 
for bias.  Bent Flyvbjerg identifies five misunderstandings regarding case studies and includes "a 
bias toward verification" as one of these (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  He goes on to assert that: 
 
"The case study contains no greater bias toward verification of the researcher’s 
preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On the contrary, experience 
indicates that the case study contains a greater bias toward falsification of preconceived 
notions than toward verification." (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.237) 
 
 Triangulation is a means for validating data and reducing potential effects of bias. 
Triangulation involves getting several measures and indicators to reference and compare. In the 
case study of the CNYICC, there is a rich body of data related to the formation and activities of 
the consortium and participants available publicly. This data comes in the form of legislative 
action from municipalities, media reports on the consortia and its activities in the press and 
online, public hearings and minutes of consortium committee meetings, agency annual and/or 
progress reports and internal memoranda (some of which is not publicly available). The 
investigator validated what was relayed in interviews with observed events and actions. 
Interview results were triangulated using information gained by comparison with other 
interviewees of the consortium. As a further check on the soundness of both the investigators’ 
interpretation and documentation of the collected data, interviewees were asked to provide direct 
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feedback. The preliminary findings were presented to the consortium core members in writing 
and in person for comment before being finalized. Results and conclusions were developed 
following a great deal of introspection and consideration of the data/evidence in its particular 
context.  
 Having contacts in the law enforcement and emergency response community facilitated 
access to these organizations. This relationship was helpful for access but created a situation of 
potential bias. This potential was addressed as described in the section above.  Additionally, 
several authors who have conducted case studies report that they revised their original hypothesis 
on essential points as a result of the study and report that their own assumptions, initial views, 
and conceptualizations were inaccurate (Campbell (1975), Ragin (1994), Geertz (1995), 
Flyvbjerg (1998, 2001). It is possible for researchers to report on data and findings in an 
objective way. 
  The case study plan called for a census of CNYICC members.  As there are fewer than 
30 members, it was possible to interview all. As the research progressed, other persons such as 
vendors, prior members and other stakeholders were considered for adding to this study. That 
decision was based on information derived through the interviews, observations, and document 
analysis. Assessment was also made as to whether or not the additional sources would be 
important to the robustness of the study. This would include considerations of the potential value 
of findings for the research, academic and professional communities. The study continued on 
until it was felt that saturation was achieved and there was no new information or questions 
developed. This decision was made in consultation with committee members. Substantive 
changes in the research process would have been submitted as a requested amendment to the 
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current Institutional Review Board (IRB) research study authorization. In this case there were 
none. 
9. Threats to Validity 
 
Threats to validity in this dissertation research were acknowledged and addressed in a 
number of ways.  As a multi-method and multi-part activity, the different means for addressing 
issues of validity varied by study. These are described further below.  
A good approach to investigating the problem of identification of organizational barriers 
to information sharing between law enforcement agencies in the United States at federal, state, 
and local levels involves a mixed methodology. Methods used in this dissertation include case 
study with in-depth qualitative interviews that include following up with survey elements using a 
Dephi technique. The in-depth interviews involved one-on-one, researcher-to-person discussion. 
This form of close interaction can lead to increased insight into people's thoughts, feelings, and 
behavior on critical and important issues. Interviews were semi-structured and permitted the 
interviewer to encourage respondents to talk at greater length about the problem of interest and 
to allow for elicitation of unanticipated information. The Delphi technique is a flexible approach, 
which aims to allow individuals to explain reasons underlying a problem or practice in this case 
within their organization. The technique is used for gathering people’s ideas to then use as a 
basis for further processing across other respondents in similar positions. This process and 
strategy was used here to investigate the phenomenon within its real-life, work place, and 
context.  
For interviews, a potential weakness is that the interviewer may disturb the process. The 
interviewer must not influence the respondent by suggesting through body language or by asking 
leading questions. Respondents may offer guarded responses. There is, however, an expectation 
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that people will be able to accurately relate their motivations, intentions, and experiences to bring 
light to the problem. Another weakness would be that the range of possible responses or the 
direction that the interviews take could lead the researchers in too many directions to be of value. 
The researcher here runs the risk of getting data and information that may not address the 
problem at hand and of getting a great deal of data that is of questionable value. These concerns 
were addressed through having an established interview protocol that was both structured and 
flexible.  The researcher conducting the interviews has many years of interview experience. The 
experience of the investigator was also a mitigating factor to threats to validity in this part of the 
study.   
Another threat to validity in the interview and data analysis process involved the potential 
for investigator bias (Weiss, 2004). The researcher here had prior experience in public safety and 
the potential for observing things in a preconceived way had to be accounted for (Diesing, 1992). 
Awareness of this, engaging with other researchers, and having input and direct feedback from 
the participants (member checking) reduced this effect. This was a source for potential subjective 
validation, expectancy, and bias in the data interpretation and observation process. The 
established interview protocol was used with all participants for guidance and consistency.  
Bias in the participant selection process for the case study of the CNYICC was reduced, 
as there was 100% participation of the core consortium membership.  
A concern is that some respondents may not complete the process. In the CNYICC case 
study, one of the core members was unavailable during a portion of the Delphi technique survey 
where responses were reviewed and ranked.  This member reviewed and accepted the responses 
and rankings after the others had already completed this. No additional changes were made.  
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 The threat that there may be contamination with others participating in the study would not 
necessarily have adverse impacts. Networking by the participants was allowed. If respondents 
choose to discuss the study with each other that was fine because, in real life, they may or may 
not choose to do so.  
10. Ethical Considerations 
 
 This dissertation seeks to achieve a better understanding of the impacts and mechanisms 
underlying and driving interactions across organizations by people.  Having a solid framework 
and understanding of the way that trust is established and maintained can be a tool. 
Understanding the establishment and creation mechanisms of trust can help society and 
institutions to work better together, build greater relationships, and improve knowledge and 
systems that make everyone better. Unfortunately, knowledge of interaction mechanisms as a 
skill or tool may be used to manipulate trust or create deception in interactions, negotiations and 
other activities for illegitimate purposes as well. 
 In terms of the framework, Figure 2, these considerations are primarily social factors. 
People create standards and interpret ethical behaviors, and these are reflected in the policy 
created as well as through actions and conduct of those in the organization interpreting these 
policies. The technology can add to controls or inhibitors to providing an environment that 
fosters certain types of activity or at least establishes accountability.  At the heart of the issue are 
the people who create it within the organization. 
 Sharing and interconnection can make entities vulnerable. A disconcerting aspect of the 
research here on information sharing is that it may be providing information that could be used 
by persons in illegitimate ways.  One could conceivably use a thorough knowledge of the trust 
process to their advantage. As part of the research, understanding the establishment of 
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mechanisms of trust between entities and individuals considerations such as this must be 
attendant.  If one follows the belief that people benefit most from having complete information in 
interactions, it would stand as an argument towards full disclosure and sharing of all the tools in 
a negotiation or information sharing interaction.   
 The considerations and dynamics involved in sharing trusted information between parties 
parallels considerations made in other negotiation environments such as international relations 
and domestic violence incidents.  In the case of international relations, nations often negotiate 
with a "speak softly and carry a big stick" style. In that environment, the parties involved are 
sometimes at an unequal power level and the side with less capability to defend or attack is at a 
disadvantage and subject to feeling coercive pressure. Trust in this case is difficult, as the parties 
are not interacting in a balanced or safe environment. Agreements made where one party has 
power over another are by their very nature coercive, and so the true wishes of the parties may 
not be reflected in these cases. The weaker party may formally agree but later take actions in 
opposition to the agreement because of this discord. As an example, the United States has 
nuclear capability and other means to compel compliance relative to its interaction with other 
countries. For a negotiation to be balanced here, the other nation involved would have to have 
equivalent capability to have a fair negotiation.  The belief here is that trust in decisions that are 
made is more valid where parties have mutual destructive capability. This is a debatable point, 
however.  Where the intent is to have two parties seek out mutually agreeable outcomes that do 
not involve damaging something, the possibility of violence or use of force cannot be an option. 
In the range of possible outcomes there cannot be one that involves harm.  In this way, there is 
not coercion but mutual interest in beneficial outcomes and the resulting agreements will be in 
line with the actual motives and interests of each of the parties involved.  The results of 
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negotiation under these conditions have the greatest potential to be acted upon as described by 
the actors. 
 A good example of how mutual destructive capability does not promote truthful 
agreements in communication and negotiation situations can be seen in family domestic violence 
situations. Police are often called in to intervene in domestic violence cases. In many of these 
cases, one spouse or party has considerably more weapons at their disposal than the other party; 
these may include: physical size, weapons, control over assets, or other options for alternate 
living arrangements. Police are trained to equalize the power between parties so they can 
facilitate truthful and earnest discussion and negotiation to resolve the issue. Police do not 
provide weapons to each of the parties to create this balance but instead seek to remove the 
weapons and create an environment that is free from coercive elements. This follows a belief that 
for truthful and earnest negotiation and information exchange, there must be a safe environment 
for all parties involved. This concept is consistent from international to personal levels regarding 
trusted information sharing.  
 Having a better understanding of trust itself is not the same as having additional coercive 
tools in an interaction. In regard to trusted information sharing, the notion of coercive capability 
is something that influences the trust between parties and the ultimate decisions that are made. 
Trust is not used as a coercive weapon, but it can be used in a manipulative or subversive way. 
Having knowledge of the way trust is developed and expressed can provide a party to an 
encounter with tools to create false trust to advance their own objectives.  An example from 
World War II depicts this process. The bombing of the United States-owned Pearl Harbor by 
Japan in 1941 is well known. Japan has a proud and respected culture of integrity and this and 
many other countries have evolved and gone through periods of conflict as well; the selection of 
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this case from the past is but one of many available. In that case, the Japanese government was 
negotiating with the United States government regarding establishing peace at the same time as 
they were preparing for the surprise attack. The image of trust can be used for subversive 
purposes.  One could consider that if the Japanese government did not have capability to use 
force, the negotiations would have had an alternative outcome.  Greater understanding of trust 
also provides tools for evaluating trust as well as identifying the mere portrayal of trust. In the 
case of Pearl Harbor, the United States would have been well served by tools for interpreting the 
portrayal of trust by the Japanese government such that they would have been in a better position 
to assess whether or not there was actual trust or merely the appearance of trust.  
 Greater knowledge of what creates trust may be used to gain unfair advantage in an 
exchange, but the likelihood of this is reduced where all parties have the most complete 
understanding of true trust measures and behavior.  In short, it will be harder to deceive or “fake 
it.”  There are many elements that go into creating and evidencing trust and they involve things 
that are malleable as well as things that are hard or impossible to manipulate.   A party can 
profess policy and take some actions that are in line with what is understood to be trustful 
behavior, but it is not possible to change something like recent history of conflicting behaviors.  
Having greater information can provide more accurate assessments and improve decision 
making.  
Fundamentally, this research proceeds on the assumption that having a greater 
understanding of trusted information sharing between individuals and organizations is beneficial 
to the greater society.     
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IV. CHAPTER - ESSAYS 
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ESSAY 1: A Framework for Conceptualizing Barriers to Intelligence Information 
Sharing in Law Enforcement: An Insider Perspective
6
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The term “information sharing” in law enforcement gained popularity as a result of the 
9/11 Commission Hearings and report of the United States government's lack of response to 
information that was known about planned terrorist attacks on the New York City World Trade 
Towers prior to the events. This led to the enactment of several executive orders by President 
George W. Bush mandating agencies implement policies to "share information" across 
organizational boundaries (United States, 2007c). Information generally, and intelligence 
information, were included in this broad mandate. Intelligence information sharing is the 
transfer of tangible or articulable facts or data obtained that relate to an actual or impending 
occurrence of a criminal or terrorist act. It includes suspicious activity reports regarding 
incidents or observations which are of a less obvious nature, but which may be supportive or 
related to criminal or terrorist related activity. 
An incident or activity of suspicious nature or that is outside of the norm for a particular 
environment and circumstance could be considered suspicious activity or intelligence 
information depending upon the circumstances. The adjudication as to whether an event is 
considered and captured as suspicious activity or intelligence is subjective and left to the 
discretion of the officer involved in the report or observation. Where a person of average 
intelligence and familiarity with the normative environment would believe an act may be a part 
                                                 
6
 This is an expanded version of the original article: Treglia, J. V., & Park, J. S. (2009). “Towards trusted 
intelligence information sharing.” In Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD Workshop on CyberSecurity and 
Intelligence Informatics. Paris, France: ACM. (pp. 45-52). 
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of the cause or furtherance of a criminal act, it would qualify as intelligence information. An 
example may be helpful here; a person taking pictures of trains in a train yard may not cause 
someone familiar with the area to be concerned. Many people collect, model, and photograph 
trains. However, if one adds to this scenario: 1) the person is not from the surrounding area; 2) 
the person is taking photos of trains and the facilities; 3) the person becomes agitated when asked 
about her/his purpose; 4) the person provides inaccurate information about where they are from 
or inconsistent versions of what they are doing, then perhaps the person is affiliated with a 
terrorist group or may have criminal intentions. This all may bring the incident to the level of a 
reportable incident, or suspicious activity report, which would become intelligence information 
to be shared among enforcement agencies. The combination of activity and circumstance is the 
trigger. This will also be referred to as intelligence information or intelligence. It is yet another 
problem, worthy of study, to identify the means by which various agencies collect and manage 
this type of information. 
 While millions of dollars have been invested in information technologies to improve 
information sharing capabilities among all law enforcement agencies, according to the National 
Security Agency (NSA), there remains a hesitation to share intelligence information between 
agencies (Lieberman, 2007). Information technologies for the future should provide for 
ubiquitous and distributed computing and communication systems that deliver transparent and 
high quality service, without disruption, and while enabling and preserving privacy, security, 
trust, participation, and cooperation. This paper identifies barriers affecting effective intelligence 
information sharing between federal, tribal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in the 
United States. An information-sharing framework is proposed that identifies three major factor 
areas that impact upon sharing: social, technical, and policy. The paper then provides an 
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application of this categorization in considering an instance of agency information sharing using 
data from a national survey of criminal justice agencies. It is argued that researching these 
dynamics will lead to improved understanding of the problems and factors and ultimately to 
identification of actionable solutions to law enforcement intelligence information sharing across 
the federal, tribal, state, and local levels. 
2. Research Methodology 
 
 This article is the result of exploratory research aimed at identifying and defining 
problems in information sharing in the law enforcement and emergency response community. It 
is provided from an insider perspective. A researcher involved in this work was also an active 
member of the law enforcement community. A grounded theory approach and soft systems 
methodology was undertaken. The overall goal was to identify and refine major themes and 
concepts in this area and to create a framework for understanding the problems and factors. 
Using this approach, data was gathered and concepts, themes, and propositions based on 
consideration of the data emerged and evolved throughout the study.  
 Goals included exploration, understanding, and identification of themes, refinement of 
concepts, and interpretation of meaning (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Padgett, 2004; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  A literature review– including primary sources of 
public data such as research reports, congressional testimony, agency after action reports, 
academic and professional literature– was conducted.  
  The data included in the analysis was taken from works primarily from 1995 through 
2010. This period contained research and policy both before and after the September 11, 2001 
(9/11) attacks in the U.S. That incident arguably had a significant impact on emergency response 
policy and practice and so covering this period is significant to researchers.  
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 Proprietary data from internal resources, such as internal memos and after action incident 
reports, were considered. Field observations and interviews with public safety personnel were 
also included in preparation of this article.
7
 Through this process, patterns and potential 
explanations are uncovered. Over the course of the progression of the investigation, theory and 
propositions were suggested and evaluated against the available facts and evidence. 
 The approach taken in gathering and reviewing the available data and literature involved 
a three-step process with feedback in between. The steps, consistent with recommendations of 
Webster and Watson (2002) included: 1) Identification of major authoritative sources and initial 
review; 2) expansion out through a snowball effect from the citations and references of the initial 
review; and 3) Making use of professional, academic, and public search engines for related 
resources.  
 Several search sources and key words were used to gather data. Leading journals in 
information systems, management, and public administration were targeted for searching. These 
included Communications of the ACM, MIS Quarterly, Academy of Management Review, 
Public Administration Review, Journal of Public Administration, Government Information 
Quarterly and others such as Information Polity. Proprietary resources included the FBI Research 
Library online and LEO (Law Enforcement Online) resources. Online searches included 
Elsevier’s Science Direct and Scopus, individual searches within the targeted journals, and 
online public searches including Google Scholar and Google Web Search. Terms used for 
searching included “information sharing”, “intelligence”, “collaboration”, “knowledge sharing”, 
                                                 
7
 Field observations were based on the researchers participation as a member of several local law enforcement 
agencies in New York State from 1982 – 2012. Agencies included: Onondaga and Madison County Sheriff’s 
Departments, Onondaga County Corrections, Manlius town, Fayetteville village court, Chittenango and Oriskany 
village police departments. Through this affiliation  the researcher had professional contact with Federal, State and 
Local agencies to include FBI, Secret Service, DEA, BATF, INS, Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, and 
others as well as regular contact with various fire, ambulance, 911 center personnel, primarily in New York State. 
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and “data sharing”. Qualifiers for searches included words such as “law enforcement”, “public 
safety”, “government”, “criminal justice”, “emergency response”, ‘emergency services”, “public 
administration” and “management”. The review and data gathering was completed when there 
seemed to be no new conceptualizations for the categories emerging from the various sources.  
 Information gathered was discussed with fellow university researchers and practitioners 
in the field to validate that it was contributing to understanding the problem, that it was valid and 
of sufficient quality. 
 Identified problems and recurrent themes related to information sharing were grouped 
into distinct areas or factors; Technical, Social, and Policy.  The factors influence information 
sharing individually and collectively.  The factors both affect and are affected by each other. The 
information-sharing framework proffered in this article was inductively derived from a broad 
initial focus on information sharing in the law enforcement and public safety communities. This 
framework is consistent with elements of Socio-Technical Systems (STS) and General Systems 
Theory (GST), as described in the sections following.  Important elements include such concepts 
as the interdependence of the relationships between and across entities.  An organizational 
system described from this perspective is comprised of interrelated interacting parts and 
relationships that cannot be correctly described absent its relationship to the whole or larger 
environment that they operate in (Von Bertalanffy, 1972).   
 Systems models from the business and management fields also shaped the selection and 
formation of the three factor categories.  Information systems in business and organizational 
studies typically identify information systems as being comprised of people, procedures, data, 
software, telecommunications, databases, and hardware that are utilized in combination to 
support a business purpose (Stair & Reynolds, 2011; O’Brien & Marakas, 2008). Additional 
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sources from Operations management and information systems similarly identify these or related 
categories for system components such as plants, equipment, control procedures, and policies 
(Lewis & Slack, 2003; Gupta, 2000). The various schemas for categorizing components were 
considered in consultation with fellow researchers and practitioners and ultimately the three 
factors of Social, Technical, and Policy were determined to be inclusive of all system 
components and descriptive enough to provide for understanding and examination of information 
sharing systems and processes in the public safety realm. 
 
Figure 9: Public Sector Inter-Organizational Information Sharing Factors 
(Yang & Maxwell, 2011) 
 
 
 Interestingly other researchers have separately proposed similar structures for considering 
factors in public sector information sharing.   Interagency information sharing research by Dawes 
(1996) and research on knowledge sharing in e-Government by Zhang et al. (2005) identify three 
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primary influential factors as technology, management and policy.  These are constructively 
similar to the framework created and presented in this research; technical, social, and policy). 
Yang and Maxwell (2011) have since proposed that three identified perspectives (Technological, 
Organizational and Managerial, and Political and Policy) influence public sector information 
sharing and they created a model using the three perspectives. The perspectives and factors 
influencing inter-organizational information sharing in the public sector are shown in the Figure 
9 above.  
The rationale and descriptions of these frameworks and models are provided in detail in the 
pages following with cognitive maps depicting the concepts, elements, and interrelationships.  
3. Literature and Related Work 
 
Information sharing is defined as “making information available to participants (people, 
processes, or systems)” (USDOD, 2007).  The leveraging of information by entities involved is 
included in this broad, yet simple, conceptualization. Information sharing has been defined in the 
public sector as “exchanging or otherwise giving other agencies access to information” (Zheng, 
2009, p.27). Researchers note that information sharing refers to both tacit knowledge and to 
explicit artifacts and codifiable information (Yang & Maxwell, 2011). In the business field, 
information sharing is defined as “the extent to which the supplier openly shares information 
about the future that may be useful to the customer relationship” (Cannon & Homburg, 2001). 
This information value potential is paralleled in public safety where agencies share information 
to solve a case or apply for funding opportunities. Information sharing is also defined as the 
degree to which partners proactively provide critical and confidential information to each other 
(Phan, Styles, & Patterson, 2005). This means that information is provided without one side 
having to ask for that, which may be useful to have. 
121 
 
 
 There is limited work available that focuses on interagency intelligence information 
sharing factors in the law enforcement sector.  
Studies done in agencies outside the United States include Glomseth et al., (2007) and 
Jing and Pengzhu (2007). Glomseth found that intelligence information sharing in police 
investigations was affected by the extent of team culture. Team culture was identified as being a 
dimension of the agency occupational culture. Jing and Pengzhu studied agencies in China with 
responsibility for identifying unlawful business activity. Their findings included that having 
inconsistent policy hinders government-to-government information sharing. 
Recent case studies confirm information sharing difficulties across agencies. The 
unwritten rules for behavior in organizations may restrict or encourage information sharing 
between agencies (Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006).  Some studies done in the 
United States involved looking at difficulties with agencies sharing information across the same 
levels (Pardo et al., 2006). Organizational culture within the agencies was found to influence 
sharing there. In another study, four types of systems (social, constituency, technical, and 
organizational) were found to influence information-sharing processes within and across 
agencies (Drake et al., 2004). Effective solutions for the issues have yet to be identified. 
Inter-organizational systems studied by management information systems researchers 
have primarily focused on the private sector and do not directly apply to the government sector 
(Lai & Mahapatra, 1997). Preliminary work involved an exploration of conditions for 
cooperation between emergency management agencies where perceived information assurance 
of others and information-sharing standards were more strongly related to information sharing 
than were cultural norms, in emergency contexts (Lee & Rao, 2007). Research on emergency 
services reported that technical environments, such as other agencies’ information assurance 
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level and technical standards, seemed to encourage information sharing systems use. 
There is initial work on cultural influences on information sharing behaviors in the 
public sector (Luna-Reyes, Andersen, Richardson, Pardo, & Cresswell, 2007). There is recent 
work on organizational capability assessment for information systems development, which 
involved criminal justice agencies and included cultural considerations and system complexity 
issues (Cresswell, Pardo, & Hassan, 2007).  Crisis response systems are “complex” systems as 
they have interdependencies among numerous parts and variables interacting simultaneously 
(Longstaff, 2003, p. 2013). 
 Public administration authors concentrate, much of the time, on the structures and 
delivery of services from public organizations from a variety of perspectives. These works aim 
to assist public administrators to be more aware of the internal structure which they are 
intimately part of and of the structures and influences that they may encounter in their external 
environments.  
 Charles Handy, a recognized British management writer, classified organizational 
culture by the power of the roles and functions taken on by individuals within organizations 
(Handy, 1976). Culturally, organizations are not homogeneous, being consisted of multiple 
and competing forces. They tend to subdivide into groups, each with the ability to subdivide 
into further subgroups based on those who compose them. Handy argues here that in order for 
managers to be successful within a given organization or environment, the manager must be 
first keenly aware of the different organizational cultures that exist within the organization 
(Handy, 1976; Handy, 1996). Once aware of these different cultures that are present in the 
organization, the manger may be effective as a liaison between the different cultures, and 
improve the chances for influencing processes and norms.  
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 Central to the test will be what works. "Public value" in information sharing and service 
provision is delivered where management is managing the external authorizing environment and 
engaging more innovatively with the public to be served (Moore, 1995). While having a voice is 
seen as a central element in assessment of public value, it is not the only element and one should 
be wary of an overly ideological interpretation of just one aspect of what is a more involved and 
complex model. 
 According to Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, law enforcement "has a chance to forge new 
attitudes of mind and structures of relationships that will help it produce high-quality solutions 
to society's problems - not just one problem but many problems; not just now but in the future" 
(Sparrow, Moore, & Kennedy, 1992). Emergency response is added to this as well. In accord 
with this Longstaff, Armstrong, Perrin, Parker, & Hidek, provide a conceptual framework for 
assessing community resilience
8
 that includes: ecological, economic, physical infrastructure, 
civil society, and governance subsystems (2010). This is a truly more holistic, systems oriented, 
picture of the prospects for crisis response and, it is argued here, information sharing processes. 
Further examination of the influence of perception of technological factors, culture, trust, and 
legal or policy factors in the law enforcement, emergency response and public sector context is 
necessary. 
4. Framework - Key Influences on Information Sharing 
 
In order to enhance the current intelligence information-sharing services between 
government entities researchers created a conceptual framework comprised of three major 
                                                 
8
 Resilience as used here is consistent with the definition used by the multi-disciplinary Resilience Alliance: “the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, undergo change, and retain the same essential functions, structure, 
identity, and feedbacks” (Longstaff, et al., 2010, p. 3). 
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areas of influence: Technical, Social, and Policy, (this is depicted and summarized in 
Figure 10 below) through previous research work (Treglia & Park, 2009). 
 
Key Influences on Trusted Information Sharing
Information
Sharing
Social
Trust
Informal Network
Criticality
Policy
Regulation
Policy Conflict
Governance
Technical
Interoperability
Availability
Control
 
Figure 10: Information Sharing Framework 
 
In this paper the preliminary framework, model and theory of intelligence 
information sharing are developed through a literature review, experience, and interviews 
with practitioners in the field. The framework and model is also tested using national 
survey data. Within each area, individual factors are identified and discussed that play 
roles in influencing whether or not intelligence information is ultimately shared. 
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4.1 Technical Influences 
 
4.1.1 Interoperability 
 
 The interoperability of information systems and the data elements captured and used 
was found to be a problematic issue. Tools such as Extensible Markup Language (XML) are 
widely used in business development of Web services and for Business to Business (B2B) 
integration and data exchange (Fernández-Medina & Yagüe, 2008; Lampathaki, Mouzakitis, 
Gionis, Charalabidis, & Askounis, 2009). Although 82% of non-federal law enforcement 
agencies in the United States use computers for internet access, unified standards for 
information systems have not been universally accepted by law enforcement entities (USDOJ 
BJS, 2006). This has led to hardware, software and network inconsistencies, and 
incompatibility (Chau, Atababhsh, Zeng, & Chen, 2002; United States, 2007b). Interoperability 
is also related to the definition of fields and data descriptions. With more than 19,000 law 
enforcement agencies in the United States, each having its own systems and hierarchy, it is no 
wonder there are issues with compatibility between agencies and systems when you try and 
collaborate or interconnect (BJS, 2007). As a matter of fact, there are many different 
information systems currently being used by law enforcement agencies for data management 
and communication, such as COPLINK, OneDOJ, N-DEx, ALECS, LInX and others 
(Bulman, 2008; Chen, Zeng, Atabakhsh, Wyzga, & Schroeder, 2003; McKay, 2008). 
Furthermore, the inconsistency in regulations hinders trust between agencies. For 
instance, there are no broadly accepted standards for security clearances and subsequent access 
across agencies. The federal government has a lengthy process for approving access to 
intelligence information and there is no provision to readily accept security clearances from 
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other federal or non-federal agencies (Whitehouse, 2007). A state police officer with secret 
clearance in his agency does not carry this standard or designation with other local or federal 
agencies. Security clearances even across federal agencies do not automatically transfer and 
must be reevaluated and reassessed by the individual agency. A justifiable concern is that there 
are not universal standards for hiring and background checks across the various agencies. The 
process used to verify a person’s credibility in a given agency may not be adequate for a certain 
level of secure access at another agency. This is a tremendous obstacle to sharing information 
among agencies and feeds into a perception of mistrust across agencies. This is an area which 
can be addressed through legislative changes and changes to internal agency processes. 
4.1.2 Availability 
 
Availability means that the systems must respond in a timely manner (Zargar, Weiss, 
Caicedo, & Joshi, 2009). These systems must have a high degree of survivability and function 
in mission critical environments where parts of the network may be compromised but accurate 
service must be continued (Park, Chandramohan, Suresh, & Giordano, 2009; Schooley, 2007). 
For instance, network availability impacts acceptance and use of systems (Chan & Teo, 2007; 
Koroma, Li, & Kazakos, 2003). Furthermore, information must be kept up to date and in 
accordance with the users’ interests and needs. For the new systems to integrate with the 
varieties of technology and protocols that are used, the complexity of processing and 
connections are increased and system performance and reliability become taxed. Systems 
become more prone to delays or failures as they must incorporate legacy and other protocols 
into their core programming and functions. Increases in overhead for security also add to the 
workload and increases the potential for system delays or failure. Systems considered slow or 
non-responsive according to the expectations of the users will have a hard time being adopted. 
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4.1.3 Control 
 
 Control as perceived by the users is required for information sharing and systems 
adoption. Information-sharing systems must be capable of controlling, monitoring, and 
managing all usage and dissemination of intelligence information for tracking purposes to 
provide assurance, which is required for trust (Li, Hess, & Valacich, 2008). There is no 
broadly accepted set of minimum security and access control standards and protocols for 
intelligence information systems that have been uniformly adopted for use across federal, 
tribal, state and local agencies (Cresswell, Pardo, & Hassan, 2007). Distributed workflow 
control tasks in these integrated and grid environments may increase the level of information 
sharing, availability, cost effectiveness, but, on the flip side, they also increase the complexity 
and control problems (Serra da Cruz, Chirigati, Dahis, Campos, & Mattoso, 2008; Park, Kang, 
& Froscher, 2001). Therefore, provenance and user control tasks and capabilities must be 
suitable to these varied environs in a trusted information-sharing system. 
4.2   Social Influences 
 
4.2.1 Trust 
 
 Trust is a key influencer of sharing behavior. Here trust refers to the degree in which the 
person with intelligence information may accurately predict the action that will be taken by 
other people in other agencies who may receive information or have access to it. Trust has been 
identified as an area of concern in much of the information systems and management research.
9
 
                                                 
9
 Trust research considered in information systems and management includes: Gao, 2005; Humenn, Chin, 
Kosiyatrakul, Older & Northrup, 2004; Jing & Pengzhu, 2007; Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa, 2004; Lee, 2006; Lee, 
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Recent work that addresses different aspects of trust in business and government interactions 
points to trust as having a greater influence than was previously typically accepted (Booth & 
Wheeler, 2007; Colquitt et al., 2007; Gerdes, 2010; Morris, Tanner, & D’Alessandro, 2010; 
Staples & Webster, 2008; Venezia, 2010). In these publications, trust is identified as a factor that 
is considered in the process of sharing information. Trust is also identified as a critical element 
for collaborative work, especially in information technology development projects, where it was 
determined to depend on the rate of knowledge sharing among those involved (Luna-Reyes et al., 
2008). Fear of information technology may interfere with trust in systems (Kaarst-Brown & 
Robey, 1999). 
 Trust occurs at the individual and organizational level. It includes other law 
enforcement officers and extends to the other staff or persons who may gain access to 
information were it made available to them and assumes that there is a means for sharing this 
information (Scott, 2006). Individual agencies may handle information security differently. 
One agency may require a higher standard than another and not share information based on 
that. Corruption in a given agency may occur and at any level (Ivkovic & Shelley, 2005). The 
person responsible to share intelligence information may have personal knowledge of 
individual employees who they do not trust or a general impression or bias, correct or not, of 
the security within the agency in general terms. The concern is complex as it can be at the 
agency or individual level that this assessment is applied. Personal impression influences a 
user’s decision to share information on the unified system or not. The person deciding to share 
the information weighs trust in this way. Trust may weigh heavily on the decision to provide 
                                                                                                                                                             
2008; Xiong & Liu, 2004; McKnight, Choudhury & Kacmar, 2002; Niu, 2007; Razavi & Iverson, 2006; Ruppel, 
Underwood-Queen & Harrington, 2003; Schoorman, Mayer & Davis, 2007; Zhang, 2005; Rocco, 1998; ISAC, 
2004; Li, Hess & Valacich 2008; Ray & Chakraborty, 2004; Chakraborty & Ray, 2006; Park, Suresh, An & 
Giordano, 2006; Park, An & Chandra, 2007 ; Walker & Ostrom, 2007. 
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information as well (Niu, 2007; Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006). In the case of a 
very trusting person, he or she is more likely to freely provide information to the system than 
someone who is more apprehensive or who has some specific concerns as above. 
 A study by van de Wijngaert and Bouwman (2009) identified trust as a contributing 
factor to user adoption of new technology systems. In their study of potential adoption of new 
wireless grids communications technology, willingness to share, and potential use of, the 
technology was found to be related to trust in the partner, social context and in the technology. 
This same study provided some of the initial support used in the creation of the information 
sharing framework here where it identified that in emergency situations people are more 
willing to share (van de Wijngaert & Bouwman, 2009). Trust as it relates to information 
sharing was investigated as well by Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999). There the authors 
were able to model the weight of influence of trust in interactions across organizations. Here a 
connection was made in terms of social exchange theory regarding trust that communication, 
attachment and having shared values had significant influence on trust (Young-Ybarra & 
Wiersema, 1999).  
4.2.2 Informal Network 
 
 Informal, or shadow, networks involve the situation where a personal or agency 
connection, in or outside of the work place, creates a conflict of interest and the organization or 
individual may not act in a non-biased, objective manner. This may involve personal 
friendships, affiliations or family ties and connections through other activities or interests 
outside the workplace. This can have positive and negative effects for organizations (Ingram 
& Lifschitz, 2006). Intelligence information that may negatively impact an agency or key 
individuals or associates may be withheld and not shared by the organization involved. The 
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stigma or interpersonal links behind the scenes play a role in interaction and sharing decisions 
(Kulik et al., 2008). This is related to the organizational notion of shadow systems, which are 
described by Stacy (1996) as “the complex web of interactions in which social covert political 
and psycho-dynamic systems coexist in tension with the legitimate system” (Shaw,1997; 
Stacey, 1996). There is an obvious link here to personal integrity and to social impacts of 
potentially damaging information that hits “too close to home.” The personal integrity of the 
individual member with the information has an influence on whether or not they will share. 
Integrity is internal to the individual. Trust is focused outward to the perception of another 
agency by the individual. Integrity is related to the specific character and makeup of the person 
with the information.   Influences such as policy, trust and personal interests, personal 
connection, and corruption affect different individuals in different ways based on their personal 
integrity and interests. A person who demonstrates a high degree of respect for the rules and 
regulations of the agency would be considered to have a high degree of integrity and would be 
more likely to follow policy than someone with a record of bending, or not following, the rules. 
Integrity involves a willingness to place the organizations rules and interests above one’s own. 
4.2.3 Criticality 
 
 Criticality of the information itself and its potential harmful impact if not disclosed is a 
key influencer of action in sharing information. Studies by J. Lee and H.R. Rao have shown 
that officers are more likely to share information where there is a clear and present danger to 
life or property (Lee & Rao, 2007). The greater the threat, the greater the likelihood that the 
people involved will cooperate and share information. Preliminary work exploring possible 
causes and effects of inter-agency information-sharing systems adoption in the counter-
terrorism and disaster management domains involved an exploration of environmental and 
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situational conditions for cooperation between emergency management agencies. The 
perceived information assurance of others and having information sharing standards were 
more strongly related to agencies sharing than were cultural norms, in emergency 
contexts. The study of Lee and Rao supports the assertion that during a crisis, where 
criticality is described as a factor, people are more willing to share information regardless 
of other influences. The timeliness of the information itself is also related to criticality. 
The relationship of time to the consequences or effectiveness of the information 
influences whether or not the information is shared or not. In the case of information 
obtained too late or after the fact, it may or may not be shared based on what 
consequence it may have at that point in time. Information of a questionable value may 
be held in waiting so that it can be verified or supported in some way before sharing. As 
the time draws near to where the information may become useless if not shared, the 
decision to share or not share is reevaluated. 
4.3   Policy Influences 
 
4.3.1 Policy Conflict, Competition and Confusion 
 
 Agency policy also has influence on whether information gets shared or not. In an agency 
with defined policy as to what is to be shared, it is easier for staff to make the determination to 
follow through with information that is clearly within the guidelines. Clear and enforced rules for 
information sharing lead to better sharing of this information (Carter & United States, 2004). 
Policies also vary and are subject to interpretation. 
 The legal boundaries surrounding intelligence information sharing are unclear. This lack 
of clarity in law and policy was reflected in the statement of John McKay, former United States 
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Attorney for the Western District of Washington, speaking before the subcommittee on 
Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment on Homeland Security 
(McKay, 2008). Having uncertainty in what is allowed to be provided presents a problem for 
those wishing to share as much intelligence information as they can (Carter, 2005). The concerns 
over privacy and violation of individual rights of citizens must be addressed (German & Stanley, 
2008). There is no clear standard or ready guideline for agencies that addresses information 
sharing factors at the federal and local levels in a readily usable way (Swire, 2006; Thompson & 
Kaarst-Brown, 2005). Civil liberties issues must be addressed (Martin, 2004). If agencies had 
this resource, they would be in a better position to actively share information and address the 
concerns over privacy and sharing (Carter & United States, 2004). The notion of these barriers to 
information sharing as a “wall” has been proffered for some time, yet arguments can be made 
that it is lack of knowledge about current statutes and policy and not the statutes themselves that 
are hindering agencies from sharing information with each other (Martin, 2004).   
 Furthermore, based on the funding or evaluation policy, agencies may compete for 
resources and there is a competitive element to doing the job better than other agencies that have 
shared interests and responsibility. For instance, funding for activities may be based on how 
many crimes are solved or specific incidents handled by a particular agency. An example of this 
would be formula grants, which are disseminated based on key reported activities handled by an 
agency. Actually, the Department of Justice alone distributed $2.396 billion dollars of 
assistance to law enforcement and other agencies based on formula and competitive grant 
requests and other programs (USDOJ, 2008). This leads to competition for important cases and 
an interest in being the agency to close a particular case or handle a particular incident. As long 
as funding determinations are made in this manner, competition among agencies will likely 
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continue to be an influencing factor. Under the present structure, many law enforcement 
agencies are put in a position of being in competition for statistics and resources with other 
agencies because agencies from the federal to local levels each must justify their budgets to their 
constituencies and oversight entities. There is a belief that showing your agency as the one 
doing the work, being involved in activity, and bearing the responsibility will all correlate to 
getting awarded more money and resources. 
4.3.2   Governance 
 
 Governance structures and systems operating in the law enforcement arena can create 
conflicts of interest and reduce cooperation. Law enforcement agencies in the United States 
share overlapping responsibilities and jurisdiction with no one unitary command; this creates 
problems over control and authority in investigations, information sharing, and access. Officials 
independently act in the interests of their constituencies as well as for the broader collective 
good. The approach and expectations for collaboration in this environment must be challenged 
to be effective in the future. Law enforcement in the US remains uniquely decentralized and 
does not operate under unitary command or control. Recent case studies on knowledge sharing 
within public sector inter-organizational networks confirm that there are information-sharing 
difficulties across agencies (Jing & Pengzhu, 2007; Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 
2006). Agencies overlap jurisdictions and responsibility; each with a duty to their own 
constituencies. Each has their own notion and structure for control. 
 There is not a clear and universal guide to what intelligence information can and cannot 
be shared across the federal, tribal, state and local levels.  The laws and policies governing 
information security, dissemination, and use vary across local, state, tribal, and federal agencies.  
Where agencies do not have clear leadership and guidance on whether or not intelligence 
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information may be shared, they may choose to take the safer path of not sharing to protect 
them from liability. For instance, security clearances for intelligence information sharing and 
recognition of legitimate rights to access intelligence information by local, state, tribal, and 
federal agencies remains a process that is not coordinated or acknowledged across agencies. 
5. Conceptual Model 
 
 A conceptual model based on the impacts of two types of direction or force of 
influences affecting whether or not sharing occurs: facilitators and detractors is introduces 
here.  The model is based on the key influences on intelligence information sharing that were 
analyzed in Section 3. This conceptual model is an offspring of Lewin’s force field analysis, 
which is used here for looking at factors or forces influencing the decision of an individual or 
organization to share intelligence information (Thomas, 1985). It is also consistent with 
organizational change stages suggested by Lewin (1951) and others (Kaarst-Brown, 1999).  
Forces may act as facilitators– driving movement toward information sharing– or as detractors 
drawing momentum away from a choice to share something like intelligence information. 
Each of the factors depicted under the headings given in the information sharing framework has 
a potential for facilitating or detracting from a choice by the person or agency to share 
intelligence information in a given context or not, and to what extent. Facilitators include the 
positive influences that result from technical, social, and policy factors. Detractors include 
negative influences resulting from technical, social and policy rules, regulations, actions or 
perceptions (see Figure 11 below). The combination and interaction of the facilitating and 
detracting forces leads to a condition of sharing or not sharing information. 
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Figure 11: Factors Influencing Information Sharing 
 
 
 As facilitators, technical   factors  such  as   having compatible operating systems, 
software, hardware, data definitions, secure access, control, high usability, and system 
availability all can work towards improving the potential for information sharing but do not 
cause information to be shared (Lee & Rao, 2007; Scott, 2006). Regarding technology, picture 
two young friends who tie two tin cans together on a string to communicate; it is not the 
technology of the cans that cause the two to talk across the string but their desire to share with 
each other that controls use of technology. It is therefore the social and cultural aspects of the 
relationship that matter more than the technology in the equation for information sharing. 
Today, the two kids from the previous example are texting. 
 Socially, greater trust and knowledge of the other parties involved may lead to a greater 
tendency towards intelligence information sharing. This process involves considerations of 
agency culture and personal ties or connections with other involved agencies, which may 
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include informal or  "shadow" networking ties outside the workplace such as connections to 
family and friends or other associations that involve one member having some other contact or 
relationship with someone associated with another agency (Drake, Steckler, & Koch, 2004; 
Marks & Sun, 2007). A common example involves family, friends, or affiliation through 
participation in clubs or activities that involve others apart from the work environment. These 
external contacts can have a positive, or negative, influence on the likelihood of intelligence 
information sharing. Shared training and joint operations such as the U.S. Marshals’ joint 
fugitive round up effort with state and local agencies in Florida were shown to have a positive 
effect on information sharing (Clark, 2008). Importance to those involved, as described 
previously, can be a critical factor influencing the sharing of intelligence information as well. 
Information that is credible and which may result in some specific harm or loss is more readily 
shared. The pressure to share this information i s  increased where there may be an approaching 
deadline or need to act quickly for safety (Lee & Rao, 2007). 
 In the area of legal influence, having a clear and enforced agency policy regarding 
intelligence information sharing can lead to a greater likelihood that information will be shared 
as will increased knowledge of laws and regulations, which allow for intelligence information 
sharing. Having an established governance system and involving participation by others has also 
been shown to facilitate collaboration and intelligence information sharing where members and 
organizations had positive regard for and accepted each other’s roles (Cresswell, Pardo, & 
Hassan, 2007; Park, Sandhu, & Ahn, 2001). It has been shown that people within agencies are 
more likely to participate in sharing systems that they have choice, investment and control over. 
 As detractors, intelligence comes from the field or other sources to an agency and the 
identified factors may negatively affect the degree to which this information is likely to be shared. 
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Legal factors with a negative influence include having separate security clearances, not uniform or 
recognized across agencies, laws regarding privacy, secrecy, or sharing of information that are 
conflicting or not well understood by participants. Social factors here also involve issues of lack of 
trust, integrity, assurance, or an agency culture, which is geared towards not sharing (Lee & Rao, 
2007). Trust is reduced where agencies compete with each other for statistics, media attention, and 
funding. Informal or outside contacts, which are described as part of the informal network, have 
great potential to provide a negative influence if the information may be potentially damaging to an 
entity or person. Criticality also includes timing of information and its potential impact such that 
where there is little urgency the pressure to share this intelligence is reduced and action may be 
delayed. Where there is no identified time frame or deadline, the information may not be reacted to 
in a timely manner and put to the side and not shared. Lack of knowledge or inaccurate knowledge 
about what actions can be taken regarding sharing of information can hinder information sharing. 
Matters of jurisdiction, authority, and governance or control over the power or influence also work 
against sharing (Drake et al., 2004). The means for quantifying or assessing the particular 
significance relative to other factors and forces remains an important question and subject for 
further research. 
 Technical factors can act as detractors as well. Many agencies use different hardware and 
software programs for communication and information management, and these may not interact 
together. Systems that are not responsive or show poor performance may not be adopted. Agencies 
with existing systems may not be financially able to change to more compatible or standardized 
systems. The costs for retraining personnel on to new services can be high as well. Costs for 
maintenance and upgrades of the systems must be considered as well. 
 These social, policy and technical factors can serve as the basis and model framework for 
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further investigation in this field. This paper argues that the inter-relationships between the 
identified factors influence the degree to which information sharing, and cooperation, is more or 
less likely to occur. This is proposed to be true for a given circumstance and environment and 
further that the resulting behavior can be observed, and represented in a conceptual model as the 
balance of this result. Knowledge of these factors may predict action. 
 Developed here for consideration is a proposed conceptual model based on the proposed 
information sharing framework that may be used to describe and to predict information sharing 
behaviors based on knowledge of the three influencing factors (social, technical, and policy) at a 
given time and for a given environment. The conceptual model proposed here was suggested from 
the research, literature, and observations conducted to date. Probable effects from modifying the 
influencing factors are more readily apparent and easier to identify using such a model. The 
conceptual model and its use are described in greater detail in the following. 
 The relationships in the proposition that are being investigated may be depicted 
conceptually in the form of an information-sharing model (this is an  early conceptual 
approach, and there are not sufficient verified quantitative tools at this time to be able to 
accurately place specific weighting or values to these elements in advance). The current or end 
state of sharing or not sharing intelligence information (IIS) is the result of the combined 
effects of identified facilitators (F) and detractors (D) present or occurring within an agency at 
the time of consideration, and is shown as IIS = f (F, D).  As they are used in this research, F is 
a function of the combination of the resulting facilitating forces for social, technical, and 
policy factors (F = (Stsu + Ttirc + Ptkg), and D is the sum of the detractor forces from those same 
factor headings (D = (Stsu + Ttirc + Ptkg). Sharing of information, which may also be considered 
cooperation, occurs where the equation results in an imbalance in the form of a positive, 
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negative, or zero - end state. If there are more forces working against sharing than those that 
work for sharing, the balance is tipped towards not sharing. It may also be the case that a 
stalemate can occur and information will not be shared. If both facilitating and detracting 
forces are equivalent (F = D) then it is a sum of zero or stalemate and information is not 
shared. One can alternatively combine summary versions of S for social (cultural) influences, 
T for technology influences, and P for policy issue influences to show the combined effect for 
IIS  as  IIS = f (SF+SD, TF+TD, PF+PD) or more simply IIS = f (S, T, P). This model may be 
further broken down to show how one may include various subcomponent influences and 
considerations such as i for interoperability, r for responsiveness, c for control, t for trust, s for 
informal networks, u for importance, k for knowledge, and g for governance factors within the 
broader categories. Not all of the factors and sub-factors may be present or available for 
consideration in a given case. The sub-categories are not meant to be exhaustive. The model 
and some possible components are show in the formulation and table in Figure 12 below: 
IIS = ƒ( F , D ) 
 
F = (Stsu + Ttirc + Ptkg)  
 
D = (Stsu + Ttirc + Ptkg) 
 
IIS = f (SF+SD, TF+TD, PF+PD) 
 
IIS = ƒ( S, T, P ) 
 
 
IIS = Sharing 
F = facilitators 
D = detractors 
S = Social factors 
  t = trust 
  s = informal   
       networks 
  u = importance  
T = Technical factors 
  t = trust 
  i  = interoperability 
  r  = responsiveness 
  c = control 
P = Policy factors 
  t = trust 
  k = knowledge 
  g = governance 
 
Figure 12: Information Sharing Model - V1 
140 
 
 
 
 The conceptual model illustrated here can be used for understanding, description, or 
comparison purposes. It can serve as a tool to assess or predict sharing potential or action based on 
knowledge of inputs stemming from agency and environmental activity or conditions. One can 
also illustratively and conceptually change or manipulate the influencing factors to consider 
possible outcomes based on different inputs or actions. The model as a tool may describe a current 
or desired state, or serve as a predictor for the potential state given certain changes to influencing 
factors. Effects of the different influencing factors will be more readily apparent and easier to 
focus on using such a model. 
6.  Testing the Model 
 
 
This paper proposes that the act of sharing or not sharing intelligence information can 
be described by considering conditions in terms of three broad factors: Social, Technical, and 
Policy as these factors were defined and operationalized previously in this paper.  This 
relationship was shown as a conceptual model where intelligence information sharing (IIS) 
behavior is a function of the combined result of facilitating and detracting influences from 
the social, technical, and policy factors as shown previously. To test the model, an alternate 
version of the conceptual model is used.  The alternate model is based on the same 
assumptions and conditions but allows survey data to be more readily input for demonstration 
and examination purposes. It is argued that IIS=ƒ(S,T,P) is an equivalent means of 
representing the relationship IIS=ƒ(F,D). A proposition is that the information-sharing model 
created is useful for describing and understanding intelligence information sharing behavior 
among participants in the law enforcement and broader public safety environment.  
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Intelligence Information Sharing (IIS) = ƒ (Social, Technical, Policy) 
IIS = ƒ (S, T, P) 
Figure 13: Information Sharing Model - V2 
 
 
To demonstrate utility of the conceptual model, survey data were used to show the 
relationship of these three factors to actual intelligence information sharing behavior. The data 
used is from a national survey of law enforcement agencies in the United States conducted on 
behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) for 2003.
10
 There are approximately 19,000 
law enforcement agencies in the United States at the local to federal levels. This survey was sent 
to 3,254 random agencies at the non-federal levels. The response rate was 90.6% for agencies 
overall and 100% for state agencies; 2,859 surveys were included in the final analysis. Of those, 
2,741, or 95.9%, had sufficient data to be used here as the data needed to have sufficient 
information to verify agency name and be able to correlate to UCR submission information. The 
2,741 survey respondents describe this population with 1.75% error at the 95% confidence level. 
Researchers consider the unusable 4.1% of total respondent data to have an insignificant impact 
on the findings for comparison purposes.  
In the case model, intelligence information sharing (IIS) is represented by the response of 
agencies as to whether or not they participate in submitting their intelligence information to the 
                                                 
10
 United States Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Law Enforcement 
Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS): 2003 Sample Survey of Law Enforcement 
Agencies [Computer file ICPSR04411-v1. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [distributor], 2006-05-10. doi:10.3886/ICPSR04411.v1. 
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Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) of the U.S. Department of Justice. This is a national repository 
for law enforcement data. Participation in the UCR is recommended for all agencies, but is not 
required by law. Agencies are considered to be sharing intelligence information if they send data 
to the UCR and they are considered to be not sharing if they do not send information to this 
repository. UCR submission is a dichotomous variable (yes or no to submitting intelligence 
information to the UCR) that is available from the data. 
The three factors, Social, Technical, and Policy, are derived through a process of 
assessing individual survey response items from the national survey and assigning them to these 
factor categories as appropriate. Researchers identified five relevant questions from the survey 
for each factor category to build ordinal variables for Social, Technical, and Policy factors from 
the selected responses. For the factor categories, each question was given a 1 or 0 based on 
whether a described condition was present or not. Each question response contributed equal 
weights 1 or 0 to the total possible for each factor category. The result was creation of three 
ordinal factor categories having scores ranging from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 5. The 
following is a listing of the factor categories with their associated questions as taken from the 
survey. The V# shown is the data item(s) identifier in the dataset followed by the text of the 
corresponding question number as taken from the survey. 
Social 
 
V43 - “Enter the number of ACTUAL part-time paid agency employees:  a. Sworn 
personnel with general arrest powers.” Any number indicated here greater than 0 is 
assigned a 1. 
V70 - “Indicate your agency's minimum education requirement which new (non-lateral) 
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officer recruits must have within two years of hiring.”  Responses indicating some 
college or more are assigned a 1, otherwise 0. 
V97 - “On average, how many total in-service hours of training are required annually for 
your agency's NON-PROBATIONARY field/patrol officers? A 1 is assigned for any total 
hours indicated here and a 0 for none. 
V129 - V135 – “Does your agency provide special pay/benefits for any of the 
following?” A 1 is assigned for checking any of the eight listed incentives (Education, 
Hazardous duty, Merit/performance, Shift differential, Special skills proficiency, 
Bilingual ability, Tuition reimbursement, Military service), otherwise 0. 
V453 - “Which of the following best describes your agency’s written policy for pursuit 
driving?” A 1 is assigned for indicating either of the following; Judgmental (leaves 
decisions to Officer’s discretion) or Agency does not have a written policy pertaining to 
pursuit driving, otherwise a 0.  (A part of this question involves a written policy issue, 
however, the response is included here as a Social indicator due to its relevance as an 
indicator of agency culture and trust, putting greater faith in officers or creating an 
environment of less strict control.)  
Technical 
 
V147 - “Does your agency participate in an operational 9-1-1 emergency telephone 
system (i.e., your agency's units can be dispatched as a result of a call to 9-1-1)?”  
Checking yes to having either a basic or enhanced system is a 1, otherwise a 0. 
V239 - “Do the public safety agencies operating in or nearby your jurisdiction (including 
your agency) use a shared radio network infrastructure that achieves interoperability?” 
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Checking yes is a 1, otherwise 0. 
V358- V386 - “Indicate whether your agency's field/patrol officers use any the following 
types of computers or terminals WHILE IN THE FIELD.” For checking a box for having 
a computer available in the vehicle or as a portable it is a 1, otherwise 0. 
V392 - “Do any of your agency’s field /patrol officers have direct access to the following 
types of information using IN-FIELD vehicle-mounted or portable computers?” 
Checking yes for Inter-agency information system is a 1, otherwise 0. 
V419 – V436 - “Does your agency maintain its own computerized files with any of the 
following information? “ Checking any or all of the listed files (Alarms, Arrests, 
Biometric data for use with facial recognition sytem, Calls for service, Criminal histories, 
Fingerprints, Incident reports, Illegal attempts to purchase firearms, Intelligence relate to 
potential terrorist activity, Stolen property, Summonses, Traffic accidents, Traffic 
citations, Traffic stops, Use-of-force incidents, Warrants) is a 1, otherwise 0. 
Policy  
V237 - “Does your agency have a written plan that specifies actions to be taken in the 
event of terrorist attacks?  (Include emergency operation plans that would be applicable 
to such an attack.)” A yes here is a 1, otherwise 0. 
V238 - “Does your agency's plan include mutual aid or cooperative agreements between 
city, county, transit, public works, and/or other agencies?” A yes is 1 a no is 0. 
V208 - “Does your agency's mission statement include a community policing 
component?” A yes here is a 1, otherwise 0. 
V213 - “During the 12-month period ending June 30, 2003, did your agency have a 
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problem-solving partnership or written agreement with any of the following?”  Checking 
“Other local law enforcement agencies” is a 1, otherwise 0.  
V440 & V451 - “Does your agency have written policy directives on the following? “ 
Checking yes for both “Code of conduct and appearance” and “Interacting with the 
media” is a 1, otherwise 0. 
6.1 Describing intelligence information sharing 
 
 
It is important to know the factors that lead to an agency sharing intelligence information. 
This is represented through examining characteristics of respondent agencies who answer the 
question of do they submit information to the UCR. This example represents the broader 
question of what are observable behaviors, as agency factors, that impact intelligence 
information sharing in the law enforcement community. The instrument used to predict whether 
or not an agency is more or less likely to share intelligence information is comprised of a 
combination of three identifiable factors: Social, Technical and Policy. The question is whether 
or not this is a reliable test for identifying the likelihood of those identified elements acting as 
predictors for agencies sharing intelligence information, in this case UCR data. The goal of this 
research is to provide evidence of this model’s utility for predicting or explaining the outcome of 
sharing intelligence information by agencies in the law enforcement community. 
6.2 Multiple Regression described 
 
Multiple regression is a technique in statistics that allows one to predict expected 
outcomes based on observed patterns of related variables in the data. It is more than a descriptive 
technique. Multiple regression rises to a predictive level of investigation of phenomenon. To 
predict the degree of intelligence information sharing among law enforcement agencies, one may 
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look at variables such as having a written policy on sharing, participation in multi-agency 
communications systems, internal structures such as computer infrastructures and others. 
Variables such as these can be captured, such as through observation or survey. As a model, they 
may contribute to understanding intelligence information sharing by an agency. The model 
proposed in this article postulates that intelligence information sharing behavior can be 
understood through created factors of Social, Technical and Policy, as previously identified.  To 
test this proposition, multiple regression analysis is conducted using the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) survey data. 
From Princeton.edu, multiple regression is: “a statistical technique that predicts values of 
one variable on the basis of two or more other variables” (wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn, 
05/01/2009).  
In multiple regression, researchers use “independent variables” to identify variables they 
expect will influence the “dependent variable” and so when used here they are called “predictor 
variables” because they are variables that are believed to have an effect on the dependent 
variable– in this case, intelligence information sharing (which may also be called the “criterion 
variable” in the literature) and which is operationalized as the agency submitting data to the 
UCR.   
In 1927 the  Department of Justice created a nationwide information sharing initiative 
known as Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. Agencies report certain arrest and incident 
information to a central repository. This sharing of information with other agencies and the 
public constitutes an act of information sharing by the participating agency. The majority of law 
enforcement agencies today voluntarily participate, but not all (USDOJ, 2008). Researchers here 
argue that sharing information through the UCR is indicative of an agencies propensity to share 
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other information of greater or lesser criticality.  Participation in UCR reporting is useful as a 
criterion variable for investigating information sharing behavior by an agency more broadly. 
Multiple regression provides an acceptable way to identify predictor variables, which are 
useful to estimating an agencies likely degree of intelligence information sharing based on what 
is known. 
6.3 SPSS Example 
 
The example here uses SPSS version 19. The data set comes from the national survey of 
law enforcement agencies in the United States conducted on behalf of the U.S. Department of 
Justice (USDOJ) for 2003-2004. There are approximately 19,000 law enforcement agencies in 
the United States at the local to federal levels. This survey was sent to 3,254 agencies at the non-
federal levels. The response rate was 90.6% for agencies overall and 100% for state agencies; 
2,859 surveys were included in the final analysis. Of those, 2,741, or 95.9%, of those had 
sufficient data to be used here as data needed to have sufficient information to verify agency 
name and be able to connect to UCR submission information. 
A metric for Intelligence Information Sharing (IIS) was selected to describe whether or 
not intelligence information is shared by an agency. The IIS response result is the criterion 
variable. IIS is comprised of the dichotomous response to whether or not the agency submits data 
to the UCR, a 1 for yes and 0 for no. This metric is used to describe whether or not the agency 
shares or does not share intelligence information.  
Predictor variables for the IIS criterion variable include the created variables: Social, 
Technical, and Policy, as described above. 
There were several other trials of the linear regression conducted. These included the 
variables identified above and also included other variables such as; population, state, budget and 
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even whether or not having a horse unit had an predictive effect. The alternate trials did not 
improve the predictive capability significantly over the present model. Interestingly, having a 
horse unit did show a slight correlation to predicting IIS, as did number of dismissals, but not 
enough to warrant including them as additional factors. The aim was to test whether the three 
identified factors could be used to accurately predict intelligence information sharing in 
accordance with the model and not necessarily to establish that it was the best formulation of all 
choices. SPSS output is provided below. 
 
6.4  Regression 
 
 
[DataSet] “LEMA2003_2741.sav” 
 
 
 
Descriptive Statisticsb 
 
Meana 
Root Mean 
Square N 
IIS .87 .934 2741 
SOCIAL 2.00 2.172 2741 
TECHNICAL 2.46 2.582 2741 
POLICY 2.91 3.176 2741 
a. The observed mean is printed 
b. Coefficients have been calculated through the origin. 
 
Figure 14: Descriptive Statistics 
 
The first table was produced by the descriptives option and contains information on 
means, the root mean square, and numbers of the population. It also tells that the coefficients have 
been calculated through the origin. Correlations provide a first look at the model as assembled. 
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Correlationsa 
 IIS SOCIAL TECHNICAL POLICY 
Std. Cross-product IIS 1.000 .873 .896 .868 
SOCIAL .873 1.000 .905 .882 
TECHNICAL .896 .905 1.000 .932 
POLICY .868 .882 .932 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) IIS . .000 .000 .000 
SOCIAL .000 . .000 .000 
TECHNICAL .000 .000 . .000 
POLICY .000 .000 .000 . 
N IIS 2741 2741 2741 2741 
SOCIAL 2741 2741 2741 2741 
TECHNICAL 2741 2741 2741 2741 
POLICY 2741 2741 2741 2741 
a. Coefficients have been calculated through the origin. 
 
Figure 15: Correlations 
 
The correlations table provides details of the correlation between pairs of the chosen 
variables. For a good predictive model, one does not want strong correlations between criterion 
and predictor variables. The values in the top box are the Pearson Correlation output and all are 
below 1, which is acceptable. The Sig (1-tailed) section and counts in the N section are also 
acceptable, well below .05 and complete counts. 
 
Variables Entered/Removedb,c 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 POLICY, 
SOCIAL, 
TECHNICAL 
. Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: IIS 
c. Linear Regression through the Origin 
 
Figure 16: Variables Entered/Removed 
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The box Variables Entered/Removed shows the result from the “Enter” query, which 
included all of the variables chosen and so all are show here as being used. 
Model Summaryc,d 
Model R R Squareb 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
Change Statistics 
Durbin-
Watson 
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 
Sig. F 
Change 
1 .910a .828 .827 .388 .828 4379.595 3 2738 .000 1.924 
a. Predictors: POLICY, SOCIAL, TECHNICAL 
b. For regression through the origin (the no-intercept model), R Square measures the proportion of the variability in the 
dependent variable about the origin explained by regression. This CANNOT be compared to R Square for models, which 
include an intercept. 
c. Dependent Variable: IIS 
d. Linear Regression through the Origin 
 
Figure 17: Model Summary 
 
The model summary shows the result from the choice of predictor variables and method. 
The R square value is shown here as .828, which means that this model accounts for 82.8 % of 
variance in the IIS scores. This is a significant percentage for this model. ANOVA is now 
conducted for further validation and significance information. 
 
ANOVAc,d 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1977.837 3 659.279 4379.595 .000a 
Residual 412.163 2738 .151   
Total 2390.000b 2741    
a. Predictors: POLICY, SOCIAL, TECHNICAL 
b. This total sum of squares is not corrected for the constant because the constant is zero for regression 
through the origin. 
c. Dependent Variable: IIS 
d. Linear Regression through the Origin 
 
Figure 18: ANOVA 
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The ANOVA reports an assessment of overall significance of the model as an F value of 
4379.595 with a (Sig.) p < 0.05 so this model is significant. 
 
Coefficientsa,b 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 SOCIAL .133 .008 .310 16.085 .000 
TECHNICAL .167 .009 .463 18.513 .000 
POLICY 
 
.048 .007 .164 7.266 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: IIS 
b. Linear Regression through the Origin 
 
Figure 19: Coefficients 
 
From the coefficient table, the Standardized Beta coefficients show a measure of each 
variables contribution to the model. These standardized beta coefficients are interpreted in a 
similar way to correlation coefficients or factor weights. Large values here indicate that a unit of 
change in the given variable will have a large effect upon the criterion variable (IIS). Signs, + or – 
of the regression or B coefficients show the direction of the relationship between the variables. If 
positive, the relationship of this particular variable to the dependent variable is positive or 
increasing. If negative, the relationship of the particular variable to the dependent variable is 
negative or declining. For a B coefficient of 0, there is no relationship. 
The order of relative importance from the B and Beta figures suggests the order of 
importance of the independent variables in this model changes slightly from the unstandardized 
Coefficients to the standardized Beta. The standardized Beta coefficient shows the order from 
greater influence to lesser: TECHNICAL, SOCIAL, and then POLICY. A greater emphasis is on 
152 
 
 
the standardized Beta because of the comparison that is being made across equations. 
As shown, the t and p (Sig.) values provide an indication of the influence of the predictor 
variables such that a large absolute t with small p value implies greater impact on the criterion 
variable. These values are also significant: all over 7 and p < 0.05. 
A histogram and scatterplot of the model are provided below. Scatter plots show direction 
and strength of the relationships between variables. The scatter plot shows a strong positive linear 
relationship with a few outliers. The predictor variables have a positive influence on the criterion 
variable, IIS. A histogram from SPSS on the regression standardized residual to frequency was 
produced as well. This shows the data conforming to a normal curve.  
The conclusions follow the two figures below. 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Histogram and Scatterplot for IIS 
 
 
The statistical package SPSS V.19 was used to analyze data from the 2003 U.S. 
Department of Justice survey of law enforcement agencies. Using the enter method, a significant 
model for IIS was established with R square = .828; F3, 2738 = 4379.595, p < 0.000*. 
Significant variables are shown below:  
 
Predictor Variable     Beta             p        .                
SOCIAL      .310  p < 0.000* 
TECHNICAL      .463  p < 0.000* 
POLICY      .164  p < 0.000* 
*actual value not shown as it is beyond three decimal places. 
 
The three-variable model strongly predicts the outcome of the IIS metric regarding 
intelligence information sharing by law enforcement agencies. 
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Figure 21: Influence of Factors 
 
 
The chart above shows the influence of the three factors upon IIS. The investigation of 
these influences will inform the model for the degree of influence each may have relative to the 
other so that decision makers can pattern solutions towards the desired end. This one case is not 
conclusive. This work can serve as the basis and framework for further investigation, which 
should focus on further quantifying the influence of these elements as well as confirming, or 
disputing, their impact and relevance in the model.  
By using the approach developed, one can visualize the effects of making changes in 
different areas of influence on the level of information sharing and observe the outcomes. One 
can see how adjustments in degree of influence for the influencing factors identified determine 
whether or not intelligence information is shared under the given circumstances. 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
While millions of dollars have been invested in technologies to improve 
intelligence information sharing among public safety agencies at the federal, tribal, state 
Intelligence 
Information 
Shared 
Social 
(.310) 
Technical 
(.463) 
Policy 
(.164) 
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and local levels, there remains a hesitation to share this information between agencies. 
This lack of coordination has hindered the ability of these entities to prevent and respond 
to crime, terrorism and to protect the public. The work done to date by others has not 
produced widely accepted solutions or paradigms for understanding the problem. This 
research was conducted by investigators including law enforcement personnel and in that 
way provides a unique insider perspective to understanding the problem. A framework and 
theory of intelligence information sharing has now been created through a multi-method 
process involving literature review, document analysis, participant observation, and 
interviews with practitioners in the field. A model consisting of three major factor areas of 
influence; Technical, Social, and Policy are identified and successfully tested using data 
from a National survey of law enforcement agencies. This model and theory should serve 
as a basic conceptual framework for further academic work that may be used by 
practitioners and academics alike and lead to additional investigation and clarification of 
the identified factors and the degree of impact they exert on the system so that actionable 
solutions can be identified and implemented. 
This research has led to the creation of a conceptual framework and model for 
information sharing that is both descriptive and predictive. It is posited in this research that 
intelligence information sharing between law enforcement agencies is affected by social, 
technical, and policy factors, which are comprised of issues and considerations including, 
but not limited to: interoperability, availability, control, trust, informal networks, 
criticality, policy conflict, competition, and governance. This was done through a research 
process involving literature review, field observation, experience, and interviews with 
practitioners in the field.  Researchers involved included members of the law enforcement 
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community, providing for a unique insider perspective to investigating and understanding 
information and collaboration issues in this community.  
Within the broader identified problem areas of technical, social, and policy factors 
individual identifiable factors were found that play roles in influencing whether or not 
information is ultimately shared.  This research has identified the major areas of influence and 
posits that these factors work to facilitate or detract from information sharing and cooperative 
behavior between agencies.  
The information sharing model consisting of three major influencing factor areas: 
Technical, Social, and Policy was successfully tested using data from a National survey of law 
enforcement agencies.  
The UCR is useful as a criterion variable for testing purposes, however, it does not speak 
directly to other forms of information sharing that may be more difficult or critical.  Researchers 
here argue that agencies who are willing to share UCR information are more likely to share 
critical information and even innocuous information generally than those who do not participate.  
This conceptual model and theory should serve as a starting point for future academic 
research and lead to clarification of the identified factors and the degree of impact they exert on 
the system so that actionable solutions can be identified and implemented.  
The information-sharing model, for considering the impacts and outcomes from the 
interaction or manipulation of the identified factors, should be further tested and validated. 
Additional tools for quantification of the factor components identified will be developed in 
further extensions of this work. This will help practitioners and policy makers identify new 
strategies to improve information sharing among all law enforcement agencies and will result in 
improved law enforcement capability to prevent and respond to crime, terrorist activity, and 
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other emergencies as well as lead to greater effectiveness in overall public service response and 
delivery across government entities in general. 
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ESSAY 2: Towards More Rapid and Effective Communication between Responders to 
Emergency Situations
11
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
That communication and information sharing gaps occur between and across responders 
and stakeholders in emergency response incidents is well known (Barr, Burther, & Mahy, 2011; 
Kovacs & Spens, 2011; Nivolianitou & Synodinou, 2011; Gaynor, Brander, Pearce, & Post, 
2008); what to effectively do about it is not. This article reports on conclusions drawn from 
empirical sources and the literature towards that goal. This article provides recommendations that 
speak to the gaps noted by the work of others as well as through first hand observations. This 
research investigated factors associated with fostering rapid and effective communications 
between various responders to emergency situations. The article presents conclusions by first 
describing the problem and presenting a review of past and current literature followed by a 
description of research methodology, then a discussion of findings and observations that were 
made, and, lastly, a summary of the conclusions and recommendations are presented. The findings 
from this research should be used to inform the design of policy and system features and 
functionality for those engaged with emergency response at all levels.  As for the academic 
community, the work should be considered part of a continuing investigation into understanding 
and improving collective response to crises considering the social, technical and policy factors. 
Timely and effective response to crises, disasters, or infrastructure failures requires shared 
situational awareness on the part of decision makers and real-time information exchange between 
                                                 
11
 This is an expanded version of the article by Treglia, J. V., McKnight, L. W., Kuehn, A., Ramnarine-Rieks, A. U., Venkatesh, 
M., & Bose, T. (2011). Interoperability by “Edgeware”: Wireless Grids for Emergency Response. 2011 44th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS).  
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formal and informal participants (Leavitt, Spelling, & Gonzales, 2007; United States, Executive 
Office of the President, & United States, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, 2006; Kean & Hamilton, 2004). Enabling policymakers, law enforcement, and 
citizens to interact in a crisis is a complex challenge, but one which can be met by a focus on the 
principle issue, which is the barriers to information sharing within and across secure networks and 
communities of trust (Wasserman, 2010). Technically providing for interoperability and 
coordination is necessary but not sufficient for overcoming this challenge. 
This article introduces a new approach to emergency response – called social emergency 
response.  A social emergency response is analogous to what might occur across general purpose 
social networks such as Facebook and Twitter, but in a localized context, and augmented by 
information-sharing methods and devices supporting the user which are not readily available – yet 
– to all users, whether in a crisis or otherwise. Services such as Facebook, Twitter and 
Crowdmap.com from Ushahidi may indeed provide valuable input to a social emergency 
response, but are each only a component of a social emergency response system. 
New devices and systems can enable a new paradigm for response to involve what is now 
described as a social emergency response. Delivery of situational awareness and exchange of vital 
information to and between disaster managers, response personnel, and citizens in a disaster area, 
through a new type of networking in difference with established response policy paradigms.  
The demonstration and evaluation of systems in use by law enforcement personnel during 
emergency response training exercises provides essential insight from practitioners dealing with 
the operational implications of new technologies and policy. Current tools and practices have been 
evaluated in both urban and rural communities, enabling generalizations to be drawn (NCR 
Project Team, 2009).  
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More effective response capability, and changes to established response protocols and 
governance, will be expected in due course. The anticipated merits and viability of a new social 
emergency response policy should be sufficiently evident to motivate further policy progress, 
widespread adoption, and diffusion of these systems and approaches, it is argued here.  
Key technical elements for social emergency response approaches are available in some 
early forms presently and in more sophisticated ways in the near future. There are advanced and 
more dispersed sharing/communication capabilities available already. These are being developed 
by various academic and private-sector entities with the ability to capture and share multiple 
wireless transmission media, including police, fire, EMS, municipal, private, cellular, CB bands, 
and others. The ability to have file sharing, social and multi-media integration to connect with 911 
centers, and first responders is becoming a reality. These are necessary but not sufficient hardware 
and software components of a social emergency response system, the policy and cultural changes 
must occur as well.  
Social and cultural aspects of coordination and engagement must be taken into account. 
Emergency situations are both complex and dynamic and it is difficult to account for exigencies in 
advance (Longstaff, 2003, 2009). Formal, informal, and non-traditional actors and their 
contribution to, and influence on, law enforcement and emergency response entities during an 
emergency have gained greater attention of late. The knowledge of how to include these 
participants in response solutions remains a challenge.  
Additionally, there is not yet a broad acceptance of these potentially more inclusive 
response models. Longstaff, Armstrons, Perrin, Parker, & Hidek, offer a preliminary framework 
for assessing community resilience as one such tool for policy makers (2010). Consistent with the 
theme of this article that framework is community-based, holistic, and scalable. Therefore, an 
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important element of a social emergency response policy is a re-conceptualization and focus on 
citizens and non-traditional stakeholders as central to the new paradigm for all stakeholders at a 
crisis to coordinate themselves. Research summarized in this article is intended to contribute to 
both social and technological change in emergency response policy and practice.  
Adoption of new collaborative technologies, but even more important, new policy 
approaches to emergency management – or as it may be called, a social emergency response 
policy – will be both more effective and lower in cost. Since citizens own resources, and devices 
are now shared tools and critical components for social emergency response, they will always be 
off-budget items for public agencies. Once the utility and viability of the novel software, services, 
and devices for social emergency response have been demonstrated, one may expect calls for 
parallel research efforts to buttress and support what would be a – socially acceptable, social 
emergency response policy – will be recognized as being needed, as well.  Although researchers 
here are confident in current and upcoming technical designs, which essentially are a synthesis 
and integration across various areas of expertise, it is recognized that the larger challenge is 
devising a social emergency response policy or creating the conditions under which such may 
emerge.  
Results of this research suggest specific elements of such a policy and environment. A 
wider and continued debate is necessary as observation of and lessons learned from additional 
exercises and actual incidents further inform and make the benefits apparent.  The policy and 
cultural change to accompany the new devices and services may involve a community policy, a 
state or national policy, or an industry self-regulatory policy; the crystal ball is too fuzzy to 
foretell. But one can definitely see telecommunications and network technologies being adopted 
and used in the near future, and suggest it is time to begin to consider both these systems, and the 
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appropriate policy response to their emergence publicly. 
 
2. Problem 
 
An effective social emergency response policy must reflect the reality that the true first 
responders to most disasters are neighbors or passersby, many of whom have small handheld 
computing devices, also known as a smart phone, tablet, or laptop, and includes victims. The old 
hierarchical model for emergency response, assuming helpless victims in need of rescue, breaks 
down when the citizens may, in fact, be better informed and coordinated than their supposed 
“rescuers” or there may be no other help. 
In addition to having new technology such as edgeware software (such as is described in 
the following sections), which can enable the coordination of people-to-people, people-to-
resources, and machines-to-machines, new paradigms for response are also necessary (McKnight, 
Bradner, Howison, 2004; McKnight, Lehr, Howison, 2007). Connecting non-traditional, but 
common, devices is particularly useful when extreme – emergency – conditions may degrade 
public networks or render them otherwise inoperable. Further, if an emergency occurs in a rural 
area, the volume of data traffic generated by emergency response personnel alone may quickly 
overwhelm even a well-functioning network infrastructure. Technical and social solutions must 
move toward enabling and leveraging the technology that is at hand and making it available to a 
broader audience.  
There is presently a surprising lack of utilization of existing technologies that can be used 
to produce and deliver the information products emergency managers need. A startling example is 
that the majority of 911 centers in the United States to not have capability to accept or send text 
messages, tweets or images from cell phones. Current 911 center computer-aided-dispatch (CAD) 
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systems have texting capability.  As an example, some 911 centers are using this for sending 
formatted texts to ambulance crews with arrival and dispatch times and other data needed for 
reporting.  For most centers, however, this is only “unofficially” used, as it is not a sanctioned 
emergency communications channel (the discussion of SMS-to-911 and related matters is 
important but beyond the scope of this article). A National Research Council report found that  
“overhead images provide the best early source of information on damage; yet the necessary 
investments in resources, training, and coordination are rarely given sufficient priority either by 
the general public or by society’s leaders” (National Research Council, 2007). Often the best 
source of situational awareness is remotely sensed data from the affected area delivered in real-
time or near real-time. This could also be images taken by civilians or responders on the scene 
using their own devices. Overhead imagery and associated remote sensing based information are 
also crucial to long term recovery from an incident and for planning mitigation strategies and only 
valuable when accessible to those involved. 
The first priority in a crisis is to contain the situation and rescue those in need, while there 
is still time to do so.  Law enforcement personnel, and local residents – save themselves, through a 
social emergency response process. The need for real or near real-time situational awareness can 
improve crisis response. Gaining a wide view including aerial images to identify hardest hit 
communities – or paths to escape – is just one resource that can help both. Social media are also 
being investigated for utility in this environment (Viel, Buehner, & Palenchar, 2011). This can 
involve images that identify and locate those in critical need as well as connecting resources and 
engaging in voice transmission. 
Problems for emergency response given the disparate systems won’t just go away.  The 
objective here is to identify the problems in the emergency response arena and suggest solutions 
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that may be undertaken using existing and emerging technology and policy as well as considering 
the social and human factors.  
A positive vision of the crisis response future includes better support for inclusion of 
activities and information from the public in disaster response and mass emergency events and 
relies upon technology as well as changes to existing response policy, structures, processes and 
expectations (Palen, Anderson, Mark, Martin, Sicker, Palmer, & Grunwald, 2010). This research 
has created a framework for understanding stakeholders, agents, and entities influencing law 
enforcement agencies to include technical, social, and policy concerns (Treglia, 2010).  There is 
growing interest in understanding citizen and government partnerships and in finding a successful 
means for government to engage with the private sector (Pittman, 2011). 
An additional focus here is on identification of formal and additional, informal and non-
traditional, actors and their influence on law enforcement and emergency response entities and 
related issues in crisis response. Other researchers have focused on these areas, which are now 
recognized as having relevance to a coordinated response to crisis incidents. Organizational 
influences are described in the work of Deverell and Olsson regarding organizational cultures 
effects on an organizations ability to change in response to crisis, where flexible structures have 
proven to be more adaptive (Deverell, Edward, & Eva-Karin Olsson, 2010). In regard to 
information sharing, Mariconi finds that IT must be in line with the professional cultures of the 
responding agencies in a crisis to be effective and that available technology, context, professional 
culture, and interaction are key factors impacting response (Marincioni, 2007).  Security and trust 
in the information has been a recognized concern in this arena as well as information quality 
(Robinson & Disley, 2010). Considerations for building communities of trust is described in 
Wasserman (2010). 
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3. Literature 
 
3.1. Emergency Response and Open Issues 
 
  There is a growing body of literature regarding information sharing in emergency response 
contexts. Adam, Atluri, Chun, Ellenberger, Shafiq, Vaidya, and Xiong (2008) investigated secure 
information sharing in emergency management contexts. Glomseth, Gottschalk, and Solli-Saether 
looked at occupational culture as a determinant of knowledge sharing by law enforcement 
agencies in an international study (Glomseth, Gottschalk, & Solli-Saether, 2007). Research on 
emergency services sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) reports “technical 
environments such as other agencies’ information assurance level and technical standards seem to 
encourage information sharing systems use” (Lee & Rao, 2007). Pardo, Gil-Garcia, and Burke, 
looked at the effects of governance structures in state and local criminal justice information 
sharing (Pardo, Gil-Garcia, & Burke, 2008). Local to state agency information sharing was the 
subject of the work by Akbulut, Kelle, Pawlowski, Schneider, and Looney (2009). Rational 
choice, trust and other issues for organizations were studied by Williams, Dias, Fedorowicz, 
Jacobson, Vilvovsky, Sawyer, and Tyworth (2009), and Gil-Garcia, Guler, Pardo, and Burke 
(2010).  
Recent case studies on knowledge sharing within public sector interorganizational 
networks confirm information sharing difficulties across agencies (Jing & Pengzhu, 2007; Pardo, 
Cresswell, Thompson, & Zhang, 2006). Emergency response agencies overlap jurisdictions and 
responsibility; each with a duty to their own constituencies. Traditionally, there has been a top-
down approach to attempts at implementation of information sharing mandates, typically from the 
Federal level downwards. Success in this has been limited. 
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Some of the recurring problems that have been identified include:  
 
1) Agencies have not established sufficient trust. 
2) Time sensitive information affects the sharing potential. 
3) Technical issues such as incompatibility, lack of standards and system reliability 
exist. 
4) Policies are not consistent or in pace with technology or society and may conflict 
with sharing interests.  
5) Personnel issues that involve social and security concerns can interfere with the 
information sharing processes. 
 
Problems can be classified into three major areas: technical, social, and policy (Treglia & 
Park, 2009). Technical factors include interoperability issues, availability, and control. Social 
factors involve social/cultural issues, trust, informal or "shadow" networks and criticality. Policy 
factors involve concerns over law and policy conflict and under what governance model or 
structure activities are allowed or restricted. Theoretical and empirical work has been done to 
identify factors that influence the sharing of information between local and state agencies 
(Akbulut et al., 2009). Those authors identify similar technical, agency and environmental factors 
that influence information sharing. A workshop on community resilience and security also 
investigated “what attributes (human, social, cultural, political, economic, technological) within a 
community are essential to ensuring resilience, and how are they interrelated (Longstaff, Mergel, 
& Armstrong, 2009)?”  
 Issues of security and trust are included in the discussion here as there are particularities 
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attending the emergency response arena deserving special attention. 
3.2. Technology Advances  
 
The evolution of communication networks has gone from centralized, hierarchical systems 
under the management of a single entity toward decentralized, distributed systems under the 
collective management of many entities. Intelligence has shifted to edge-nodes, which 
increasingly are capable of acting as autonomous agents making complex decisions to create, 
deliver, or receive services (McKnight, Sharif, & Wijngaert, 2005; McKnight & Howison, 2003; 
McKnight, Lehr, & Howison, 2007). Previously, grid computing focused on large-scale sharing of 
computing resources such as software, hardware, databases, and data sources (Foster & 
Kesselman, 2004). The growth of wireless increased opportunities for computing to become 
ubiquitous (always available, always connected). Heterogeneity of networking resources needs to 
be managed (mobility and wireless/wired interconnection). There are an increasing number of end 
nodes (connected computers in everything from bodies to clothes, appliances, cars, and walls). 
This has led to a transition; wireless grids are organized as ad hoc networks and represent an 
advanced state of evolution in communication networks (McKnight & Howison, 2003; McKnight, 
Lehr, & Howison, 2007). Wireless grids are defined as the ad-hoc dynamic sharing of physical 
and virtual resources among heterogeneous devices. Wireless grid applications may be considered 
in three categories of applications: (1) those that collect or aggregate data; (2) take advantage of 
their location or where they can move to; and (3) take advantage of cooperation among a mesh of 
mobile devices. 
Related work regarding wireless grids include works on user and socio-technical 
perspectives and challenges (McKnight, Sharif, & Wijngaert, 2005; McKnight & Howison, 2003), 
coordination of user and device behaviors (McKnight, Lehr, & Howison, 2007), and future 
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internet applications and bridging communicative channels (McKnight, Howison, & Bradner, 
2004; Dutton, Gillett, McKnight, & Peltu, 2004; McKnight, 2007). There has been increasing 
acknowledgement of the nascent growth of wireless grids as a new engineering field of scientific 
inquiry and innovation (Fitzek & Katz, 2007; Manvi & Birie, 2009; Li, Sun, Yu, & Cai, 2009; 
Birie & Manvi, 2010, 2011; Li, Gong, Lai, Han, Qiu, & Yang, 2012; Sun, Mao, Liu, Liu, & Guan, 
2012).  
The grid, as conceptualized, is an emerging infrastructure that will fundamentally change 
the way people think about and use computing resources (McKnight, 2007). The concept of this 
virtual workspace is that of a configurable execution environment created and managed by 
reflecting client requirements (Foster & Kesselman, 2004; ISOC, 2010). A broader understanding 
of the nature of the opportunities offered by grid computing, virtual environments, and the 
technologies or standards needed to realize those opportunities is now required (Foster & 
Kesselman, 2004; Brooks, Caicedo, & Park, 2012).  
“Edgeware” describes software that resides beyond the cloud, across edge network 
devices, both wired and wireless (Treglia, Ramnarine-Rieks, & McKnight, 2010). Wireless Grids 
‘edgeware’ technology sits at the outermost limits of networks, allowing all facets of a user’s 
environment to be interoperated and shared easily. This new class of software for ad hoc 
distributed resource collaboration allows for coordination of devices and content on a new scale. 
There are many kinds of devices that can be shared using this service– for example, mobile 
phones and Internet devices, printers, displays, remote sensing devices, local weather sensors, 
wireless sensor networks, etc. 
The fundamental difference that this form of interconnection has over traditional 
networking is that it allows for true resource sharing and not simply access. In the case of wireless 
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grids, you access distant resources and programs similar to using the device directly. In this way, 
legacy concerns and incompatibility issues are overcome. Security and access controls have been 
established such that owners determine use and constraints. Ownership, user autonomy, and 
sovereignty regarding the sharing and process are maintained. The wireless grids technology 
identified here transforms disparate devices into a shared and interactive grid of accessible 
resources. Technical standards and open application programming interfaces (API) are needed to 
enable the adoption and growth of this new technology. 
3.3. Standards and Protocols Development 
 
Governments are responding to the need for standards in public warning systems. 
Examples of these activities include: “Partnership for Public Warning” in the U.S., “Forum for 
Public Safety Communication Europe”, and also the Internet Society's "Public Warning Network 
Challenge" (ISOC, 2010). These examples signify recognition of the importance of crisis-ready, 
multi-channel, regional and international public warning dissemination networks.  
Protocols are being established and adopted in the emergency services realm. The 
Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) is an Extensible Markup Language (XML) based format that 
allows for messages to be disseminated consistently, maintaining integrity across communications 
warning applications through the use of compatible alert formats. The goal here was to create a 
neutral and open format for warning systems interoperability. It was created through an unofficial 
and non-commercial initiative. The use of the CAP was initially limited but gained wider 
acceptance following its adoption by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS) as a standard in 2004, and it has since been implemented in the 
U.S. and other countries (Botterell & Addams-Moring, 2007). Open source initiatives are proving 
to be valuable for public warning and commercial ICT-based (Information and Communications 
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Technology - based) warning services continue to exist as well (Botterell & Addams-Moring, 
2007). 
Because emergency response situations are emergent and dynamic, it is difficult to 
account for every exigency in advance. Emergency management as a complex system is being 
studied in the category of resilient ecological systems (Longstaff, 2009). According to Longstaff 
(2003) “complex systems often operate under very simple rules but exhibit unpredictable or 
surprising behavior when several forces interact in the system.” At the crisis scene, it may be that 
planned technologies may not function or are inadequate under the given circumstances. 
Emergency response personnel may need to mix and match other disparate and possibly 
unfamiliar technologies to fit the tasks at hand (Mendonça, Jefferson, & Harrald, 2007). 
When it comes to emergency response, additional requirements need to be taken into 
account. Among others, this includes coordination of resources in ad hoc situations. 
Interoperability for emergency response is defined as, “The ability of disparate and diverse 
emergency response units to interact in emergency situations towards common goals, involving 
the sharing of information and knowledge between involved organizations and units via defined or 
ad hoc processes to achieve coordinated actions, by means of the exchange of data between their 
respective information and communication technology (ICT) systems” (IDABC, 2008).  
To achieve interoperability among diverse emergency response units and organizations, 
there are developed and agreed on “Interoperability Principles”. Together with the general 
objectives of emergency response services, the interoperability principles are policy guidelines 
that define what should (and what should not) be achieved. For agencies that may have differing 
techniques for operating, these principles serve as a uniform guide. They can provide additional 
guidance and compliance checks for implementation on a system, process, and organization level. 
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These guidelines are necessary to make it clear to all participants what is meant when speaking 
about interoperability. This goes far beyond technical issues (Kuehn, Spichiger, & Riedl, 2009). A 
best practice example of how such interoperability principles work is given in the European 
Interoperability Framework (EIF) in the context of e-government (IDABC, 2008). Similar 
principles need to be developed for the emergency response sector in a broadly supported multi-
stakeholder forum. 
Principles are hardly enough to address the complex challenges that interoperability poses. 
Longstaff identifies the political and environmental complexity as challenges for managing 
surprises in such complex systems (2009). A conceptual framework is needed to investigate 
different facets of this challenge as not only technical and semantic factors but also organizational 
and policy factors and the current political context need to be taken into account. The EIF 
introduces a framework that considers five levels – political context, legal, organizational, 
semantic, and technical – that need to be considered to establish interoperability (IDABC, 2008). 
From an analytical point of view, the five levels offer helpful insights: "where" and “what" 
interoperability issues may arise and "which" actor may respond to them (i.e. a legally non-
compliant transaction on the organizational level that needs to be addressed by a legislative 
function). 
Establishing open, non-proprietary protocols for emergency response communication and 
information dissemination systems would allow systems to evolve more readily, and incorporate 
more intelligent and robust capabilities, which would make them more effective.  
4. Methodology 
 
A truly mixed-methods approach is being taken. Methods and activities included field 
observation, case study, policy analysis, interviews and document analysis.  The work also 
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included analysis of existing survey data compiled by the Public Safety Networks Study and 
Police Executive Research Forum and include preliminary findings from a case study of the 
Central New York Interoperable Communications Consortium (CNYICC). Using an inductive 
approach and considering aspects of general systems theory, this qualitative research design is 
suited to the study of complex problems (Schutt, 2006). The case study method and Delphi 
Technique are effective for gaining insider knowledge from small number of individuals regarding 
their actual experience. The goal is to obtain the richest data surrounding the research issue and to 
capture the complexity in context (Benbasat et al., 1987).  
Researchers participating here include members of both the law enforcement and 
academic communities. Researchers included semi-structured interviews with emergency services 
and law enforcement personnel at the front line and administrative levels, analysis of after-action 
reports, existing policies, and direct observation (NCR Project Team, 2009). The participants 
included public officials, service providers, and community leaders. Interviews were conducted in 
a manner as described by Harrison, Gil-Garcia, Pardo and Fiona (2006). The interviews were 
semi-structured, open ended, and not exceeding two hours. The interest was in obtaining 
cooperation and information-related responses from the respondents relative to emergencies with 
special attention to needs and resources during the response. Social factors, inter-organizational 
relationships during the response, the effect of pre-existing resources, plans, or programs on the 
ability to respond, and the effect of rules and laws on the response were factor areas investigated.  
The findings in this research are based on field observation and participation in actual 
crisis incidents.  The researcher also participated and observed tabletop and field exercises and 
reviewed documentation of actual and exercise only after action reports. Common themes and 
issues were identified through reflection and review of the incidents and commentary.  
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Researchers reviewed the materials and reflected on key issues, social, policy and 
technical challenges that emerged from the observations and reports as recurring themes or 
incidents. Most formal incident reports followed a structured format providing identifiable 
sections for issues identified, gaps and areas for further analysis, training or restructuring.  This 
made the task of identifying common themes across cases easier and more effective.  Having 
multiple sources for data such as formal reports combined with observation and public records 
allowed for findings to be validated or questioned. The period involved for these activities 
includes the years 1999 to 2012.  Actual multi-agency crisis event participant observations, and 
table top and field exercises participated in are shown in the tables below:   
Incident Location  State Year 
CSX freight train derailment with tank car explosion and toxic gas leak  Oneida NY 2007 
Suicidal man with gun at Colgate University Hamilton NY 2010  
Officer shooting involving a multi-jurisdiction chase and the SUNYIT 
college campus 
Marcy NY 2010 
 
Table 1: Actual Multi-Agency Crisis Events 
 
Incident Location State Year 
Multi-agency emergency disaster response drill at Syracuse 
University 
Syracuse NY 2011 
Large-scale active shooter emergency exercise at Morrisville 
State College 
Morrisville NY 2011  
Winter Fury wide-area multi-jurisdiction severe weather 
environmental crisis tabletop exercise 
Cicero NY 2012 
Multi-jurisdictional mass casualty interstate highway disaster 
tabletop exercise 
Canastota NY 2012 
Railroad accident - explosion and toxic gas multi-agency 
tabletop exercise 
Syracuse NY 2012 
 
Table 2: Table Top and Field Exercises 
 
      After-action reports and documentation from actual crises and exercises were examined and 
researchers considered the material over several months to come up with patterns and meaning 
from the data sources. This activity included the following sources shown in the table below: 
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Report Year 
Report on the Columbine High School Shootings, Jefferson County, CO  1999 
Arlington County After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist 
Attack on the Pentagon - Arlington Virginia Fire Department, Arlington, VA 
 2001 
Response to the Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon: Pentagon Family Assistance Center 
(PFAC) After-Action Report - Office of the Under Secretary of Defense - Personnel and 
Readiness, Washington, DC 
 2003 
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Report), Washington, D.C, 
  2004 
Platte Canyon High School Shooting After-Action Report. Park County (CO) Emergency 
Management, Park County, CO 
 2006 
Operation Shared Service After-Action Report - Central New York Regional Medical 
Reserve Corps - State University of New York - Upstate Medical University, Syracuse, 
NY 
 2006 
The federal response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons learned - U.S. Executive Office of the 
President 
 2006 
Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy, National Institute 
of Justice/NCJRS 
 2007  
Empire Express Hurricane Functional Exercise (FE) After-Action Report (AAR), Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
 2009 
New York State Department of Health, Office of Health Emergency Preparedness 2008-
2009 Interoperable Communications Drills, New York City Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene 
 2009 
State of Louisiana After-Action Report and Improvement Plan, Hurricanes Gustav and 
Ike, Louisiana Governor’s Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 
(OHSEP) 
 2009 
2009 Presidential Inauguration Regional After-Action Report, Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Homeland Security, National Captial Region, NCR Project Team 
 2009 
Independent Assessment Report of the Emergency Alert System and Crisis 
Communications Capabilities of the University of Alabama in Huntsville, James Lee Witt 
Associates 
 2010 
Civil Preparedness Communication Drill After-Action Report/Improvement Plan, The 
Monroe County Department of Public Health (MCDPH) 
 2010 
Shooting on the Woodbridge Campus After-Incident Review, Northern Virginia 
Community College 
 2010 
Active Shooter/Suicide on the University of Texas at Austin Campus, Police Department, 
The University of Texas at Austin 
 2010  
Hurricane Irene/Tropical Storm Lee Response, Lancaster County Emergency 
Management Agency 
 2011 
A Review of the UNCW Police Response to the July 29, 2011 Shooting at 4750 Seahawk 
Court (Seahawk Square), University of North Carolina Wilmington  
 2011 
University of Texas at Austin Active Shooter/Suicide After-Action Report, University of 
Texas 
 2011 
After Action Report for Active Shooter Functional Exercise, Chapman University  2012 
Tropical Storm Irene: Western Massachusetts After-Action Report/Improvement Plan, 
August 27-28, 2011, Western Massachusetts Regional Homeland Security Advisory 
Council 
 2012 
 
Table 3: After-action Reports and Documentation from Actual Crises and Exercises 
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The process of observation and cross-checking with consideration of training and actual 
incident accounts and discussions provided the researchers with the support and evidence for 
issues and gaps identified . The objective behind the data gathering was to understand the roles of 
information and technology in response to emergencies as well as the influence of the response on 
the subsequent work of government agencies, private organizations and citizens with the aim of 
improving it.   
 
5. Findings and Discussion  
 
5.1 Social Emergency Response 
 
The broader purpose of this research is to contribute to academic and practitioner 
knowledge regarding information-sharing policy and practice across law enforcement agencies 
and the emergency response community, to now include non-government entities and others as 
participants.   Of course, the validation of the utility of the novel systems and components for 
social emergency response described here ultimately has a practical objective: to help people save 
their own lives, or help save their neighbors, when an emergency occurs.  If law enforcement and 
emergency personnel can assist and channel these instincts and energies through essentially 
becoming the operators of what may be the only functional network in a town, that is likely to 
benefit both the public authorities, and of course, the people whose lives may be saved in an 
emergency, because a more rapid and effective response is now possible. It is not being claimed or 
anticipated that all problems will be resolved by the new hardware and software systems, far from 
it; resolution of legitimate policy concerns may inhibit the adoption and diffusion of such a social 
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emergency response approach. All the more reason, therefore, to simultaneously consider the 
extant social and policy barriers. 
Important questions arise for communities in times of crisis. These include concerns about 
what is going on? where can one find help? how does one contact family and friends? (Longstaff, 
Mergel, & Armstrong, 2009). Researchers report seeing a positive response and high level of 
interest showing to date in these exercises by stakeholders who seem to appreciate the opportunity 
to be part of the –social emergency response - solution.   
Multiple commercial partners and possible early adopters have inquired about when these 
systems will be available, in the U.S., Europe, Africa and Australia. This widespread interest in an 
alternate approach is not surprising as emergencies can occur – and do – anywhere. The present 
“single network” approach to achieving interoperability creates the potential for a single point of 
failure in a disaster. Having just one primary means of communication is a poor engineering 
approach. This vulnerability allows for potential damage to critical infrastructure by terrorists or 
others who wish to cause harm. Current communications policy in the U.S. reflects this, as there 
are now requirements for identification of alternate communications channels for such exigencies.  
5.2 Technical factors 
  
Existing approaches to the inter-operability issue are predominantly network-based, such 
as through deployment of hardware based repeaters or gateways. This is expensive, requires 
extensive prior coordination and planning, and only addresses part of the problem. The example of 
entities moving to IPv6 is evidence to the fact that transition issues and deployment challenges 
bring added security implications (Caicedo, Joshi, & Tuladhar, 2009). Primary and secondary 
users in distributed networks present security problems and can be a roadblock to system adoption 
(Zargar, Weiss, Caicedo, & Joshi, 2009). Standards-based approaches are best for connectivity, 
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but time required to develop standards can be high and achieving consensus non-trivial. 
Configurable radios or software defined radios provide an adaptable infrastructure that can 
interconnect a variety of frequency bands (Caicedo, 2007). This technology is only now being 
developed for the emergency response environment. 
5.3 Social factors 
 
Having ability to communicate and share in emergency response technically is a necessary 
first step. There must also be a commonly understood and accepted command structure and 
willingness to share for the system to work (Treglia, McKnight, Kuehn, Ramnarine-Reiks, 
Venkatesh, & Bose, 2011). Effective communication protocols involve identifying persons who 
should be included in the response and the accompanying roles and authority expected.  Here, a 
new paradigm is proposed to include non-government agents and other citizen stakeholders. The 
victims are important first responders as well. 
Crisis response and notification as social practice raises many interesting questions 
requiring research (Ryan, 2006).  Contemporary trends in citizen science and citizen engagement 
in “participatory” knowledge creation and information dissemination are critical developments in 
the pro-social use of advanced technology, but the social organization of this space and the social 
dynamics of the diverse groups involved – which may include law enforcement and designated 
first responders with their more formal views on notification as “official” practice as well as 
community leaders and ordinary citizens with their less formal practices in this regard - have not 
received sustained attention from the public safety, technical and socio-technical research 
communities.  
Notification and participation norms arguably differ across professional and community 
groups. These are the formal and informal participants. Community leaders, ordinary citizens, and 
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law enforcement professionals at critical sites intend the system for use. Design specifications for 
the proposed system is based on research into the social organization of notification in two 
communities in Syracuse, NY – the immigrant groups on the North side and the largely African-
American population on the Southside (Treglia, McKnight, Kuehn, Ramnarine-Reiks, Venkatesh, 
Bose, 2011). Research will be under-taken as part of the lead-up to the two field tests and as part 
of the debriefing following the field tests. Cultural groups may be fearful of technology and avoid 
innovation that could improve communication (Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999). 
Findings from this research will be used in designing policy, system features and 
functionality and the interface of the refined edgeware software application.  
5.4 Policy Factors 
 
At a major crisis, there are multiple layers of governance with overlapping jurisdictions, 
responsibility, and authority. By way of example, there are 17,876 state and local law enforcement 
agencies and 26,464 fire departments in the U.S. (BJS, 2007; USFA 2011). Agencies have varied 
degrees of sovereign leadership, policies, procedures, and resources. Governance, coordination, 
and information sharing in this multi-interest and dynamic environment are difficult. This shared 
responsibility and overlapping jurisdiction affects the ability of law enforcement entities to 
cooperate effectively. At the federal level, there may not be clear sole jurisdiction and even across 
federal agencies questions of responsibility or control are unclear. To facilitate interagency 
operations it is necessary to share information, sensitive information and intelligence information 
across agencies and levels.  In regard to information coordination it is noted that “while the U.S. 
government is generally considered to have the most advanced security classification system, 
there has been a steady chorus promoting the need for fundamental research on the security 
classification system” (Thompson & Kaarst-Brown, 2005, p. 246). These ambiguities interfere 
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with collaboration in joint activities or operations. The model shown in Figure 22 below illustrates 
states having jurisdiction and responsibility that overlaps with lower level units of government. 
The cities are separate from towns or villages, although they are located within a county and state. 
The federal arena exists in a separate sense with designated responsibility that still may overlap or 
co-exist with other entities. Although not depicted here, international agencies add yet another 
element to be addressed when cross-border incidents are manifest. Non-government entities and 
other stakeholders also cross these boundaries.  
 
Figure 22: Overlapping Responsibility and Jurisdiction in United States 
(Treglia, 2010) 
5.5 Two Tier Parallel Circles 
 
In this multi-interest environment, emergency response is best described as a two-tier 
circle having concurrent parallel operations: 1) the formal recognized law enforcement and 
emergency responders who are formally and traditionally organized and who operate with a given 
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governance structure having identifiable jurisdiction and responsibility; and 2) the non-
government, non-traditional stakeholders and involved persons and entities, who may be victims, 
and other ancillary or ad-hoc information and service providers or support agencies acting towards 
goals for the particular incident or crisis event.  
In describing the parallel processes, the first circle or level is the formal traditional and 
officially recognized emergency response system and players, which formally include the police, 
fire, and EMS. The second layer or level includes other formal and informal stakeholders and non-
government support or service entities necessary to the response efforts. This area includes citizen 
and citizen group participants, which have not previously been considered in this way, and other 
entities such as the Red Cross, power plant, or water authority where needed.  Homeland Security 
and FEMA may be considered support services providers. This is depicted in Figure 23. 
As described above, overlapping jurisdiction, responsibility, and control lead to ambiguity 
and conflict of interest (Treglia, McKnight, Kuehn, Ramnarine-Reiks, Venkatesh, & Bose, 2011). 
Necessary resources may be under government control, private or non-government control. In the 
U.S. there is growing support and adoption of the Federal Emergency Management 
Administration (FEMA) National Incident Management System (NIMS) model for command and 
control (FEMA, 2011). This model recognizes sovereignty and provides for joint command and 
independent control over resources while providing for an ordered and recognizable 
organizational structure (FEMA, 2011). Much federal funding requires knowledge of and 
participation in the NIMS model for law enforcement and others. The NIMS model of command 
and control is suited to the present day multi-stakeholder and participant crisis response 
environment as depicted in the parallel circle schema described here. 
 Activity in the two parallel circles is autonomous and, at times, these participants must 
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share information and interact across these boundaries. The traditional formal circle has 
responsibility and control over human and other resources through formal and socially accepted 
institutions. The second circle has separate intrinsic authority and purpose based on individual 
roles, needs, and controls over what can be contributed: information, personnel or other resources. 
The first circle is more formally organized and the latter can be formal, such as a recognized 
sectarian group, or more ad-hoc and flexible with few rules or established communications 
channels to other entities. 
 
Figure 23: Information and Resource Flows 
 
The two layers operate independently with their own resources and activities.  The first 
layer can dip into the information, contacts and resources of the other layer for knowledge and 
coordination outside the traditional boundaries. Researchers here propose, as a dramatic shift from 
the current established relationships and comfort level that greater bi-directional or multi-
directional exchange of information and resources will occur than is currently the case. Things of 
value in the second layer include resources such as camera phone images, twitter information, and 
cultural knowledge from local groups on interests and needs. This is also where collaboration 
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between agencies and volunteers interact and provide information and inputs to social emergency 
response policy development, which may be localized and customized to meet the particular social 
communities and cultures present in particular geographic area.  
A mechanism for bridging these two parallel arenas is provided through technology and 
policy/culture change that must account for the vast overload of information possible and have 
ability to filter through things like location or identity to identify potentially relevant information 
from the mix of all available information. Avoiding information overload and its resulting 
paralysis is as important in an emergency as having information available. There must also be a 
way to coordinate, manage, retain, and then sift through this captured data and through a process 
make it available to those who need it (Palen, Anderson, Mark, Sicker, Palmer, & Grunwald, 
2010). The technology device, personnel, policy, and social processes described must function in 
this type of environment to be effective.  
Empowering both local authorities and community residents to help each other and save 
themselves will be proven to be a positive improvement over current practice.  
Information sharing in social communities is an example of complex social behavior in 
that transmitting, withholding, storing, and modifying information is subject to norms and 
motivated by social obligations (Ryan, 206). There is the opportunity here to further probe into the 
social organization and dynamics. How do members of immigrant groups on the North side 
interact with non-immigrant groups around notification? And since the target users include 
professionals such as law enforcement officers, it would be important to look at the “seams” in 
this space as well: seams between community members, community leaders, and professionals.  
How is information shared (or not shared) across such seams? How are information sharing, non-
sharing, and social organization related? The objective here is to also examine patterns of social 
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behavior and specify the design accordingly in order to promote trust within and across social 
groups and within a context of individual discretion. Trust is found to be an important variable for 
effective communication management in crises (Longstaff & Yang, 2008). Researchers here look 
to address cross-boundary information sharing issues as identified in Ryan (2006) and Pardo, Gil-
Garcia, and Burke (2008). The approach is to take the social aspects of notification as key inputs 
into system design, which would bring to bear on technical work a rich body of social science 
research on the diffusion of innovations, theories of social contagion, information disclosure, 
governance, resilience, and the economics of information, among others (Akerlof, 1970; 
Quarantelli, 1997; Longstaff et al., 2010). 
Four important areas for design work in the system include: first, what would an 
appropriate configuration of notification roles and responsibilities be in ad hoc, hybrid social 
support structures? This would be the case when ordinary citizen and professionals must work 
together at critical event sites. The implications for applications design have been previously 
identified by the Syracuse University (SU) Partnerships for Innovation (PFI) research undertaken 
since 2002, namely, that removing complexity from the system for users and facilitating rapid and 
easy application is crucial; and is facilitated by having open specifications. Second, what would 
ordinary citizens need to have as a stock of knowledge in order to determine when a gas leak, for 
example, is potentially disastrous? What features/functionality should be considered in the design 
in order to facilitate quick access to reliable, actionable, and timely information and knowledge? 
Third, in a dynamic, ad hoc network with nodes entering and exiting, how should one best support 
user authentication so as to foster trust? Fourth is the issue of data believability and trust. What 
additional sources of data, or more frequent sampling by sensors of the environment, could be 
automatically gathered and provided by the system in ambiguous situations? Can location provide 
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a means for designating priority for communications to the command personnel or responders? 
Lessons learned from field-testing the system should produce design guidelines and guide 
development of policies for the distributed cognitive engine/gateway devices envisioned.     
5.6 Interpretation Issues 
 
An identified issue that needs to be resolved is how to manage the problem of having 
access to systems or services but not being able to translate or navigate to the needed data, 
information or action. Resolving differences in how material and personnel resources are 
identified and described is a problem separate from gaining physical access or control. Creation 
and use of ontologies can help improve the understanding of other, possibly unfamiliar, systems. 
The U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is working to address this through its 
promotion of standardized ontologies of conceptual mappings for resources (Mendonça et al., 
2007). 
Information overload has been identified as a problem for emergency responders (Turoff, 
2002). The capabilities afforded through technologies such as wireless grids will make even more 
information available in these cases, contributing to that aspect of the problem. Having the ability 
to filter and create hierarchical or rule-based controls for information access will mitigate the 
overload and at the same time provide richer and more current information flows to those who 
need it most. 
Soon there are likely to be even more robust communication-based collaborative tools 
developed that would critically filter out nonessential or duplicate information while placing 
emphasis on vital information intelligently (Mendonça et al., 2007). In this way, new support 
systems and a greater amount of information will enhance and not impede the operational 
processes. 
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6. Conclusion  
 
     That communication and information sharing gaps occur between and across 
responders and stakeholders in emergency response incidents is well known (Barr, Burther, & 
Mahy, 2011; Kovacs, & Spens, 2011; Nivolianitou & Synodinou, 2011; Gaynor, Brander, Pearce, 
& Post, 2008), what to effectively do about it has not been so clear. This article reports on 
conclusions drawn from empirical sources and the literature towards that goal. Recommendations 
that speak to gaps noted by observation and the work of others are provided. Factors associated 
with fostering rapid and effective communications between various responders to emergency 
situations were investigated. The article presented conclusions by first describing the problem and 
presenting a review of past and current literature followed by a description of the research 
methodology used, then a discussion of findings and observations made, and last a summary of 
the conclusions and recommendations Findings from this research should inform the design of 
policy and system features and functionality for emergency response at all levels.  As for the 
academic community, the work should be considered as part of a continuing investigation into 
understanding and improving collective response to crises considering the social, technical and 
policy factors. 
This essay argues that a social emergency response policy must be developed to reflect the 
reality that the true first responders to most disasters are the victims, neighbors, or passersby with 
handheld devices or other technology. The traditional hierarchical model for emergency response, 
assuming helpless victims in need of rescue, breaks down when the citizens may in fact be better 
informed and coordinated than their supposed rescuers. Social media and crowd sourcing are 
being explored as a means for emergency coordination. The wisdom of the crowd in a time of 
panic and rumor may be limited and information distributed across many sources. There remains a 
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need for some level of coordination of data, resources and response. 
A new social emergency response policy is needed. This will be best achieved through 
continued public awareness and debate. Researchers here acknowledge that social aspects of 
stakeholder coordination and engagement have been neglected at crises. The new recognized 
emergency response community must include non-government entities and citizens. Technology 
will provide new supports and opportunities for improving speed and quality of emergency 
response coordination. It remains true that social, technical and policy approaches must be aligned 
for effective crisis response. 
Smart devices in the hands of on scene users may be insufficient if law enforcement and 
other personnel cannot tell who is trustworthy, or whether civilians are on the scene by 
happenstance, or are other first responders such as fire and EMT personnel.  Further, public 
networks in crises often break down from the harsh conditions of for example, an earthquake or 
hurricane, which caused the emergency, at other times, concerned family and friends from out of 
the area can overload networks and cause delay in emergency response. In still other cases, the 
networks are operating fine even in the midst of disaster, but public authorities have essentially 
seized them claiming most bandwidth for themselves, leaving the public, some of whom may be 
injured or in need of rescue, unable to communicate.  
The results of this research will also lead to new commercial products, services and jobs– 
in addition to the potential gains in effectively managing emergency and crisis response. Before 
the market and widespread access to these solutions can fully emerge, however, policymakers and 
emergency response professional communities face several challenges.  Can the emergency 
response community accept becoming peers on a social network of people, devices, and 
networks?  Without a willingness to work collaboratively with the community to define the 
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specific operating conditions for what some may see as privacy-invading devices, the pace of 
adoption and diffusion may be slower that is desirable. On the other hand, having strong privacy 
and security mechanisms built into the core of the technology, such as through wireless grid open 
specifications, both near the physical (cognitive radio) and virtual (edgeware gridlet) layers, may 
reassure users and promote trust in these systems (Zargar et al., 2009; Brooks, Caicedo, & Park, 
2012).  In either case, discussion and debate on social emergency response policy is needed. It is 
the hope that this work will incite debate and possibly foster change such that there will be new 
agenda for social emergency response.  
Much research still needs to be done on information interoperability especially within the 
context of emergency response systems.  
Emerging technological solutions will allow cooperation and resource sharing to occur in 
the existing and blended environment. Going forward, systems can grow and even change 
platforms but will retain their functionality and interoperability by having such intermediary 
services. Many of the identified barriers to entry and the degree of potential risk that must be taken 
to implement a new technology are reduced where options may be tried in the present 
interoperable operating environment. New potential solutions can be implemented with the most 
successful ones being identified, refined and continued. 
Researchers propose to establish by acknowledgement parallel networking 
communications capabilities, voluntarily, by community residents, emergency responders, and 
others to serve their own needs.  This community grid, once established, can bring significant 
expansion in the number and variety of devices and networks available to assist in emergency 
response, is for those residents secondary to their improved ability to look after themselves and 
each other in the routine emergencies any community can face on a daily basis.  
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Government officials were involved in the public forums hosted in 2011 by the New York 
State Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Services. During these “listening sessions” and 
topic discussions, the notion of stakeholders was identified as including mostly the traditional 
police, fire, and EMS agencies, some not-for-profit human services providers such as the Red 
Cross, and utility providers such as the power and water authorities. Engagement with citizen 
groups, culturally identifiable groups, or other members of the community, private industry– such 
as a construction company for specialized equipment support or a brewery that could change gears 
readily to put out and distribute bottled water when necessary– are only now being considered.  
The path to this end appears to be to continue to openly discuss the issues, raising 
awareness, and thereby changing perceptions and expectations. A good example comes from 
taking a different view of the traditional hierarchical control model. If you view the model as 
clarifying responsibility and control by having a single responsible party at the top you can see 
how it may also convey the message that everyone else is then not responsible.  The new approach 
is cooperative and requires a reconceptualization of responsibility and acceptance of shared and 
dynamic authority and participation by all. All are responsible and all should participate as they 
can. There is no one magic solution, but a multitude of individual and group solutions occurring 
simultaneously that interoperates and are adapted as necessary by those able.  
The proposed result is human stigmergy in crisis response. Each stakeholder party reacts 
and contributes individually toward a common goal with the result being a collective social 
emergency/crisis response led by one and all. The motion and activity of a unified flock of birds 
reflects this notion of cooperative stigmergy. From a distance the birds appear as one being, 
moving, changing and reacting to the environment based on basic and shared needs.  
The goal of this research is to help people to help themselves in a crisis. This includes 
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formal and informal responders. Emergency services applications, including technology such as 
wireless grids, can empower citizens through their devices to cooperate and contribute to their 
own community response. This article asserts that police, fire, EMS, hospitals, municipal services, 
utilities, gas companies, media, and community residents will benefit from enhanced information 
sharing in emergencies by embracing a more inclusive understanding and stigmergic approach. 
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ESSAY 3:  Identifying Factors that Support Collaboration in a Multi-jurisdiction 
Environment:  A Case Study of the Central New York Interoperable Communications 
Consortium  
 
1. Introduction 
 
If you ask the janitor at Nlets (National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System) 
what his job is, he will proudly tell you "saving lives."  As part of a larger case study of the 
organization, researchers interviewed staff at all levels of Nlets and found that they had an 
embedded culture and sense of higher purpose throughout the entire organization (PSN, 2011). 
Nlets is a state-owned, not-for-profit organization providing the backbone infrastructure and 
networking services that interconnect law enforcement agencies across the nation and with many 
other countries, through such services as interfacing with INTERPOL. Although these staff 
members are geographically about as far away as you can get from the sites of emergencies, they 
express a direct connection with the cop on the street facing a dangerous felon and the fireman 
who scours in the midst of a crumbling structure for signs of life. 
The case study of the Central New York Interoperable Communications Consortium 
(CNYICC) gives a similar and more detailed picture of this process as it relates to county-level 
inter-agency cooperation and collaborations in public safety that have been successful in multi-
jurisdictional environments with competing interests.  
This research seeks to identify factors that have an impact upon public safety information 
sharing collaborations and technology adoption practices in the law enforcement and emergency 
response communities. The study will contribute to theory on information sharing and 
collaboration processes in public sector settings, and will make additional contributions by 
providing practitioners with policy and practice guidance for developing more effective sharing 
relationships in collaborative information system initiatives to improve operations. It is hoped 
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that these contributions will result in improved law enforcement and emergency response 
capability to prevent and respond to crime, terrorist activity, and other disasters while providing 
a foundation for further academic research on information sharing across public and private 
agencies.  Results from this investigation will be relevant to, and assist in informing, the 
development and implementation of similar emergency response, or public safety, collaborations 
in the future.  
Of any state, New York has the most local police department full time employees 
(72,380), in their 391 local police department agencies (BJS, 2011, p.16). New York State also 
has 1,857 fire departments and fire brigades, 1,122 ambulance services, and 785 non-transporting 
first-response services (NYS DHSES, 2011, p.6). This is a technology - and policy - intensive 
environment and includes a multitude of cultures and competing interests.   
Counties play an important role in the public safety process due to their very position and 
structure in New York State and in the United States. Research conducted in this area is 
significant to public safety literature and professional practice locally, nationally and 
internationally.   
Public safety agencies today must collaborate in an unprecedented way to respond to 
fiscal and technological challenges in providing critical law enforcement and lifesaving services. 
Improved transportation and the broad reach of the internet have expanded the scope of incidents 
and investigations. The public no longer accepts legacy arguments regarding incompatible 
systems and the lack of sharing of vital information and resources; they demand a move forward. 
Across the country, multijurisdictional collaborations are forming in order to address these 
needs. Rather than fumbling through trial and error, they should make use of knowledge from 
others who have gone this way before and gained insights that can help improve the process and 
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outcomes. The mandate was stated most simply by a northeastern 911 administrator, “the 
obligation to me stays the same . . . I have to deliver status quo, lifesaving results every day 
without an excuse” (Anonymous, 2011). 
A disturbing statistic, the phrase "29/121" refers to the 121 firefighters who lost their 
lives in the North Tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 due to a lack of 
interoperable communications (Peha, 2005). In the 29 minutes after the first evacuation order 
went out, these firemen who had incompatible communications equipment never received the 
warning and, thus, did not get out in time (Peha, 2005).  This is but one example of 
communications technology failing to meet the most basic needs of public safety organizations 
on the scene. These failures are not the results of simple operator error or a design flaw but are 
rooted in the communications infrastructure and policy for public safety communications in the 
United States.  
To address these problems, innovation in both technology and policy are necessary. The 
willingness of various public safety agencies and jurisdictions to partner in compatible solutions 
is more important than the technology to be used (Treglia, 2009; NYS DHSES, 2011). 
The purpose of this research is to contribute to scientific and professional knowledge 
regarding cooperative information sharing across law enforcement agencies and the emergency 
response community. The basis for this case study is derived from a set of seemingly 
unsophisticated yet fundamental questions: What are the factors that support collaboration 
among public safety agencies in information sharing projects involving information 
technologies? What factors work against successful collaboration among law enforcement, 
emergency response agencies, and other stakeholders? Answers to these questions are pursued 
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here through case study, policy analysis, interviews, and the use of existing survey data compiled 
by the Public Safety Networks Study and Police Executive Research Forum.   
 In this study, researchers focused on a multi-jurisdictional public safety consortium 
formed and operating in upstate New York – the CNYICC. In the area of public safety, officials 
in New York State who spearhead communications planning for local systems are primarily from 
county government and most typically department heads of Emergency Services (NYS DHSES, 
2011). Investigation of the CNYICC is significant to public safety study as the core members are 
heads of county emergency communications departments. Qualitative data from the case study 
was analyzed using content analysis techniques to identify key issues and factors, as identified 
by the respondents, which may be relevant to other such formations. Findings addressing the 
research questions identified previously are reported on. 
Law enforcement and emergency response agencies, or public safety agencies, are tasked 
with responding to crises under any conditions or circumstances. They cannot wait for the 
eventual change that may take decades to occur as an older generation is replaced by a newer 
one. 
Communications/911 centers comprise a key participant and resource in the intelligence 
information “gathering and sharing” mission of public safety entities. To be effective, a 
communications/911 center should be able to connect and share with first responders, 
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination resources, whether they be local law 
enforcement intelligence units or fusion centers. By leveraging emerging standards in 
intelligence information sharing, communications centers can assist in the collection and sharing 
of information with other intelligence centers. This, in turn, allows the communications centers 
to receive critical intelligence information for dissemination to the field. Cooperation with these 
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other agencies is the critical element that allows this to occur. Understanding how to facilitate 
such cooperation and sharing in this environment can greatly improve the delivery of public 
safety services. 
This paper is organized as follows:  The first section contains a review of prior research 
on public safety and professional collaboration issues and outcomes. Methodology for the case 
study and analysis are described next followed by a description of the CNYICC and important 
macro and micro environmental issues impacting it. This is followed by presentation of key 
initial findings from the case study, as well as an analysis of significant factors influencing the 
development and operation of this type of public safety collaboration.  This follows a structure 
similar to that of another case study of a collaborative first responder network, CapWIN 
(Fedorowicz, Gogan, & Williams, 2007). The study concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of these findings for practitioners and researchers, and proposes possible directions 
for further research. 
 
2. Background 
 
This essay reports on the CNYICC. The associated development of interoperable 
emergency communications in the area through this collaboration was the subject of the case 
study here. This research has investigated the issue of what elements go into successful 
collaboration among disparate county government emergency response management agencies. 
Researchers here consider the social, technical, and policy factors. The motivation for 
cooperation here consists of multiple dimensions: to better serve the public, to prepare for 
funding opportunities, to share information, to collectively speak to standards issues, and to 
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collectively pool resources to achieve greater influence over vendors for equipment and services 
contracts.  
The case study of the CNYICC provides an example of an alternative governance 
solution for public safety collaboration. The CNYICC was created outside, in parallel with, 
standard formal government structures to address the common interests and needs of multiple 
counties in providing for emergency communications. The consortium coordinates regional and 
local communications policy and activities of participating dispatch centers, public safety 
agencies, and other stakeholders acting through their individual agencies. CNYICC interacts 
with both the government and private sectors relative to emergency communications and 
response issues. Formed by written memorandum of understanding (MOU) and espousing a 
shared interest in improving interoperable communications collectively across the multi-county 
region, the consortium continues to operate as a loosely controlled cooperative having few 
formalized policies. 
A figure showing the makeup and structure of the CNYICC is provided below.  The  
Figure 24 shows the CNYICC Core Membership in the center of a concentric circle.  Core 
Membership consists of the directors of the five participating counties and a member 
representative from the state police. Core members actually vote and direct CNYICC action. It 
should be noted that the state has not formally signed on to the Memorandum of Understanding 
as did the counties. The next layer depicted shows the CNYICC Extended Membership, which 
consists of non-core members from government, profit and not for profit agencies having an 
interest in the activities of the CNYICC. Types of entities in the extended membership area are 
listed in the figure; the numbers showing in parentheses at the right of the described types are an 
approximate number of those observed participating in meetings during the study. At the 
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extended member level the parties have a stake in the work of the consortium.  The chairman of 
the CNYICC said that the public or any interested group or individual may participate in the 
extended meetings. There is in principal a last layer where the public may participate; however, 
the researcher did not observe any civilians or members of the public in this category during the 
course of the study. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Composition of the CNYICC  
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3. Literature 
 
Other agencies have come together in response to a crisis, for a targeted funding 
opportunity or due to formal mandate. Critical incidents can also serve as galvanizing forces that 
bring about public sector initiatives based on political feedback or pressure. These statements are 
supported by current research regarding the formation and governance of public safety networks 
(Kingdon, 1997; Sawyer, Fedorowicz, Tyworth, Markus, & Williams, 2007; Williams, Dias, 
Fedorowicz, Jacobson, Vilvovsky, Sawyer, & Tyworth, 2009; Sawyer & Fedorowicz, 2012). 
According to Weiss (1987), who examined the forces that push public agencies to 
overcome barriers to cooperation, the question of whether agencies work together may be 
influenced by economic and financial imperatives, norm satisfaction, reduction of uncertainty, 
political advantage, and legal mandates. The disparity in classifying information by federal and 
local agencies is a barrier to effective collaboration (Thompson & Kaarst-Brown, 2005). 
Formation of Public Safety Networks (PSNs) as information sharing networks was 
studied in depth by the Public Safety Networks Study (http://publicsafetynetworksstudy.org), 
which is a multi-university research collaboration (Sawyer & Fedorowicz, 2012; Sawyer, 
Schrier, Fedorowicz, Dias, Williams, & Tyworth, 2012). That study focused on Public Safety 
Networks (PSNs) created for use at the state and local levels in the United States and involved a 
mix of law enforcement and other emergency response and support agencies. Using factors 
derived from both rational choice and institutional theories, the authors describe the size and 
maturity of state-level PSNs and propose a set of factors that may predict public safety 
collaboration (Williams, Fedorowicz, & Tomasino, 2010). This dissertation argues that in at least 
one North American case study public safety officials formed a consortium for interoperable 
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communications based not on those reasons but for higher-order interests such as the public good 
(Treglia, 2012).   
  A finding from the Public Safety Networks Study project regarding PSN development 
included that institutional factors provided the most significant coefficient indicating a state’s 
culture of endorsing technological advances, collaboration, transparent sharing of data, or other 
administrative reforms (Williams, Fedorowicz, & Tomasino, 2010). An organizational culture 
fearful of information technology may avoid innovation that could facilitate communication 
(Kaarst-Brown & Robey, 1999). A different culture may seek out new processes. 
Agranoff and McGuire (2001) show how a change in state-administered federal 
programs, increasing regulation at the state and federal levels, reductions in financial assistance 
programs, and increasing regulations require agencies to form unconventional partnerships in 
order to share resources. This was not entirely the case here. 
To date, no single ‘‘true’’ definition of “collaboration” has been widely adopted in the 
realm of emergency response and public safety. The case study focuses on the collective action 
of the organizations’ players, which involves their disparate and interdependent responses to 
internal and external environmental influences, rules, and options (Astley & Van de Ven, 1983). 
Researchers provide insights based on a limited view of public safety collaborations in general, 
so research here is but one contribution to that larger effort. Thomson anticipates that theory on 
collaboration will evolve over time through empirical work, including ‘‘models for particular 
niches’’ that collectively support a greater understanding of collaboration and which account for 
the dynamism and complexity in this environment (Thomson, Perry & Miller, 2009; Ostrom, 
1990). 
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Wood and Gray (1991) proposed, as a preliminary research agenda for collaboration, the 
investigation of four key issues: 1) the meaning of collaboration; 2) how collaborations are 
convened; 3) the relationship between collaboration and environmental uncertainty and control; 
and 4) the relationship between the individual and collective interests of collaborating partners 
(Wood & Gray, 1991). In this essay, researchers address these issues in the context of CNYICC 
and thereby contribute to the greater effort of describing and understanding problems and 
solutions within this niche area of public safety and emergency response.  
Collaboration, as conceptualized in this essay, involves a joint organizational entity (i.e., 
the CNYICC) and its infrastructure, processes, technological resources, and relationships.  
Various autonomous actors come together for a common purpose, be it a program, service, or 
product, over time and in infrequent emergency event situations (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; 
Moynihan, 2005; Milward & Provan, 2006).  Fedorowicz, Gogan, & Williams (2006) write that, 
“for every successful initiative, there have, unfortunately, been many failed attempts, thanks to a 
variety of complex political, administrative, and technical challenges.” A similar model is 
proposed for considering these issues in the law enforcement and emergency response field 
involving technical, social and policy considerations (Treglia & Park, 2009).   
The challenge of finding a means by which to assess effectiveness of these collaborations 
(networks) is considered by Provan, Milward, and Brinton (2001). Emergency response activity 
does not always lend itself to traditional hierarchical organization and is therefore difficult to 
measure. New age management activity is represented by Lipnack and Stamps’ (1994) five 
"teamnet" principles: 1) Purpose (unifying purpose) – shared commitment to goals is the binding 
force, not legalisms; 2) Members (independent members) – sovereignty is retained during 
cooperation; 3) Links (voluntary linkages) – actors participate by choice with crisscrossing 
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relationships and communicate extensively on an ad-hoc basis; 4) Leaders (multiple leaders) – 
more than one person can assume leadership role; 5) Levels (integrated levels) – people work at 
different levels within and across the organization, up and down (Lipnack & Stamps, 1994). 
Here, these principles can be seen as characteristics of management within a federated system, 
particularly the emergent jurisdiction-based and network models. Today’s public safety 
emergency response agencies would fit with such a model. 
Collaborations formed may be governed informally (Bardach, 2001) or in a more 
explicitly or formally structured way (Milward and Provan, 2006). Interorganizational systems 
(IOS) provide connecting infrastructure in support of information exchange and communication 
(Cash & Konsynski, 1985). Research such as this has identified a need for explicit structures for 
multi-agency collaborations. Social capital and having governance structures especially suited to 
the context or environment can promote trust and by extension improve collaboration (Ostrom, 
2009; Walker & Ostrom, 2007). The case studied here does not align exactly with a more 
structured organizational model. Experience here reveals a more complex dynamic regarding the 
need for and types of formalization regarding governance and activity. 
Collaboration has been described as a process where “autonomous or semi-autonomous 
actors interact through formal and informal negotiation, jointly creating rules and structures 
governing their relationships and ways to act or decide on the issues that brought them together; 
it is a process involving shared norms and mutually beneficial interactions (Thomson, Perry, & 
Miller, 2011).  
Collaboration success can be difficult to quantify. Several approaches have been taken to 
measure and describe collaboration outcomes (Westphal, Thoben, & Seifert, 2008).  Kothari, 
MacLean, Edwards and Hobbs (2011) note that traditional mechanisms and indicators for 
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measuring cooperation are not well established.  Thomson, Perry and Miller developed a 
multidimensional assessment model of collaboration using data from a survey of national service 
program participants (2009). From that study five key dimensions are described that form an 
overall construct of collaboration. Collaborating with partners is an essential competency for 
public safety entities. Kuenzel  and Welscher report that there are eight factors important to 
‘Public Safety Collaboration Success’ (2009). The eight success factors are explained below and 
serve as an essential frame-work for analyzing and assessing collaboration processes: 
1. Relevance and Sense of Urgency: The need to collaborate can emerge from political 
strategy; improvement in services; civil society and media exerting pressure on the public 
sector to change the policies.   
2. Incentives and Benefits: The reciprocal benefit from partnership can arise from the 
interest of each member. 
3. People & Roles: The success in collaboration depends directly on establishing a social 
system wherein the individuals must have interpersonal relationship and a mindset for 
collaboration. 
4. Organizational Structure: It is because of the organizational structure that collaboration 
from the individuals, having political and social relationships, is mostly sought. 
5. Reflection & Learning: It is due to the changing environment which makes the ongoing 
learning process occur. Collaboration thus demands that all the partners must have a great 
deal of reflection and knowledge. 
6. Skills and Capabilities: A variety of skills are needed for the collaboration to be feasible. 
These skills pertain to management, strategic aptitude, negotiating and communicating 
capabilities. 
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7. Resources: The more the resources the more the collaboration. The scope and duration of 
collaboration determines the amount of resources required. 
8. Outside Support & Supervision: when collaboration has admittance to external support it 
can easily achieve its targeted goals.       
The authors suggest that the eight identified success factors (above) must be made part of 
the design and operation of a collaboration to have the highest probability of achieving its 
desired public safety objectives (Kuenzel & Welscher, 2009). This model may be used to 
describe the success of public safety collaborations. Following the presentation of the study 
findings the information sharing model and factors from this model are used as a tool to assess 
the success of the CNYICC discuss other relevant issues from the case study. 
Findings from the Public Safety Networks Study project include prescriptive 
recommendations for government policy makers, and participating agencies as they work 
towards collaborative information sharing.  The five implementation  recommendations from 
Sawyer and Fedorowicz (2012) include:  
 
1. Involve all stakeholders in the design of a collaborative work 
2. Create networks that stakeholders will value, participate in, and use .  
3. Pursue every opportunity to fund a collaborative network  
4. Develop a diverse set of performance goals 
5. Leverage technology to advance a collaborative network  
  
Formalization is conceptualized as the extent to which tasks or obligations are structured 
within an organization or entity, and the degree to which these activities are governed by 
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identifiable rules and procedures. Other, early, definitions of the concept of formalization include 
“ … statements of procedures, rules, roles, and operation of procedures which deal with (a) 
decision seeking (applications for capital, employment, and so on), (b) conveying of decisions 
and instructions (plans, minutes, requisitions and so on), and (c) conveying of information, 
including feedback" (Hall, Johnson, & Haas, 1967; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, Macdonald, Turner, 
& Lupton, 1963). The measurement of formalization in organizations is operationalized as "… 
the proportion of codified jobs and the range of variation that is tolerated within the rules 
defining the jobs, the higher the proportion of codified jobs and the less the range of variation 
allowed, the more formalized the organization” (Aiken & Hage, 1966, p. 499; Hage, 1965, p. 
295).   
Sales (2010) suggest that formalization of policy has positive effects on the organization 
and can improve information sharing.  Others see formal systems as potentially less effective in 
facilitating information sharing than informal ones (Hall & Tolbert, 2004; Kim & Lee, 2006; 
Willem & Buelens, 2007). It may be that having informal policy leads to increased openness and 
greater interaction and communication in an organization (Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2000; Kim & 
Lee, 2006). The case of the CNYICC demonstrates operation of a collaboration having less 
formal structures in its development stages. For longer term mature operation of collaborations 
the need for greater formalization may arise.   
Reflecting on the formation and purposes of professional associations may help create a 
better understanding of the CNYICC development and activities as collaboration. Montgomery 
(1987) argues that professional associations are movements of workers coming together 
purposely to protect their collective interests. In describing the proper motivation and sentiment 
of the members of these organizations, Montgomery notes that members were “fully prepared, if 
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need be, to sacrifice personal interests to the common good” (Montgomery, 1987).  Interestingly, 
this sentiment was reflected by all of the members in CNYICC.  
Professional associations in the United States gained recognition as early as the 18th 
century. They were founded due to the ineffectiveness of other structures to sufficiently address 
their concerns and interests.  Associations, or societies, brought together members of the same 
profession with common interests.  Groups from trade, legal bodies, social scientists, and 
medical professionals found it worth forming associations based on their professional interests 
(Douglas, 1987; Powell & Steinberg, 2006), and they sought a common voice to protect and 
serve these interests. Some believed that government structures alone were inadequate to 
accommodate public interests due to high costs or the complexity of varied public demands 
(Douglas, 1987). These associations in the public sector provide outlets for solidarity and 
pluralism in society (DuFour & Eaker, 1998). The success of these associations stems from their 
ability to bargain and advocate collectively with a common language, to respond to the 
specialized needs of their members, and to identify significant political and social concerns 
(DuFour & Eaker, 1998).  
Professional associations are recognized as playing a significant role as regulatory 
mechanisms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ruef & Scott, 1998). In an article following their case 
study, Greenwod, Suddaby and Hinings (2002) suggest that associations can exert great 
influence especially in times of deinstitutionalization and change.  The role of associations in 
that phase is to host the discourse and endorse the change within the profession and as it is 
portrayed externally (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002). 
Work by Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) suggests that professional 
associations are important for three reasons. First, associations provide arenas where 
219 
 
 
organizations interact and collectively represent their interests and needs to each other; these are 
important venues for candid interaction to occur (Greenwood et al., 2002). Crucial in the 
associations is the construction and maintenance of consensus over boundaries, priorities, 
membership, and behavior. Associations are not entirely homogeneous communities, and there 
remain differences among participants (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). Decision-making in 
associations has been characterized as a political process (Dezalay & Garth, 1996), which is to 
say that it is not a static environment. Secondly, identity and norms develop not just from 
interaction within a community but from outside interactions and social construction as well 
(Abbott, 1988; Cant & Sharma, 1995). Third, associations monitor compliance with normatively 
or coercively sanctioned expectations or rules (Greenwood et al., 2002). Associations therefore 
are active in these processes as they "define or enforce" collective values, acting as guardians 
and stewards of institutionalized practices.  
Theorization is a process of abstracting from prevailing conventions, which may be hard 
to apply practically to more field-sensitive conventions – a form more suited to broader adoption 
(Abbott, 1988). Tolbert and Zucker suggest that theorization is comprised of “two major tasks”: 
the first involves specification of a general “organizational failing”, where local innovation is a 
“solution or treatment,” and justifies the innovation (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). They also claim 
that diffusion also occurs where new ideas are proven more suitable than current practices, that 
there is a better way of doing something. Empirical work here is limited (Halliday, 1987; Van 
Hoy, 1993), but includes older studies, such as those of Collins (1979) and Freidson (1988).  
Regulatory agencies, such as governmental and professional associations – and, as argued 
here, consortiums – are important to the theorization process because they foster the formation of 
shared meanings and understandings in a field (Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott & Backman, 1990).  
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Associations have different roles in different stages of the process of change, where they 
react to events or consider routine activities.  As described by Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings 
(2002), there are six stages of institutional change: precipitating jolts, de-institutionalization, pre-
institutionalization, theorization, diffusion and re-institutionalization, shown in the figure below.  
These factors are portrayed as being sequential in action. The factors identified here align with 
those of another conceptual model for considering issues and impacts in the law enforcement and 
emergency response community – Social, Technical, and Policy (or Regulatory as used here), 
and Lewin’s change model (1951), from Treglia and Park (2009). That theoretical framework 
was initially applied to information sharing generally in the law enforcement and emergency 
response communities. Each of the identified factors is considered in assessing a situation or 
environment; however, they will have varying degrees of applicability depending on the 
particular circumstances being examined. 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Stages of Institutional Change 
       (Greenwood, Suddaby and Hinings, 2002) 
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4. Methodology 
 
 
This essay reports on the CNYICC as well as its emergence and operation as a 
collaborative entity in the area of public safety.  The CNYICC formed and developed to address 
the needs of various counties in facing technological, financial, and political challenges to 
providing interoperable communications to emergency responders and services to the citizens in 
Central New York State. The CNYICC is one of the first and most successful multi-jurisdictional 
public safety consortiums of its kind.  
The case study reported on here examines various aspects of the external environment, 
agency context, and the consortium’s organizational structure, goals, and governance processes. 
The purpose in this endeavor was to examine factors related to the emergence and sustained 
operation of the consortium in its context and to capture viewpoints of the participants from the 
different organizations and jurisdictions that have different roles that impact the consortium and 
its operation. The investigation was done in order to learn about consortium member views on 
constraints and barriers to interagency resource sharing and collaboration processes as the 
consortium evolved over time and to make their own observations.  
This article reports the findings regarding the first years of this ongoing collaboration. 
The intent is to contribute to scientific and professional knowledge about cooperative 
information sharing in the law enforcement agencies and emergency response communities 
(referred to as public safety agencies). This research looks to respond to questions of: What 
factors support collaboration among public safety agencies in information sharing projects 
involving information technologies, and what factors work against having a successful ongoing 
collaboration among these participants? 
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This was an exploratory study that involved grounded theory and an inductive approach 
in parts to explore and investigate collaboration and information sharing in a specific public 
safety context, the CNYICC.  A multi-method approach was selected using a research design 
including literature review, field observation, participant observation, document analysis, 
empirical investigation, case study, interviews and the Delphi technique. The interview protocol 
was adapted from the protocol used in the study of Public Safety Networks (Sawyer, 
Fedorowicz, Tyworth, Markus, & Williams. 2007; PSN, 2011).  That research involved looking 
at various aspects of Public Safety Network (PSN) formation and continuation as collaborations 
that share information (Williams, Fedorowicz, & Tomasino, 2010).  The PSN interview guide 
was used as the starting point for creation of the outline and structure of the CNYICC interview 
guide. The introduction, content areas and order of questions from the PSN interview protocol 
were considered by this researcher for applicability to the case study purposes and intended 
interviewees. Sections were deleted and parts added by the researcher. The final interview 
protocol used was reviewed with fellow researchers, the Syracuse University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB), the police, and 911 administrators and adjusted based on that feedback to 
the final form (see Appendix 3 Interview Guide).  
To date the state has not formally signed on to the Memorandum of Understanding for 
the CNYICC, as have the counties. At the extended member level, there is, in principle, a last 
layer where the public may participate; however, the researcher did not observe any civilians or 
members of the public in this category during the course of the study.  
Several consortium meetings of the core membership and the extended group were 
observed directly by the investigator from 2010 to 2012.  Notes as to the content of the meeting 
and participants involved were taken by hand. These contacts were not recorded as researchers 
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thought it may cause participants to be more guarded with their remarks. Notes and reflections of 
the researcher were taken both during and following the activities. Informal and ad-hoc contacts 
from 2007 forward involved conversations and discussion on the phone or at meetings of the 
consortium, department and committee, related to training and operational events, such as area 
multi-jurisdictional tabletop and field exercises related to emergency response. Note that one 
investigator was also a staff member within one of the consortium agencies and, thus, privy to a 
certain amount of insider communications.  
 
 
 
Figure 26: Composition of the CNYICC 
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Archival documents, both public and internal, were analyzed covering the time period 
from 2007, in which year the consortium was officially formed, through 2011. Documents were 
obtained through direct contact with agencies at their offices, at meetings, as well as through 
internet web sites. Searches of public records and organizational archives were also conducted. 
This information includes resources and material such as annual reports, website material, 
PowerPoint presentations, media coverage, MOUs, legislative reports, grant proposals, memos, 
meeting minutes, and other materials.  These resources are summarized in Table 4 below. 
 
~# Resource ~# Resource 
30 Archival documents (public and internal) 12 Meeting agenda and minutes – Legislature 
10 Agency Annual Reports 1 MOU 
5 Agency Web Site Material 40 News Media Accounts (print & web based) 
14 Formal interviews 12 PowerPoint Presentations by agencies 
16 Grant Proposals 2 Prior documented interviews 
90 Informal Agency Contacts/Interviews 24 Staff Meetings 
84 Internal memos and email correspondence 16 Training exercises and meetings 
4 CNYICC Core Group Meetings 3 CNYICC extended members meetings 
Table 4: Summary of Data Collected 
 
 
 
Semi-structured face-to-face interviews (ranging from less than a half hour to over two 
hours in length) were conducted with past and present members of the consortium as well as with 
key commercial sector consultants and vendors, related staff persons and other outside agencies 
to include state entities. Topics discussed included: background (agency and individual), 
contacts, stakeholders, technology, cultural environment, policy, governance, influence over 
change, competition, and the consortium (formation and what works and does not work well). 
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The full interview protocol is included in Appendix C.   
The study involved a census of all five core 911 Director members of the consortium and 
additionally included one past founding 911 Director member and the state police representative. 
As previously described, core consortium membership consisted of the five 911 directors, or 
members of equivalent positions, from each of the five original consortium counties with a state 
police representative. Additionally, formal interviews were conducted with four other staff 
members from consortium county agencies and three vendors/consultants who had interest in 
public safety communications and related events in Central New York in this area. These persons 
were selected from the extended membership as they were in county management or supervisory 
positions or upper managers of the vendor/consultant agencies and would be familiar with 
CNYICC issues. Informants discussed the environment and their individual motivations for 
creating and participating in the consortium. They reflected on key issues, social, policy and 
technical challenges that they had encountered, based on the interview protocol previously 
described. 
 The formal interviews were conducted by one interviewer over a two-month period in the 
fall of 2011. All formal interviews were recorded and professionally transcribed for verification 
and analysis.  During the period of the study, fourteen such formal interviews were conducted in 
addition to about 90 informal contacts/informal interviews that occurred in the workplace, at 
meetings, trainings and other events. 
 During the course of the formal interviews, the interviewer summarized the noted 
responses and solicited verification and additional feedback from the informants as a means of 
verification of understanding.  Transcripts for the core members were provided to each 
individually to review for accuracy and verify allowable content for use in the study, formally 
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referred to as “member checking.” The business here involved sensitive material and activity, so 
information required vetting for dissemination or use.  
 The researcher spent a considerable amount of time reviewing the tapes, transcripts and 
other supporting materials to look for patterns, common themes and conflicting elements. One 
such information conflict came in the area of the stated rationale for consortium members 
working together.  The members, in the interviews, state that they did not meet for financial 
reasons or in response to regulation but for broader more higher order interest goals.  In the 
public material, such as media accounts and legislative transcripts their participation is described 
as necessary to address financial and regulatory needs as well as for technical reasons.  This 
could be reconciled by considering that the purpose of the public and legislative rhetoric was to 
persuade and provide a clear statement and reason for the need to participate that could be 
embraced and understood by those audiences. There was no such need for this in the private 
interviews.  What is said publicly does not always match that said behind closed doors. 
 A table summarizing the timeline for this research is provided below (Table 5). 
 
Date <<< Related Meetings & Activity          Case Study Milestones >>> Date 
 Interviews with Nlets personnel, Phoenix, AZ (PSN Study) 12/16/2009 
 Met with Onondaga County Commissioner, preliminary 06/08/2010 
 Formal request for access to CNYICC for study 06/10/2010 
 Access to CNYICC for study granted 07/28/2010 
08/25/2010 CNYICC Meeting, Extended Membership, Oswego, NY  
09/01/2010 CNYICC Meeting, Extended Membership, Oswego, NY  
01/26/2011 Winning Grants and Meeting CJIS Requirements, Teleconference  
03/16/2011 NYS Univ. Police Morrisville College Tactical Exercise, Morrisville  
03/30/2011  CNYICC Meeting, Core Members, Syracuse, NY  
04/06/2011 Cyber Terrorism Speaker, Douglas Smith, Asst Dir for Private Sector US DHS, 
Albany, NY. 
 
04/11/2011 ICGP (Interoperable Communications Grant Program) Grant Summit, 
Wampsville, NY 
 
04/19/2011 911 Center CAD Product DEMO, Wampsville, NY  
 SU IRB (Institutional Review Board) Case Study Submission 04/24/2011 
05/05/2011 SCNYUA (Syracuse Central New York Urban Area) Working Group, Syracuse, 
NY (Meet first Thursday each month 10:30 am) 
 
05/24/2011 DHSES Office of Counter Terrorism Conference Call - RE: FY2011 HSGP 
Grants 
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06/28/2011 Nlets Conference & Business meeting, Burlington, VT  
 Informal interviews with Nlets members 06/29/2011 
 SU IRB (Institutional Review Board) Case Study Meeting 07/11/2011 
07/22/2011 SCNYUA & CNYICC, Tabletop Exercise Planning Conference, 
Teleconference 
 
 SU IRB (Institutional Review Board) Case Study Approval 07/22/2011 
08/01/2011 SCNYUA Crisis Response Syr. Univ. Field Exercise, Syracuse  
08/08/2011 SCNYUA & CNYICC, Tabletop Crisis Response Exercise, Auburn  
 Formal Interviews with participants begin 09/15/2011 
09/21/2011 NYS Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services Office of 
Counter Terrorism Regional Workshop, Auburn, NY 
 
10/12/2011 Syracuse UASI TTX After Action Conference, Teleconference   
10/14/2011 CNYICC Meeting, Core Members, Oswego, NY  
 Formal Interviews with participants complete 10/14/2011 
 Data collection from interviews and transcription complete 10/21/2011 
11/01/2011 Critical Infrastructure Grant Program (CIGP) Conference Call  
 Initial factors identified, list & interview transcripts sent to CNYICC core 
members for ranking, input, data verification and edits (Delphi technique 
begin)  
11/27/2011 
11/28/2011  CNYICC Meeting, Core Members, Oswego, NY  
 Explain factor ranking request to CNYICC core participants  11/28/2011 
 Factor rankings received & combined then resent to group for comment 
(one member unavailable)  
11/29/2011 
 Final factor rankings and edits received & compiled; result verified by 
CNYICC core participants   
12/09/2011 
 Case study draft of results completed 12/26/2011 
01/07/2012 Syracuse Police/Burmese Community Meeting, Syracuse  
01/19/2012 Madison County Area Emergency Response Tabletop Exercise, Wampsville, 
NY 
 
 
Table 5: Timeline of Research, December 2009 – January 2012 
 
 Using a modification of a normative (or consensus) Delphi Technique, the six core 911 
Director members (five from the counties and one retired founding member) were asked in their 
review to rank the key factors that had been identified by investigators in the review and coding 
of the responses and to add or remove factors as they deemed appropriate (Turoff, 1970; 
Charlton, 2004; Yousuf, 2007). Delbecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) indicate the Delphi 
technique can be used “To correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of 
disciplines.” Core members are considered subject matter experts in public safety 
communications.  
A preliminary list of sixteen factors believed to impact public safety collaborations in 
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positive and negative ways was provided to them for consideration. The initial list was derived 
by the researcher from analysis of all interview responses as well as responses to specific 
questions about the consortium including: “what about it is working well, what is not so well, 
why do you stay in this,” and “what could be done to improve the effectiveness”? The related 
responses were aggregated based on similarity to reduce the number of factors as much as 
possible. Researchers reviewed the data looking for these themes both manually and through the 
use of Atlas.ti (data analysis) software. The researcher studied the audible and transcribed 
interviews over several weeks to identify themes and issues. Other researchers, doctoral students 
and public safety personnel were consulted regarding the various themes and categorizations 
proposed. This process was repeated in part several times. The participants were asked first to 
review the factors provided, then to add or remove factors as they saw fit and finally to rank 
order them, ties for the factors were allowed (one member was unavailable for this stage of the 
process and after the final ranking was completed they indicated their support for the findings). 
Following the receipt of all refined and rank-ordered responses, investigators created an 
aggregated rank-ordered list based on that ranking, and sent it out to the group for final 
comments and appraisal. Feedback from this stage was then used to create the final factors – 
considered important to establishment and maintenance of successful public safety – identified in 
this case study.  
 Threats to validity were acknowledged and addressed in a number of ways.  Bias in the 
participant selection process was reduced, as there was 100% participation of the core 
consortium membership. Another threat to validity in the interview and data analysis process 
involved the potential for investigator bias (Weiss, 2004). The researcher here had prior 
experience in public safety and the potential for observing things in a pre-conceived way had to 
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be accounted for (Diesing, 1992). Awareness of this, engaging with other researchers, and 
having input and direct feedback from the participants (member checking) reduced this effect. 
This was a source for potential subjective validation, expectancy, and bias in the data 
interpretation and observation process. The established interview protocol was used with all 
participants.  
A concern is that some respondents may not complete the process. In the CNYICC case 
study, one of the core members was unavailable during a portion of the Delphi technique survey 
where responses were reviewed and ranked.  This member reviewed and accepted the responses 
and rankings after the others had already completed this. No additional changes were made.  
 The threat that there may be contamination with others participating in the study would 
not necessarily have adverse impacts. Networking by the participants was allowed. In real life 
the respondents discuss their activities with anyone they choose and therefore if they wish to 
discuss the study with each other while it is going on that is fine and reflective of their actual 
way of operating.  
This material and process as described formed the basis of the case presentation in the 
sections that follow. 
 
5. CNYICC Overview 
 
 
The CNYICC was formally created in 2007 by a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between five central New York counties – Cayuga, Cortland, Madison, Onondaga, and Oswego 
(shown in the Appendix) – and signed by the various legislative bodies. Consortium membership 
has been evolving since its inception with the New York State Police participating since 2009, 
and there are several other counties now considering joining as well. The active working team 
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for the consortium consists of the participating 911 County Administrators and representation 
from the New York State Police, with technical support being provided individually and by 
various private sector consultants under contract with some consortium counties and acting 
without contract for others. The mission of the consortium is “[t]o provide wireless UHF narrow 
ban, simulcast communications network for all first responders in the CNYICC area, to 
encourage participation in the CNYICC thereby reducing member agency cost, and to continue 
to seek alternative funding methods to reduce local governmental costs” (Allen, Balloni, 
Hartnett, & Stayton, 2007). Consortium members promote creating interoperable 
communications systems for all emergency responders. The consortium is not funded, nor does it 
have dedicated staff or formal corporate entity status. The mission statement provides direction 
for the consortium members collectively and as individual entities. 
The CNYICC meets on a monthly basis and as needed. As of this date, the consortium 
has developed only a draft plan of governance and policy that can be expanded upon further. The 
governance plan is not signed, nor has it been formally adopted; the version at the time of this 
writing is shown in the Appendix E (the current plan was given to an upstate college for review 
and possible update by CNYICC). Activities, strategic planning, and governance (to include 
membership, agency rights and responsibilities, and regional authority for coordination and 
assignment of interoperability assets) remain as informally negotiated items without formal 
written policies. The consortium has a Chairman who is appointed by the working members. The 
core members, who are the 911 directors for the participating counties, meet to decide policy and 
approve actions to be taken in the name of the consortium, such as the consortium approval of a 
policy position or grant proposal to jointly pursue. The consortium also has an extended 
membership group that meets several times a year. The extended membership meetings include 
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the core members as well as their staff and may include other county emergency managers, heads 
of fire departments, EMS, law enforcement, hospitals, and public utility providers; colleges, 
universities, communications services, equipment vendors, and others are also allowed to attend. 
In 2010, there was a significant change to the core membership of the CNYICC.  A 
strong founding member accepted another government position, and so the new incoming county 
911 commissioner was going to assume a role in the consortium as a core member. Potentially, 
this could have been a negative turning point as this member had been a critical part of the initial 
formation and possessed great leadership, vision, and interpersonal skills. Since it was a 
relatively small group, this also meant that each participant had a strong impact on the 
consortium as a whole. The core members had no prior personal relationships when the 
consortium formed. They had known of each other through participation in professional 
association meetings and through participation in training and conferences. In this case, the 
incoming commissioner possessed interpersonal and technical skills, as described in the 
following sections of this article, which allowed for a fluid transition and continuation of synergy 
among the group that continues to date. When asked about the potential of changing the 
consortium dynamics due to such a transition, some of the core members said that they (as a 
group), and the positive momentum that was there, simply would not have allowed a person to 
come in who did not fit; the new arrival would have had to conform. 
The CNYICC is an example of a challenging new model for collaboration among 
previously independently oriented public safety entities. Police, fire, and EMS agencies as well 
as their respective jurisdictions have traditionally been autonomous in their operations and 
governance. In this paper, researchers identify several factors that, it is argued, led to this newly 
created union and additional factors that promote sustainability and success of such partnerships 
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in the public safety arena. In the next section, researchers briefly identify some external factors 
and issues that were active at the time of the consortium’s formation and progress, and which 
impact consortium decisions and activity. Figure 27 below depicts CNYICC’s influence and 
relationships, both inward and outward. Arrows are used to show direction of influence and a 
general weighting for degree of influence, contact, or frequency. As shown in the figure, the 
individual 911 directors have increased and more direct access and influence with vendors and 
government agencies than if there had been no such consortium.   
 
County Board of 
Supervisors/County 
Legislature
County 911 
Director
CNYICC Core 
Members
State 
Agencies
Federal 
Agencies
Trade Associations
National & Local
Vendors
Local
Vendors
Regional
Vendors
National &
International
 
 
Figure 27: CNYICC Influence and Relationships 
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6. External Factors 
 
A number of external factors were identified as having influence in the formation and 
ongoing operation of the CNYICC.  This section begins with a timeline (table 5 below) 
highlighting these factors/events at the federal, state, and local levels, followed by a listing of the 
identified external factors. An expanded timeline (table 9) with event description and 
implications included is provided in Appendix H.  
 
Date Federal Level Event State Level Event Local Level Event 
1982 National Emergency Number 
Association (NENA) 
 (CNYICC members all participate 
here currently) 
1989 Project 25 (P25 or APCO-25) 
initiated 
  
1991  911 Wireless Surcharge 
imposed 
Counties not getting proposed 
revenues as anticipated 
1995 Project 25 - Phase I Completed   
2001 9/11 Terrorist Attack in US Statewide Wireless Network 
(SWN) RFP initiated 
 
  9/11 Terrorist Attack in US 9/11 Terrorist Attack in US 
2003 Next Generation 911 (NG9-1-1 
or NG911) 
Next Generation 911 (NG9-1-
1 or NG911) 
Next Generation 911 (NG9-1-1 or 
NG911) 
2004 Narrowbanding Land Mobile 
Radio (LMR) ordered by FCC 
  
2005 National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) use mandated 
by Presidential Directive 
States adopt same  
  
Incident Command System 
(ICS) use mandated by 
Presidential Directive 
 
States adopt same 
 
  
SAFECOM – Interoperability 
Continuum 
  
  
Hurricane Katrina 
 
Hurricane Katrina 
 
 
   
Statewide Wireless Network 
(SWN) initiated 
 
2006   CNYICC Discussions Initiated 
    
2007 Project 25 compliance 
verification from vendor 
required 
Statewide Wireless Network 
(SWN) reporting required 
CNYICC Formally Created (MOU) 
2008 The National Emergency 
Communications Plan (NECP) 
  
2009  Statewide Wireless Network 
(SWN) Cancelled 
 
  Project 25 (P25) standards 
included at state level  
 
2010   
 
CNYICC Core Membership Change 
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911 Landline Surcharge and  
Mortgage recording tax 
blocked by State 
2011  911 landline Surcharges and  
Mortgage recording tax still 
not allowed by State 
911 landline Surcharge and  
Mortgage recording tax adopted by 
counties 
Source: (Treglia, 2012) See also table 5 in appendix. 
 
Table 6: Events and Activities Impacting CNYICC 
 
External factors that impacted the CNYICC include the following: Statewide Wireless 
Network (SWN), Project 25 (P-25), Next Generation 911 (NG911), National Emergency 
Number Association (NENA), SAFECOM, The National Emergency Communications Plan 
(NECP), National Incident Management System (NIMS), Incident Command System (ICS), and 
Narrowbanding. These factors are each described in Appendix I.  
6.1 Funding Environment 
 
The funding climate in the United States for public safety communications centers was 
not affluent. Policy measures for raising funds for infrastructure was being curtailed by 
limitations on such things as counties ability to create revenue through things such as mortgage 
filing fees or surcharges.  In the state of New York, there has been ongoing conflict regarding the 
appropriation and distribution of allowed surcharges and allocations for interoperable 
communications and infrastructure improvement. During the time of this study, there were 
emerging from the federal and state levels, a number of competitive and formula funding 
opportunities through a variety of agencies. The state of the nation regarding the scope of need 
for systems overhaul and improvement was far greater than the proposed allocations would 
provide.  Local entities took issue with having to compete for these financial resources that they 
felt were due each by reason of their individual contributions.  Having fewer opportunities for 
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funding makes it more likely that public safety entities will see each other as competitors and this 
could lead to lack of cooperation. In the case of the CNYICC it brought them together more.  
The conflicts over funding made for a common cause or issue that public safety entities could 
identify with and work together to address as a group. 
  
7. Findings 
 
This section presents the initial findings and identifies factors considered important to 
establishment and maintenance of successful public safety collaboration– in this case the 
CNYICC– involving multiple county level government agencies in New York State, which is 
one of the central research questions. The final factors presented were derived from the data 
collected in the case study and are the result of the combined responses from all primary 
consortium members to include one past founding member, as described previously in the 
methods section.  
The responses were inductively derived from the interviews and data through a grounded 
theory approach.  The terms used are taken and presented, where possible, verbatim from the 
respondents. The interpretation and use of the factors are from the perspective of the 
interviewees. Use of the terminology by the interviewees may not correspond directly or 
accurately to the conceptualization of these same terms in other contexts or the academic 
literature of a particular field. The findings do accurately represent the opinions of the 
consortium members and related stakeholders from an insider perspective. 
Although these factors are presented individually, they are interrelated and should be 
considered collectively. Researchers argue that in concert the factors represent important 
elements of what in this case is considered a successful collaboration. At this point in the 
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research, researchers are not able to quantify or separate out individual factors to assess 
individual impacts. A summary of the important factors to consider in establishing and 
maintaining a consortium in public safety (derived from the consideration of study data and 
feedback from consortium members) includes the factors identified in Table 7 below and  further 
described in the section following. 
 
 
What helps foster Collaboration:  
 
1.   In it for right reasons - greater good 
2.   Trust 
3.   Personal characteristics of key managers people oriented focus 
4.   Face to face, and regular contact with partners and   
      stakeholders 
5.   Autonomy and flexibility for participants 
6.   Basic written agreement/understanding (flexible, not complex 
      or detailed) 
7.   Measurable Objectives 
8.   Technical Standards 
9.   Share control, all are important, i.e. don't have biggest partner 
      in charge 
10. Use consultants for knowledge and insights 
 
 
What does not help Collaboration: 
 
1.  Lack of standards 
2.  Dictate from the top, top-down bureaucracy in County  
     Governments 
3.  Assumption that everything will work everywhere, Insist  
     participants follow 
     same course 
4.  Manage by memo or indirect communication 
6.  Look out just your own interests 
7.  Strict and detailed governance plans 
 
Table 7: Factors Important to Successful Collaboration in Public Safety 
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7.1. What helps collaboration 
 
7.1.1 In it for right reasons - greater good 
 
All core participants identified being in it for the right reasons and working for the 
greater good as the top most important factors. This is the highest rated factor among the 
consortium members.  “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is translated in public safety to 
signify the common foe of protecting lives of the citizens, officers, and responders that put 
themselves out to help and protect others.  The difference in the public safety realm, that sets it 
apart from the business world and to a degree the not for profits, is the motivation;, in public 
safety, that it is about saving lives. Those engaged know it and feel it. In a corporation when the 
third quarter returns are below the projections, there is a problem. When the 911 center has a 
failing in the system or their communications to an officer on the scene or between fire units 
needing information and resources to battle a blaze or catastrophe people’s lives are lost and that 
has no comparison on a balance sheet.  Higher-order interests as a motivating factor in business 
literature regarding collaborative behavior is not on the list. Where collaborators can satisfy each 
other's different interests without hurting themselves, collaboration can occur (Wood and Gray, 
1991). Similarity in mission, and commitment to similar populations, have been identified as 
important factors for collaboration success (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Thomson, 1999). The 
effects of these factors are most visible in the public safety realm where it is this higher-order 
interest and mission that drives behavior. Those who have competing fiscal and political interests 
are galvanized and unified against the foe or notion of saving lives and protecting the public in a 
way that overcomes such barriers.   
In the interviews, informants provided several emotional examples of their shared interest 
in higher order interests.  One administrator said: 
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“One of the reasons that so many lives were lost on September 11th is the inability to 
communicate between emergency services.  We want to build a system where we can 
communicate between emergency services.  People die when communication, it’s critical 
on the battlefield and it doesn’t matter whether you’re fighting a fire, fighting a, doing a 
major police action or dealing with any other emergency, or doing a battlefield.” 
 
 Another administrator expressed his thoughts regarding another consortium member in a 
leadership position:  
 
“… he’s also in it for the right reasons.  He’s doing it for the right reasons.” 
 
 When asked about formation of the consortium as being done “because it was just the 
right thing to do,” one administrator replied: 
 
“That’s, I don’t think you could have hit it more on the head.  The people that were in the 
business and knew what we were facing got together ‘cause, and we all agreed this is the 
right thing to do, now how do we get others on board and so that was agreed before any 
government was involved in it other than at that 911 director level.  We agreed that this 
was the right thing to do.” 
 
 Lessons learned in this arena are applicable to other areas. In government, there is a 
higher order interest of helping people and in the not for profit sector the entities are typically in 
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it for a higher purpose, in school districts this is also true.  In those cases, one should expect that 
managers and policy and practice should press on the higher moral ground for doing the job to 
increase collaboration and worker performance and cooperation and sticking to the mission. This 
works for collaboration and also in insuring cyber security, which is an ongoing challenge that 
requires constant vigilance and reminders from management to keep it fresh as it is easy to get 
complacent when things go well.   
 This is a highly regulated and technologically infused area and environment. In this way, 
the public safety consortia and operation is differentiated from a great many typical businesses. 
Still, much of what is learned here is relevant to other places, business or otherwise, that share 
the policy and technology complexity and engagement.  
 There is further work to be done to see if the higher-order interest has as strong a 
corollary in the business world. Existing models for collaboration should now rate trust, personal 
contact and shared vision highly in the formation formulas for cooperation. Other business 
strategic texts address formal strategic alliances as existing beyond a narrow joint project or 
action to a longer term relationship that acknowledges that at times one may be getting more 
from the relationship than the other but aware that over the long term it is better for both, 
sticking together in lean times as well as when all is good - or not jumping ship just for a short 
term gain. 
 
7.1.2 Trust 
 
 Trust and establishment of trusted relationships was rated as essential to success in 
collaborative efforts. This is reflected in the comment from a 911 administrator: 
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“Right from the very beginning we were very candid and honest and we have a very good 
relationship among ourselves that we’re in it to work together and help each other out and 
I think that that’s really been the most important part is the fact that there’s no, you know, 
we don’t, there’s no hidden agendas, you know, we just seek to do the right thing for the 
..."  
 
Another administrator spoke highly of their peers in the consortium: 
 
“They were all straight shooters. I mean, really, they all pretty much give you things at 
face value.  I know when XXX tells me something, or when YYY tells me something, 
I’m getting it at face value.” 
 
Those interviewed also reflected a sense of trust in others generally: 
Respondent     Why did I, I trust people until you give me a reason not to. 
Interviewer     Okay. And then these people gave you plenty of reason to 
           trust them. 
Respondent     Yes. 
 
 There were examples of how consortium members worked to establish trust with 
stakeholders: 
 
“I’m not going to tell you what you want to hear;, I’m going to tell you what the truth is, 
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…that’s about building faith and confidence that what you’re saying is correct, and there 
were times that what we were saying was not correct because we misunderstood 
something and then you go back to them and say you know what I said at the last 
meeting, that was not correct and again you build credibility, you build faith, you build 
that relationship …” 
 
Another administrator described the trust building process as ongoing and requiring direct 
personal involvement: 
 
“We’re going down to the firehouse, we’re going, I cannot tell you the amount of night 
meetings and face-to-face, it’s all about building relationships and trust.” 
 
 Trust is essential to unified action. Law enforcement and emergency response agencies 
are tasked with responding to crises under any conditions or circumstances. The movie 
"Gladiator," DreamWorks Home Entertainment, 2000, includes a telling scene where the hero 
(Maximus) unites his comrades, who are expected to be defeated in a mock battle against more 
powerful forces. As they stand facing the large closed doors in the Roman Coliseum, Maximus 
urges them saying "whatever comes out of these gates, we've got a better chance of survival if 
we work together. Do you understand? If we stay together we survive" (Wick, Franzoni, Lustig, 
& Scott, 2000). By their coordinated, selfless, and collective action, against the terrible and 
unknown, they triumph. You can picture this today as the Chairman and CNYICC face the 
ominous doors to the legislative chamber (for example) urging consortium members "work 
together," "whatever comes out" of the legislature, committee, technology, or other source, and 
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they will have a better chance for survival. The members have stayed together and have better 
prepared and positioned themselves for success and opportunity because of this. 
 Levels of trust are identified in the literature as playing a strong role in people’s or groups 
choices to share information, and it is argued here collaborate. Razavi and Iverson portray the 
sense of trust as varying by degree (2006). They describe trust as not simply being a trust or not 
trust decision but rather that users’ sense of trust may move from greater to lesser levels.  This is 
applied to human groups as well in virtual and face-to-face environments.  Level of trust, 
according to this same study, can be raised over time through participation with the group or 
community. Also consistent with the findings of Razavi and Iverson, members of the consortium 
were able to meet virtually and continue to grow their trust where face-to-face meeting was not 
possible. The significance of developing trust was noted by all core members of the CNYICC 
interviewed.  
7.1.3 Personal characteristics of key manager’s people oriented focus 
 
 Management style and personal characteristics of key leadership personnel was identified 
as an important factor to success of getting people to work together.   
 When asked about the skills necessary for success in the consortium, one administrator 
said that the most important would be “vision and it’s that ability to go out there and talk to 
people and get them on the same page.”  
 Each of the director’s involved showed evidence of people-focused orientations. A 
cultivational culture was evident in each of the agencies visited. Investigators observed that open 
door policies were the norm. Most had candy or food in their offices to invite casual meetings. 
All members have pursued higher education. Each of the consortium members made a point of 
recognizing and encouraging quality performance in their staff formally and informally. One 
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administrator routinely uses items accumulated from participation in conferences and workshops 
(such as coffee mugs, water bottles, pouches and pens) as prizes to acknowledge and recognize 
those doing good work: 
 
“There’s very little you can do as a government agency to recognize your people.  So 
anything that you can do, I think, is a good thing. You know, I can’t give them a bonus if 
they do a good job, but I can give them a pat on the back; I can say pick something out of 
the prize bin ‘cause that’s what that box is over there, the prize bin, and I fill it with all 
the things I get from all the conferences that I go to, you know.” 
 
 Individually, each of the consortium members is committed to working together 
constructively and selflessly, as one administrator describes: 
 
“Yeah, I think so. I think because of our very nature that we’ve been so far been able to 
be successful, and I mean when I said each of us are very capable of checking our egos at 
the door when we sit down.” 
 
 There was observed a clear management style that engaged with others, managing by 
committee and making use of multiple means and channels for input.  This is well described by 
one of the 911 Administrators: 
 
“Well, there’s a ton of different, I mean we, not a ton, but one thing that I think makes 
this center very successful is that it doesn’t do things in a vacuum.  We have always been 
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open to input by committee and things that we do.  For example, when the radio system 
was started up from the very beginning there was a team leads set up, and that team leads 
[sic] was consisting of representatives from all the major users, police, fire, government, 
county government, and they made global recommendations, but they also made service 
related recommendations of the radio systems.  So, for example, you know, we talked 
when planning this system we talked overall on what we all felt we would want to do in 
writing the RFP and then, when it came to the things like programming radios and 
templates and talk groups and things like that, each service, you know, we would meet as 
a combined group to talk about the interoperability of it, but when it came time to how 
does county fire work, you know, fire people would meet and make those 
recommendations, police people would make those recommendations.  So, a lot of things 
that we do here are done by committee, which I think ultimately is responsible for a big 
portion of the success of what we do. “ 
 
“You know, computer-aided dispatch, when we did computer-aided dispatch, it wasn’t 
just us making a recommendation we involved all the users and what CAD system are we 
going to go to and, consequently, I think we got a much better CAD system ultimately.  
So we do do a lot of things by committee.” 
 
“I don’t think that fire has this, but there’s a police users group that has representatives 
from the police service, and they will sit there and meet and talk about things that, if it 
can be resolved on that level, it gets resolved, if not it comes forward to the representative 
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to PROC (Policy Review and Oversight Committee), PROC will bring it to the table kind 
of thing.” 
 
 There was clear evidence that the consortium sought out participation of the stakeholders 
and others throughout the process. These meetings are ongoing. One administrator describes a 
“roundtable” discussion conducted with extended members: 
 
“Yeah, our roundtable discussion includes members of each piece in the consortium and 
it’s open to everyone; we’ve been very open with who can be a member or take a part in 
this.  You know, early on, we invited you to come and see and we were very happy to 
have you here and now we have the state police playing a part in this consortium idea. So 
we bring them to the table.  Anyone who we think can advance our cause to be very 
honest.” 
 
 Most all administrators reported adjusting their schedules to be able to interface with 
those working afternoon and evening schedules. The positive characteristics of the members of 
the consortium, as reflected in the way they work within their agencies, are believed to be an 
important contribution to its success.  
7.1.4 Face to face, and regular contact with partners and stakeholders 
 
 Engaging personally, face to face, with partners and stakeholders was identified by all of 
the consortium members and vendors that were interviewed as significant to developing and 
maintaining working relationships. This was originally described as face to face contact with 
partners and separately with stakeholders but combined them for discussion here as they are 
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related and share justifications. This is explained by one of the 911 administrators in the 
following: 
 
“The stakeholders, well, you have your own government is one of the stakeholders, 
certainly all of the fire and EMS first responders is another major stakeholder, citizens 
are your stakeholders. Ultimately, they’re footing the bill and in addition to reaping the 
greatest benefit because they know that if we have the right tools, we can help them when 
they need our help.  Those are the critical stakeholders.”   
 
 When asked directly if they felt that if they did not meet face-to-face would they have 
accomplished what they did or be as organized, the respondent administrator answered, “No, no I 
would say definitely not.” This position is further reflected in statements from other 
administrators interviewed: 
 
“I like that face-to-face contact, it builds relationships as well and the rapport.  It’s you 
need to have face-to-face stuff.” 
 
“…we’re going, I cannot tell you the amount of night meetings and face-to-face, it’s all 
about building relationships and trust.” 
 
 Those interviewed also spoke of limitations and problems with impersonal 
communication such as emails or memos: 
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“Well, first of all, sometimes things in e-mails can be misinterpreted: you don’t have 
inflection in your voice, it’s easier to explain it than it is to– explain it in words– than it is 
to explain it in a typed message.  I find myself doing that often, you know, e-mail back 
and forth, let’s just talk to each other, so I get on the phone and say look at, ‘this will 
work much easier.’ You can’t have a conversation through e-mail as far as I’m 
concerned, so I mean, you know, e-mail is good for ‘we have a SNIC meeting next 
Tuesday at 10:00, see you then,’ but it’s not good for, as far as I’m concerned, ‘XXX this 
is YYY how you doing, …, you know, I’m thinking about having a SNIC meeting next 
week what days do you have available.  You know, I talked to ZZZ he’s got Tuesday, 
how does Wednesday look for you?’  You can’t do that kind of, I can’t do that on e-
mail.” 
 
“Yes.  I do the County Police Chief’s meeting every month.  I do the Central New York 
Fire Districts meeting every two months it is, but face-to-face wherever we can.” 
 
“I think the best form of communication, and this is me personally, is face-to-face.  A lot 
of people can interpret e-mails incorrectly– the tone of them, or the wording– some 
people aren’t good writers and have trouble expressing themselves, electronic or on 
paper, if you will, and I think it’s best sometimes done face-to-face.” 
 
“…but we also have conference calls now ‘cause we’re getting down to the nitty gritty.  
Some of those conference calls can be intense because people take what was said the 
wrong way by other members; well, you’re not seeing the person and it can get, it has 
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gotten, confrontational at times where the same team met yesterday things were said that 
could cause confrontation, but they weren’t because you’re in the same room, you see 
how it was delivered, the tone it was delivered, the mannerism, the body language.” 
 
 The practice of engaging with as much personal contact as possible under the 
circumstances was consistently observed and reflected in the interviews. Building or establishing 
trust is described as a key linkage in the connection between communication and cooperation 
(Ostrom & Walker, 2005, p.34). Consistent with the observations in the case study here 
researchers such as Ostrom and Walker (2003) demonstrated that trust and positive reciprocity is 
promoted through face to face interactions in both small and larger groups.  Trust is further 
characterized in the literature as “a lubricant of social interaction” (Ostrom, 2003). Good faith 
builds these positive perceptions and relationships for all parties involved. 
7.1.5 Autonomy and flexibility for participants 
 
 Recognition of sovereignty and maintaining individual identity and control are important 
to the members of the consortium, and any formation to organize must account for this. The 
counties, agencies, and departments that all must work together are diverse. There are strong 
interests and personalities involved; however, each are brought together under the common 
interest of protecting the public. The current organization and governance structure of the 
consortium reflects this and seems to be effective. The current MOU is the guiding document for 
the operation of the consortium but to date the policies and procedures that would further 
formalize and codify the operation of the consortium and supporting committees or groups 
remain on the drafting table. In this case, less formalization seems to be valuable to sustaining 
the effective relationships. Several remarks from those interviewed provide evidence of this: 
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“We started doing this because we needed to and we wanted to, not because somebody 
told us to.” 
 
“Alright, it wasn’t like ‘well you got to do this, no you don’t, you don’t have to do 
anything.’  That’s what makes the consortium work: there’s no pressure to do anything 
okay.  That’s probably the only success story I can really tell you, but it was also, I have 
to tell you, that it was also a component of that was the personalities involved, the people 
involved.  They were all willing to work together; there was no, ‘it’s mine, I’m better 
than you are, I’m smarter than you are,’ I call it the brat mentality, there was none of that. 
They were all very straight forward, very easy to work with, you know, we’re willing to 
share, there was none of that, I got to be in charge or I’m not playing or I’m going to take 
my toys and go home, I didn’t see any of that the whole time and that’s four years now, 
five years now it’s been going on.“ 
 
Other remarks included statements such as: 
 
“The fire service in general has got major issues, issues that I can’t fix.  One, because we 
don’t have any control to fix them.  They’re all kings in their castles and there’s major 
issues ...” 
 
“It’s not a policy thing, it’s the law.  The law says they’re the kings in their castles, it’s 
the home-rule state and you can’t change it unless you change state law. Change state law 
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we can fix some of these problems, but people in my position to work for the county we 
have no authority to step into a fire department and say hey you’re doing this wrong” 
 
“That’s the key is, you know, taking the politics aside, the finances of folks that they can 
afford to fund the solutions.  So they need to be flexible and have a work around and 
you’ll still maintain that connectivity and the coordination between these users that, you 
know, I think that’s happening.” 
 
Other interviewees said: 
 
“But, at one point, we went to Albany, went to Washington and we lobbied for this, you 
know, and SWN (Statewide Wireless Network plan) and said look, ‘we don’t have any 
problem with SWN, we’ll let SWN on the network, we don’t have any issues with them, 
we’re not in competition with them, we want to maintain and own our own radio system 
just for the safety of our first responders, I don’t want to be dealing with somebody in 
Albany and the bureaucracy that goes around with it, okay.  So if you want to come on 
the system you’re more than welcome to do that,’ and that’s the premise we went on.” 
 
“I’ll have a regional system here; we’ll have a regional system here, you can go anywhere 
in five counties, you’ll have to go a long ways to get out of reach of our radio system, 
which is really cool.  Farther than probably you ever will, you know, you can’t expect to 
go to New York City and talk on your radio system.” 
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Still others said of flexibility that: 
 
“You can be a member of more than one consortia. You can work with the other counties.  
You know, we have Onondaga as well as they have their own little consortium.  Broome 
County is developing their own; we’re going to be a part of both of them.” 
 
Interviewees provided statements regarding their sentiments on sovereignty as: 
 
“…when they (State) came here and did their presentation, we went after them on that, 
‘who’s going to run this, who’s going to operate it, who’s going to own it, how do we 
make changes? Well you have to call the state, and we’ll give you a rep from the state, 
call Albany they can put you on, make changes and we’re all looking at each other going 
thank you very much we’re out of here, okay, have a nice day. ‘” 
 
“We weren’t giving up, we’ve had our own system for years, and we’re not giving up our 
own system here and it should be managed and funded locally for how you operate and 
every county is different, some are more rural than others and that needs to stay in place.  
You lose sight of that; you’re going to have a New York City mentality running 
everything up here and the next thing you know it’s not going to work for anybody, and it 
will fail miserably.” 
 
Another member continued on about local interests and flexibility as: 
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“… you have to design it until it functions on a local situation locally for what you do, 
your county is different that my county. My county is different than your county; we all 
have our different problems and our different issues. You can’t take one shoe does not fit 
everybody, even during the consortium, we recognized early on some of the stuff we got 
working here they will never have, never want, that’s okay, you know? That’s okay 
because if it’s there and you ever want to get into it you’re welcome to join us that’s fine 
too and that’s how we left it.” 
 
7.1.6 Basic written agreement/understanding  
 
 The common understanding in business is that partnerships should be codified in detailed 
written contracts that clearly specify goals, expectations and responsibilities for all parties 
involved.  Contrary to this notion, the CNYICC operates through a loose written memorandum 
of understanding (MOU). The consortium is successfully operating in this way still. A finding 
here is that agreements should be basically written, flexible, and not complex or overly detailed. 
Several of the interviewees provided some insights and support to this form of operation: 
 
“No, it’s a very, I think, it’s a loose fit organization.  Like I said, it’s really the 
consortium is the five of us and I think that we all have the same common goal, you 
know, we’re very concerned about the service that we provide our people and we all look 
into the ghost of Christmas future and know that our business is going to get more and 
more expensive and we know that working together we can do better than working 
independently in terms of saving money, putting together better interoperable systems.  
253 
 
 
So it’s a win/win situation: there’s nothing to lose here.  So, I think that helps and they’re 
good people, you know… they’re very good to work with.” 
 
 Adjustments to initial plans are required at times and the present consortium structure 
allows for flexibility. Working from an overall agreement that the county has originally 
approved, adjustments are made case-by-case as needs, priorities, and opportunities arise. A 911 
administrator gave the following account of making changes in course: 
 
“Exactly, they’re just made operationally and I don’t think there’s anything– there’s 
nothing illegal about that– you make operational adjustments, but mostly you know, the 
contract is your guiding document and it’s good to spend a lot of time, my 
recommendation, spend a lot of time in that contract clarification period making sure ...” 
 
 In one instance, linking two sites across counties through a microwave link was 
discussed. This was not part of the original plans, it bore a significant cost, and there was no 
funding for it. During a consortium member meeting, the State Police informally offered to 
provide the hardware and install the link. This was a several hundred thousand dollar general 
verbal commitment made during the course of a meeting of the core membership. The state did 
follow up and formalize the offer and working with the consortium and counties involved the 
link was established. The initial discussion and offer to assist by the state occurred through the 
course of consortium meetings.  The formal follow up required written agreements and financial 
commitment as well as discussion and agreement over future stewardship and maintenance. The 
process slowed and the offer nearly was withdrawn at the point where the verbal commitments 
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were to be put to paper and the formal agreement drafted.  General consensus towards the goals 
and mission was found to be relatively easy to achieve. When the details of the contract and 
commitment had to be formalized, it was more scrutinized and the informal way of working gave 
way to the more business style formal contract negotiation process. Still, it is possibly because of 
the relationships that are part of the consortium that this volatile stage was able to be effectively 
worked through. In this case if it were not for the positive relationships established in and 
through the consortium the solution would have not come about in the first place or likely been 
dropped in the negotiation phase.  
 There was discussion across the consortium members that, in the future, as more complex 
agreements and activities are undertaken, there may be a need for a more formal structure.  This 
was reflected in the statement below regarding potential benefits to greater formalization:  
 
“I think we have to.  In order for us to be successful in that area, you know, up to this 
point what we have now has worked and will probably continue to work for what we’re 
doing right now, but if we want to do better, if we want to explore new areas like a 
regional communication system, or you know, a regional telephony system, or regional 
maintenance, or regional repair shop, or you know, think way outside of the box we’re 
going to need more structure than that. “ 
 
7.1.7 Measurable Objectives 
 
 Identifying measurable objectives and clarifying the purpose for the consortium was 
added to the list of factors after review by the members of the consortium. There is a need to 
have a means for identifying milestones or objectives that are observable and reportable to 
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maintain the course and to provide support and justification to stakeholders and members. A 
consortium member said of this, “… you have to show where you’re going to benefit yourself 
and the other party….” Another member said of the person initiating the idea of the consortium 
that he “had vision.” The literature on collaboration in business and government supports this. 
Clear objectives and other things such as an identifiable vision for what is to be accomplished 
and having standards or models to compare against also seem to be valuable to supporting 
ongoing collaborative activity: 
 
“Each of us spend the majority of our day taking care of ourselves, but we get together 
from time to time to make sure that we can learn a lesson from the other and to make sure 
that the vision of all this is going to work and the end remains intact.” 
 
 In the case of public safety and emergency response, there are models for improving 
interoperability, such as SAFECOM that can be followed (SAFECOM, 2011). A large 
technology vendor was asked if using the SAFECOM model in development of governance and 
communication policies and practices would lead to long term relationships amongst the counties 
and the respondent administrator said that: 
 
“In a limited way, yes.  I believe it (SAFECOM) is one of many tools to maintain long-
term relationships. However, I think having common financial interests and common 
technology may do more for building long term consortium relationships.” 
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 Other objectives come about through mandates such as P25 or Narrowbanding, as 
discussed in the earlier sections. Some examples from this investigation are included below. 
 
“There were three things, September 11th, and the need to be interoperable, that was 
huge, you know, the basic is that you need to be able to talk to whoever you need to talk 
to when you need to talk to.  So interoperability, narrow banding was a factor, and the 
fact that our legacy systems were obsolete or impractical.  Impractical being low band 
VHF that fire service was using.  You know, the amount of equipment being 
manufactured for low band is disappearing, the noise, the appearance, the size of the 
antennas, there’s a lot of things that render that an impractical alternative.” 
 
“The narrow banding is going to happen, it’s going to happen on January 1st, 2013.” 
 
 Regulation and existing policy allowed for clarity or purpose and provided guidance for 
implementing new ways of operating.  This is shown in a statement from a 911 administrator: 
 
“We basically took existing radio policies and rather than reinvent the wheel we said lets 
adapt our existing policy which people are used to, cause we had a 911 system, we had 
policies and procedures, let’s adapt those to meet our new system, you know; so we’re 
going to have to change some things to meet the new system but basically people already 
know how to operate in terms of policies and procedures, who talks when and that kind 
of thing, and we included them in writing the policies.  Okay, you know, the fire chief’s 
radio committee have several members sit on the, actually chair, the committee deciding 
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on the policies for fire communications.  Police chief, same thing, on the police talk 
groups.” 
7.1.8 Technical Standards 
 
 
 Clearly, having identified technical standards allows for greater interoperability and it 
also provides, in some cases, a more stable base for cooperative ventures such as consortium’s 
for public safety. It was found that the emergence of standards for technology allowed for 
collective activity and consensus. Members of the consortium described and identified many 
instances of technology standards for hardware and policy in emergency response 
communication that helped them to work together to provide services and prepare for upcoming 
changes. Some of the relevant comments are provided below: 
 
Q It seemed like everybody is floundering until someone stepped up and put some 
standards out there.  
Resp Yeah.  
Q So that I think that even that raw set, you know, that very rough outline of 
standards gave people a way to come together, otherwise you know, it’s just every 
man for themselves.  
Resp Right, right.  And that’s something where we’re really starting to get a hold of 
now, you know, I’d like to see that statement you just made in writing. 
 
 
Resp There’s standards, you don’t get that little part of the pie if you don’t comply.   
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 Regarding commercial purchasing or choice in technology solutions standards allowed, 
the consortium to consider greater interoperable technology options as a group. According to 
those interviewed, technical standards forced a degree of interoperability on the market and 
allowed cooperative planning by groups such as the consortium: 
 
Q So that’s better for the end users because now there’s more choice.   
Resp Sure, now they have a choice.   
Q So some of that before was based on lock in, if XXX had you buying XXX stuff 
you were likely to be stuck buying XXX stuff forever.  
Resp You’re right, if you had a YYY trunk system, you only bought YYY ... if you 
bought a YYY trunk system, you could only buy YYY subscribers to talk on that 
system.  If you had a XXX deck system, you only could by a XXX deck radio to 
talk on the system.  You couldn’t go buy a YYY and have it talk on that system.  
So that locked you in.  Now, as systems are being built, you could build a YYY 
infrastructure and have ZZZ radios talking on it or ... 
 
 Things such as technical standards are good candidates for higher-level government or 
organizational control and guidance. Sovereignty and control are recurrent concerns among those 
observed in this study. They expressed fears over federal mandates or state direction and control 
without consideration of local interests. They do, however, express acceptance of a role for State 
or Federal levels of government in the area of broad technology policy and standards adoption 
and enforcement.  This would include standards setting bodies such as IEEE (Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers) or APCO (Association of Public-Safety Communications 
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Officials – International) as well. In the words of one local member, “be the standard bearer” and 
provide the overall guidance and standards so that the commercial vendors and local providers 
can progress.  There is an acknowledgement that standard setting is a good thing and that it is 
best done at the higher levels.  
 
“Yeah, we’ll probably be saying LTE and broadband spectrum and, you know, if the 
federal government gets its way with the development and build out of 700, 800 spectrum 
for LTE network this will be a public safety, there will be a public safety grade device 
that looks very similar to this that does everything.” 
 
“there’s standards that need to be in place so that all of that is serviceable and 
manageable and you don’t have a lot of proprietary technology that’s in the middle of it 
that becomes costly and difficult to service and maintain.  So the standards need to be 
built to talk, to merge the two very distinct to spare technologies between public safety, 
P-25 infrastructure and LTE 4 GE, 3 GE, whatever that happens to be.” 
 
“I think P-25 is critical, in order to bring this to the masses affordably and, again, I use 
my voice over IP.  When voice over IP was first adopted, you had an awful lot of 
companies, the big guys, the XXX’s the YYY and ZZZ’s that had their own proprietary 
communication between their core server and the actual telephone instrument.” 
 
“Once the industry drove that technology to what’s called SIP, which is an industry 
standard you can now purchase a telephone that will work that’s agnostic, doesn’t care 
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whether that XXX, YYY, ZZZ, if P-25 if it’s truly going to work and drive the cost of 
that subscriber radio down and commoditize it which from where I sit is good and bad 
because there’s an awful lot of revenue that’s generated by the XXX’s of the world 
selling radios and the YYY’s and if you commoditize that then, obviously, there’s, you 
know, it would hurt a company like XXX, but as a consumer, as a taxpayer it’s important 
that P-25 is a standard that that radio becomes agnostic whether that’s ZZZ infrastructure 
like it is in X County A, County B went ZZZ or whether it’s YYY infrastructure it really 
should be interoperable.” 
 
 There are also problems with current technology standards and regulations that limit 
interfere with how agencies may interoperate. Outdated regulatory structures do not reflect the 
multi-jurisdictional complexity of current public safety emergency response operating 
environments. An example described here involves limitations on flexibility for spectrum 
licensing and use: 
 
“Yeah, so we decided that hey, you know, the door is open if you want to come and play 
you can come and play, we’ll get interoperability with you somehow.  But they all agree 
to go with a 450 system whether they’re trunked or conventional, okay.  Most of them 
have a trunk system; some are using the conventional mode for a number of different 
reasons in their own county.  That’s their business, but right now we can, the hardest part 
right now is trying to find interop because you cannot license, we were unable to license 
frequencies on multiple counties because the FCC won’t let you do that as of yet.  So you 
can’t get a licensed frequency to cover three different areas, three different systems.” 
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“You cannot license; right now we have been unable to license a frequency to go to 
multiple counties because they’re licensed to agencies.  So I have a frequency licensed to 
me, I can’t license it to them, okay, that type of thing.” 
 
 In other ways new technologies are enabling cooperation in ways that was not before 
possible amongst partner agencies. This is evidenced in the standards for fiber connectivity and 
microwave transmission used to link partners. A 911 administrator put it this way: 
 
“Well, I mean, part of the things that we can do in communications we couldn’t do until 
we had fiber op, you know, fiber in the microwave that’s out here and the linking that 
we’re doing between the counties is really the key to this, you know, because we didn’t 
have that kind of data with them and the pipe wasn’t big enough to carry what we needed 
to carry.” 
 
 Standards and technology capability play a critical role in the ability of agencies to come 
together as cooperatives or through organization such as the CNYICC.  
 
7.1.9 Share control, all are important 
 
 Members of the consortium unanimously voiced their opinion that control issues were 
significant in this environment. They explain that creating and maintaining a sense that each 
entity has a degree of control in the process, which they can accept, and especially over their 
own resources and area of responsibility was paramount to their acceptance of the consortium 
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and its direction. A finding in this study includes that participants must share control, 
governance, and that each one is considered important. The structure and operation of the 
consortium must reflect this in structure and operation.  A firm recommendation coming from 
the respondents is to not have the largest, or most apparently influential, party being in charge. 
Players in this arena are especially committed to their roles and responsibilities and have a sense 
that if something will negatively impact safety or their ability to do their job, be it personnel, 
policy, or technology, they will quickly dismiss it. One administrator put it as:  
 
“We want them to control their own system; we’re just sharing resources.  They have a 
say in how the system operates and that was the safety really. 
 
 The participants and stakeholders have a strong sense of sovereignty and are sensitive to 
mandates or external party’s demands.  In this environment, it was important to acknowledge this 
and constantly and consistently reiterate the message that each would maintain individual control 
while participating in the larger group. Along these lines, the consortium purposefully saw that 
the largest county was not the one to chair the committee because of the inherent appearance that 
they would take charge and be controlling. This is reflected through one of the administrators: 
 
Resp … we had said “you know what, for the greater good of this fledgling 
organization that we have here let’s pick one of the lesser counties to be the head 
of this so it doesn’t look like it’s an XXX County initiative.”   
Q Very purposely.  
Resp Yes, very purposely we decided… 
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“Yeah, … without the government stakeholder buying into it, you don’t have the backing 
to go forward here, you really don’t, you need that backing.  So that’s a huge 
stakeholder and unless you get all the emergency services to some degree or 
another singing from the same sheet of music you can’t build 30 or 50 or 100 
different systems for 100 different kingdoms, you got to build one system that’s 
going to be that everybody in all their kingdoms can live with and feel like they 
have a say-so in it, you know; it can’t be just we’re going to dictate these things.  
So governance was an important thing.  Again, that governance thing, you’re 
going to have a seat at the table when we decide who gets what talk group, 
something the state couldn’t promise us, we could promise our stakeholders, 
you’ll have a seat, you’ll have input.” 
 
 One of the benefits of the consortium was to allow for a combined collective voice in 
contract negotiations and purchases with vendors for services. Even here, the need to maintain 
individual identity and control were considered. Collective purchasing while maintaining 
individual interests and needs is shown in the following statements from a staff member: 
 
Resp … now if we pool our resources, if one fire department, now we have twelve, 
XXX has 54, last I heard.  If one fire department wants to go out and buy a 
thousand feet of hose, they’re going to get one price for it.  If twelve fire 
departments each want to buy a thousand feet of hose, they can get a better price 
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for it.  They buy it jointly as a co-op.  We do the same thing with your radio 
resources.   
Q But does that, do you get constrained by that or does this leave you guys with 
freedom?  
Resp Just because you buy it at co-op, nothing else is controlling you.   
 
 The authority and power of the consortium here is derived from the consent of the 
participants and stakeholders. They take measures to actively convey this message in an ongoing 
way.  The understanding was well described by one of the staff members:  
 
“XXX doesn’t sit there and say ‘okay the consortium has decided,’ what he’ll say is ‘we 
were talking with some of the other counties and an idea hit the table and this is what it is 
and what do you guys think about it.’  So you always make sure it goes back down to a 
county level as YYY did, as ZZZ does today.  It really comes back down to the 
independent counties are still making the decisions; some of the ideas are the 
consortium.”  
 
7.1.10 Use consultants for knowledge and insights 
 
 The use of independent sources of research and information by the members of the 
consortium was said to be important to effective decision making and data collection. Use of 
external consultants can provide a sense of empowerment to organizations (Kaarst-Brown, 
1999). Members of the consortium report that they conducted their own research in addition to 
including insights and knowledge from paid consultants, vendors and consultants working in an 
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unpaid capacity, and through university researchers. They sought out information and insight 
from a variety of sources.  
 
“… they (Independent Consultants) were vendor agnostic so they didn’t care, they didn’t 
care if it was XXX, YYY, or whatever the system was, they went into it without bias.  
That’s what the … (independent consultants) … that’s what they brought to the table was 
that the county department heads could go back to them and say listen, if I tell them I 
want this, it’s not going to carry as much weight.  You do the research, take look at what 
our best options are, and bring all of our options to the table, that’s where a consultant is 
always good.” 
 
“… there’s a certain role here that it’s always easier for us a servicer to sit down with our 
end user and discuss ideas, discuss system designs.” 
 
 There is also a recognition that consultants are gaining more than the financial 
remuneration, for those that are paid, through their participation in the process. This information 
came from one of the administrators in the consortium: 
 
“When it came to consultants, you know, there’s also another side of this to where the 
consultant wants to come in and sit down with the servicer so that they can educate 
themselves on the system so that they can appear educated out in front of their customers.  
And again, I don’t mean that in a derogatory sense, but we at that point start looking out 
for our own livelihood and saying alright what’s the return on this, making sure that the 
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consultants understand the advantage of doing business with us over doing business with 
someone else.” 
 
 Among the commercial vendors it was found that they network and share information 
even though they are in competition with each other in some areas. This is revealed in interviews 
with some of the vendors: 
 
Resp Yeah, I guess that was a, they trust me a little bit more.  And the nice thing is, 
even though it’s competition amongst the shops, we do quite often talk amongst 
ourselves to solve the problems for the ... (Communications Project) 
Q Common problems  
Resp Common problems.  You know, XXX at Company A, we are in constant contact 
with and YYY at Company B, whenever I have an issue that I need to talk to him 
about he would be my contact….  
 
 It was found that the degree of use of paid and unpaid consultants as well as the timing of 
their involvement with the process varied amongst the counties. There did not emerge a clear 
right or wrong way to do this.  There does appear to be a change in the relationship at the point 
where a written contract is to be executed. Vendors participate as unpaid consultants through 
affiliation with the counties in related projects and at the point where the vendor may be engaged 
more directly in work that is part of a formal project that will be under contract it becomes more 
of a professional and formalized relationship.   
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 In other cases, counties have informal relationships with University researchers who 
provide research support as well. Technical and policy expertise can be accessed in this way 
through formal and informal means. At least one of the CNYICC counties was engaging 
informally with a local university (Syracuse University) for such support and included assistance 
with grant opportunities; they credit having this support for their being awarded nearly $3 
million dollars through recent competitive funding requests. 
 
 The themes identified above have significance based on the rank order that was created 
by the core member participants. It is important, however, to note that they are not to be 
considered independently but work in combination.  The researchers have not quantitatively 
assessed the frequency of the remarks by category. Researchers did find evidence of the 
identified factors present in all of the core member interviews, the common themes being 
mentioned by everyone. 
7.2 What does not work to facilitate collaboration   
 
 This article first considered ten factors identified by the participants as being important to 
the initiation, formation and ongoing operation of the CNYICC. Information from 911 
administrators, staff, and related government and private stakeholders was included. This section 
briefly describes factors that were identified as working against collaboration in this 
environment. This is related to the 2nd research question and results stem from analysis of the 
interviews and data collected.   
 The factors were rank ordered by the participants for their significance as follows: 1) lack 
of shared standards; 2) decisions being dictated from the top as in the top-down bureaucracy of 
county governments; 3) the assumption that everything will work everywhere, insisting that 
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participants follow the same course even when structural and political frames of each county 
differ; 4) management by memo or indirect communication; 5) looking out just one’s own 
interests; and 6) overly strict and detailed governance plans.  
 Many of these factors were addressed in the context of the earlier discussion of positive 
factors, so that information will not be repeated here. This section provides further discussion on 
some of the findings regarding those factors that were identified as working against collaboration 
and connect them with other research and literature. 
 The lack of explicit standards and the existence of conflicting or ambiguous standards 
have been identified as a cause of early and persistent incompatibility problems in public safety. 
This was echoed by the interviewees in the preceding sections.  Organizations in public safety 
still use hardware and software of varying types. Integration of heterogeneous platforms, non-
standard data, and proprietary schemas impede collaborative use and sharing (Atabakhsh, 
Larson, Petersen, Violette, & Chen, 2004; Fedorowicz, Gogan, & Williams, 2007).  Having 
standards can make it possible for companies to make universally compatible systems. This 
would lead to greater availability for these products and cheaper pricing due to increased 
demand. According to some of those interviewed, companies still create proprietary features in 
communications products that hinder full compatibility.  The instance was described where 
certain radio brands met the P25 standard but included additional features such as greater 
encryption capability. In that case– to be able to use a feature that was beyond the standard or 
communication with others who have that capability– you must purchase that particular type of 
radio and the feature. It is a similar case with upgrades for software.  Agencies with interoperable 
software systems may lose compatibility if they do not all pursue the same upgrade paths over 
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time. Technological standards promote collaboration but the benefits can be limited as has been 
shown in this case and other studies of public safety agencies (Lee & Rao, 2007). 
 Among public safety agencies, there is a great sense of personal identity and sovereignty; 
their staff members express a direct sense of responsibility to their constituents and stakeholders. 
It was evident in this study that a strategy of top-down bureaucracy, or dictating from the top in 
working with county and local governments, was not well accepted where local-level 
participants were not made to feel part of the process, that their interests were being considered, 
or that they had adequate power in the process. This is also reflected in the literature on 
leadership.  Leadership that is innovative and having leaders exercise the proper amount of 
authority lead to greater sustainability in collaborations in studies that included state level justice 
agencies (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009). Other work found that organizational autonomy 
influence by managers within the particular agency mattered to a greater degree than 
management or political leadership from outside the agency (Vann, 2005).  The respondents in 
the case study here reflected these sentiments and added that each agency also has their preferred 
way of operating.   
 Agencies may have similar objectives but operate differently. One cannot assume in 
regards to technology, governance, and control that everything (or solution) will work the same 
everywhere. The CNYICC study confirmed this point. Different persons perceive situations from 
their own, or their agency, perspective and each interprets it differently (Alter, 1999). Even 
successful solutions do not work in the same way in all environments. Multiple paths can lead to 
a similarly successful end, and not all agencies will choose the same means. Brafman and 
Beckstrom describe successful governance systems that have distributed leadership and 
leaderless entities that account well for regional nuances (2008). One agency may require a 
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higher standard for security than another or have different priorities for protection (Ivkovic & 
Shelley, 2005). There are great similarities across operations in the public safety arena, but there 
remain political, technical, social, and other factors that are so dissimilar that they must be 
accounted for individually. 
 Good interpersonal communication skills were identified as key to successful 
collaboration engagements in this case study and the literature (Yang & Maxwell, 2011). A sure-
fire way for a joint activity to fail can be to manage it impersonally through memos or indirect 
communication. Collaboration is a contact sport and requires relationship building and personal 
attention. A respondent 911 administrator remarked “…people can interpret e-mails incorrectly, 
the tone of them, or the wording, some people aren’t good writers and have trouble expressing 
themselves, electronic or on paper…” Evidence from the literature and this case study support 
the notion that impersonal and one-way communication should be used sparingly in this area.  
 Another way to diminish the enthusiasm and support of partners and stakeholders in a 
collaborative venture is to look out for just one’s own interests. In the case of the CNYICC, 
numerous positive remarks were made regarding the selflessness of those involved and their 
efforts in looking out for the greater interests of all. The agency problem or principal-agency 
problem is a concern among even public safety personnel and entities. This involves conflicts 
that arise where those responsible for looking to the interests of others use their power or 
positions for their own interests ahead of those they are to serve (Gailmard, 2010; Miller, 2005). 
For these reasons, oversight or control mechanisms may be necessary to mitigate such self-
interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). Such principal-agent role conflicts can impair fair and effective 
management of public safety resources. In public safety especially command personnel depend 
on agents who may not directly report to them and the interests of those agents may conflict with 
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those of the command personnel (Rauchhaus, 2009). Agencies can use measures such as 
monitoring, incentives, punishment, and the like to foster compliance.  Providing for effective 
accountability and control mechanisms that allow autonomy for participating agencies remain 
difficult issues to be addressed in the law enforcement and emergency response context. The 
appearance of self-interest, beyond looking out for one’s agency, citizens, and stakeholders 
interests was seen as having a negative for collaboration according to all members of the 
consortium. 
 Having strict and detailed governance plans was found not to be necessary for building 
trustworthy working relationships in this study.  Bardach (2001) found that collaboration may be 
effectively governed informally. In the case of the CNYICC, members have yet to complete their 
written policy and procedures for governance and operation.  The wording of the original MOU 
was broad and continues to be controlling. Consortium participants state that the CNYICC 
operates better by depending on the personal commitment of the members over a detailed written 
contract; they depend upon each other and their personal commitment and trust to bind them 
together.  Individual personal commitment is largely responsible for the success of this 
collaboration and not the paper. One cannot, however, draw the inference that formalization of 
policy and procedure in collaborations is not needed.  Cash and Konsynski (1985) showed that 
established infrastructure in support of information exchange and communication was good for 
collaboration. The experience of the CNYICC is still young by other organizational standards.  
The case study points to the need to allow for flexibility and some informality in the 
development and early stages of formation and growth. Participants stated that for longer term 
mature operation the need for greater formalization does arise.  Research by Sales (2010) 
suggests that formalization of policy will have a positive effect on the organization and improve 
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information sharing. This important related finding will be examined further in the discussion 
section. 
 
8. Discussion 
 
 This section discussed the assessment of success factors relative to the CNYICC and 
other issues that this case study may address or contribute to understanding collaboration and 
information sharing in the public safety sector. This research sought to identify factors that 
foster and hinder public safety collaboration.  An inductive approach was taken and 
recommendations derived from practitioners in the field were gathered and empirically 
assessed, analyzed and presented. The participants believe that this collaboration has been 
successful. A public sector collaboration success assessment model is used to consider the 
CNYICC and the recommendations that are derived from the case study. Further discussion on 
social, technical and policy related matters, as those factors have been identified in the 
information sharing framework (Treglia & Park, 2009) that were developed from this case 
study is provided as well.  
8.1 Success Model and Assessment 
 
 Alternate models for collaboration success were sought out as a means to test the 
recommendations from respondents in the case study of the CNYICC, to consider the success 
of the CNYICC, and to triangulate results. The previous section presented the findings and 
discussed each of the ten specific factors that were identified by the study participants as 
helping to achieve or improve collaboration as well as the seven factors that work against 
success in collaborations and by extension information sharing and cooperation.  The factors 
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that support collaboration, in the words of the respondents are: In it for right reasons or the 
greater good, Trust, Personal characteristics of key managers and people oriented focus, Face 
to face and regular contact with partners and stakeholders, Autonomy and flexibility for 
participants, Basic written agreement/understanding (flexible, not complex or detailed), 
Measurable Objectives, Technical Standards, Share control (all are important, i.e. don't have 
biggest partner in charge), and Use consultants for knowledge and insights. The factors they 
identified as working against collaboration were:  Lack of standards, Dictate from the top or 
top-down bureaucracy in County Governments, Assume that everything will work everywhere 
or insist participants follow the same course, Manage by memo or indirect communication,  
Look out just your own interests, and Strict and detailed governance plans.  It is but a single 
case study, however, it is one that is representative of many other public safety 
communications collaborations occurring across the United States 
 Kuenzel and Welscher propose an alternate model positing that there are eight factors 
important to ‘Public Safety Collaboration Success’ (2009). The success factors serve as an 
essential frame-work for assessing public safety collaboration processes. These factors are: 1. 
Relevance and Sense of Urgency; 2. Incentives and Benefits; 3. People & Roles; 4. 
Organizational Structure; 5. Reflection & Learning: 6. Skills and Capabilities; 7. Resources; and 
8. Outside Support & Supervision. They suggest that the eight identified success factors must 
be present or made part of the design and operation of a collaboration to have the highest 
probability of achieving its desired public safety objectives (Kuenzel & Welscher, 2009).  This 
section takes the eight factors and groups them for analysis into the categories of social, 
technical and policy using the information sharing factor framework (Treglia & Park, 2009). 
The success of the CNYICC is assessed in this way.  By using this process the CNYICC case 
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study data may also be more readily compared to extant literature on other collaborations in 
public safety that may use this same tool. The table below shows the grouping of the factor 
correlations, see Table 8 below.  
 
Information Sharing 
Framework  
(Treglia & Park, 2009) 
Public Sector Success Factors  
(Kuenzel & Welscher, 2009) 
 
Social 
 
Criticality 
Trust 
Culture 
Informal Network 
Quality 
Relevance and Sense of Urgency 
Incentives and Benefits 
People & Roles 
Reflection and Learning 
Skills and Capabilities 
 
Technical 
 
Interoperability 
Availability 
Control 
Resources 
 
Policy  
 
Regulation and Legislation 
Governance 
Levels 
Jurisdiction 
Financial 
Organizational Capability  
Organizational Structure 
Outside Support and Supervision 
 
Table 8: Information Sharing Framework and Assessment Factors 
 
 
 The social category from the information sharing framework contains issues of 
criticality, informal networks and culture. Using this schema the Relevance and sense of 
urgency, incentives and benefits, people & roles, reflection and learning, skills and 
capabilities, from the public sector success factors of Kuenzel and Welscher (2009) fit in the 
heading of Social in the framework. The technical category of the information sharing 
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framework maps to resources in the Kuenzel and Welscher (2009) success factors list. The 
final information sharing category of policy is most related to public sector success factors of 
organizational structure, and outside support and supervision. In this way one may assess the 
success or lack thereof of the CNYICC according to that instrument. 
 The CNYICC is successful in the social aspects with respect to the public sector factors 
identified in Kuenzel and Welscher (2009). Socially the CNYICC formed and operates out of a 
sense of higher order interest and public purpose. The need for public safety and the urgency 
associated with the task of creating interoperable communications for emergency responders is 
a clear, important and galvanizing purpose. Activities of the consortium are directly relevant to 
this purpose and supported by local government officials and the public. Benefits to 
participation in this consortium are many as described in the findings section. The discussion 
on the objectives of professional associations is relevant to this view of the operation and 
motivation of the CNYICC and assessing it in terms of criticality or sense of urgency. 
Members of the CNYICC act collectively to benefit each other and their society based on the 
sense of urgency in preparing for opportunities and positioning themselves to create fiscal 
advantage, to avoid problems and to work for the greater good. Seeking funding opportunities 
and securing more advantageous arrangements with vendors for services is a stated purpose of 
the CNYICC and they have successfully secured funds and unified to influence vendor 
relationships and contracts.  
 The CNYICC is also successful in relation to skills and capabilities as well as reflection 
and learning.  CNYICC members are observed to have high levels of interpersonal 
communication skill and leadership skill.  They showed this in their actions by operating their 
meetings and agencies as learning organizations.  They spoke of and were observed to lead and 
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communicate in a “hands on” way and “face to face” where possible. Members of the CNYICC 
display fine leadership qualities. Members of the CMYICC put a great deal of time into their 
development of interpersonal relationships and trust within and across organisations.   
 The CNYICC is successful in procuring adequate resources for ongoing operation and 
growth as these are described by Kuenzel and Welscher (2009).  CNYICC members have 
adequate fiscal and personnel resources to meet routinely, participate in conferences, meetings, 
lobbying and education outreach activities with the support provided through their agencies in 
support of their stated goals and objectives.  This support resource that the participating 
agencies have provided includes things such as time, manpower, equipment, facilities, other 
supplies and communications support as needed.  All of this has allowed for adequate 
participation and communication as a consortium.  
 Outside support and supervision, and organizational structure are success factors from 
Kuenzel and Welscher (2009) that are considered policy related.  From this conceptual view 
the CNYICC was observed to react to perceived external policy and regulatory changes 
coming from state and federal levels (see Tables 6, p. 229 & 9, p. 331). In interviews with 
respondents there were mixed remarks, as identified in the previous sections, that evidence 
keen awareness of pending mandates such as narrowbanding yet they also explicitly state that 
pending regulation did not cause them to collaborate. CNYICC members report being 
supported by outside consultants, university researchers, and vendors in addition to their own 
agency personnel, see the previous findings section for specific examples and discussion on 
this topic. The 911 administrators reported that they have adequate authority and control within 
their agencies to effect necessary change.  Governance structures are according to the members 
adequate for the time being.  They report as well that they are all high enough in the hierarchy 
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to effect policy, procedure and even cultural changes in their organizations. It is also valuable 
that the legislatures have chosen to give weight and influence to the CNYICC as there are no 
formal processes for enforcing mandates or recommendations from the CNYICC. This is not 
so say that dealing with local legislatures or other municipal management personnel is without 
conflict.  The respondents report that it is manageable for them.   
 Organizations participating in the CNYICC participate and follow the guidance because 
they trust the CNYICC and choose to do so. This is so because it serves their higher and 
legitimate interests in the short and long term for service to the community and 
communications services. The primary controlling document is the broadly worded MOU for 
the establishment of the consortium.  The draft documents outline operation and policy and 
procedures for the consortium are under development and have not been formalized.  The 
consortium operates successfully in its governance as they have sought appropriations and 
funding and created policy and infrastructures within each respective jurisdiction that works 
for them and works in aggregate across the region.  
 Using the information sharing framework (Treglia & Park, 2009) of social, technical 
and policy factors researchers described and summarized the Kuenzel and Welscher (2009) 
success factors as they pertain to the CNYICC. The CNYICC is a successful collaboration as 
assessed by the eight public sector success factors described by Kuenzel and Welscher (2009).  
8.2 Social Factors 
 
 Effective leadership is consistently recognized as an essential element to collaboration. 
Brafman and Beckstrom confirm that flexibility in leadership guided by a shared vision and 
goal are important aspects of successful governance and collaboration models (2008). 
Individual leadership characteristics were identified important to collaboration success in the 
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CNYICC study. The contribution of individual leadership characteristics in organizations have 
been studied by many (Zhang, Dawes, & Pardo, 2009; Parry, 2009). Internal leadership, that 
being from managers considered to be within the agency, matters more than external or outside 
political leadership (Vann, 2005). In line with this proposition members of the consortium 
seemed to extend their allegiance outward to the membership agencies. Those parties 
considered to be outsiders may move closer to the trusted circle by participating in a 
consortium or other recognized public safety affiliation.  
 Trust is considered in many ways in the CNYICC study and is a significant component 
for consideration in collaboration and information sharing transactions. Trust in face to face to 
face interaction can readily develop over time (McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011; Jeffries, 2002).  
In the case of the CNYICC respondents proclaimed the importance of face to face contact 
whenever possible with staff and stakeholders. Group identity, affiliation and norms develop 
from interactions within a community and from outside interactions and social contacts as well 
(Abbott, 1988; Cant & Sharma, 1995). It appears that in moving to virtual communication it 
was important to at least initially develop rapport and trust through face to face interaction. 
This is conclusion is supported by the work of (Zheng, Veinott, Nos, Olson, & Olson, 2002; 
Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa, 2004). Face to face, and regular contact with partners and 
stakeholders, which can be considered socialization, was a top factor for collaboration success 
as identified by CNYICC respondents. Socialization has been shown to support establishment 
of group identity and improve trust (Rocco, 1998). 
 An interesting aspect of trust relationship emergence based on prior relationships was 
observed in the CNYICC study. Participants in collaborative work need to develop a degree of 
trust in each other and their institutions to be successful in interacting and sharing information. 
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Respondents in the CNYICC study report that most did not have prior social contacts or 
relationships with the other members. They report having met each other and developed their 
trusted relationships through common association meetings and through participation the 
CNYICC itself. Respondents acknowledged that over time meetings and contacts had to be 
conducted virtually, by phone, due to logistical constraints.  
 An argument could be made that participants have a propensity to trust others and that 
this was a determining effect for their establishing trust relationships in the workplace. Self-
reports from CNYICC respondents show that they considered themselves trusting of others 
generally. Research has been done that looked at aspects of establishing, maintaining and re-
creating trust in working relationships (Zheng et al., 2002; Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa, 2004). 
These studies included a focus on the effects of pre-disposition to trust or propensity to trust on 
cooperation and engagement and have resulted in mixed results.  There is evidence that found 
no support for a hypothesis that individual trust propensity leads to increased trust in 
collaborative encounters (Koufaris & Hampton-Sosa, 2004) and other evidence and findings to 
the contrary (Ridings, Gefen, & Arinze, 2002). Having a general disposition to trust others 
increased the degree of trust that persons in the study afforded to others in the study (Gefen, 
2000). The studies described here involved virtual transactions as well. This is significant as 
the interaction of the CNYICC involves both face to face and virtual meetings and 
engagement. 
8.3 Technical Factors 
 
 Technology impacted the actions of the members of the CNYICC and their agencies in 
many ways.  
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 Technologically, respondents in the case study projected that use of multi-media such 
as video teleconferencing would likely support distributed collaboration in a positive way.  
They only accept voice communication for meetings as they have established prior personal 
contact and relationships. Research supports the proposition that image and video use to 
accompany communication virtually improves the communication experience almost to that of 
face-to-face (Ben-Ner & Puterman, 2002). The study by Zheng, Veinott, Bos, Olson and Olson 
(2002) conclude that “having a static photograph of the partner is as effective in establishing 
trust, whereas a text-based, static information sheet of personal information is not.” This same 
study also confirms a finding that face-to-face meeting is the most effective form of 
interaction.  
 Technological implications on talk groups were an issue. Determining who can talk 
with whom and under what conditions was discussed as constrained by the technology. One 
example is in the case of talk groups and channels. The radio technology that is being used 
only allows for a certain number of channel positions. Based on brand and model radios may 
have 16 or 24 readily selectable positions, for example. The structure of the radio controls the 
range of decisions that can be made as to channel position, numbers and access (such as the 
number of channels or channel groups that can be selected by a particular style of radio). In 
this way the technology is dictating the way he that channels can be picked and limiting the 
number that there could be at any one time and also because of physical dial it means that you 
have deterred him from one position to the next. The most important channels need to be at the 
top or most readily accessible. As a responder you want to scroll up or down from the most 
used channel. If using a physical dial considerations such as size come in to play and one 
should turn left and right from the most used positions. It should also be noted that constraints 
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such as having to do this while wearing heavy gloves or in conditions of black smoke impact 
what choices can be made. 
 Technological considerations such as these influence policy and practice decisions 
acutely in the public safety environment. 
 Although there are technical standards that help support collaboration there are other 
things that vendors do that work around this. It was identified in the study that having 
standards would help collaboration can help companies to make compatible systems that would 
make them cheaper in competition. An observed problem was that although P25 and other such 
requirements provide standards the company's still work around them to differentiate their 
products. A certain company can meet the basic standard but offer additional non-standard 
proprietary services or features that may not be supportable by competitors. One example of 
this is in encryption for talk groups. Radio companies can meet the standard for required 
channels and frequencies and then offer additional services such as a proprietary encryption 
capability. The problem that this creates is that now if the one agency needs to talk to another 
agency which has a radio from another manufacturer that agency cannot do so. Although 
having established and enforced standards in place promotes interoperability companies are 
still able to create exclusivity with add-ons or special features that go beyond the standards and 
ultimately impede interoperability. Participation by informed stakeholders in the legislative 
and regulatory processes can work to address issues such as these. 
 Investigation of the CNYICC brought to light additional technological concerns related 
to communication and information sharing. Things such as the number of characters possible 
or display size influence how radios are set up and what information may be available to users. 
Identifying channels for use can be problematic when there are limitations to the number and 
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types of characters that can be used to identify a channel. Further problems using the 
technology can involve ontology or choices in naming or otherwise identifying channels used 
by various agencies. A recommendation that plain language be used is helpful but does not 
account for variations in terminology for those from different regions or professions.  
Universal terminology or graphic images may help. Having additional capacity to show more 
characters or to add graphic images may mitigate some of these issues.  
8.4 Policy Factors 
 
 Policy associated with technology affects operational decisions for agencies as well. As 
an example ownership and use of licensed channels and frequencies creates legal conflicts over 
frequency channel use by emergency response agencies. Multiple jurisdictions may wish to use 
or operate on the same channels to share information and collaborate yet regulation can 
preclude such an arrangement. Respondents echoed concerns over communications regulation. 
The current structure in the United States for the licensing is FCC channels require a particular 
owner be identified and does not generally allow multiple-jurisdictions to share a frequency. 
This type of policy makes it hard to have shared ownership or use of radios across multiple 
jurisdictions, and includes issues crossing and overlapping state and international territory.  
 The case study for the CNYICC identified that flexible and informal governance 
structures facilitate collaboration in public safety during early developmental stages. Other 
researchers acknowledge that alternative governance and collaboration arrangements may 
improve success, participation and the sharing of information (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2008). 
This insight must be paired with the statements from CNYICC participants acknowledging that 
it is important to appreciate that “one size does not fit all” and that solutions must be suited to 
the particular context. In some cases early formal processes, such as a memorandum of 
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understanding (MOU) or memorandum of agreement (MOA), may be necessary to secure 
commitment or provide assurance to partners that their interests will be met and that what is 
agreed upon is clearly understood and documented. Other collaborations, such as those 
involving less trusted partners, may need to allow more initial space and less pressure in the 
early and formative stages (Cook, Hardin, & Levi, 2007; Benamati, Serva, & Fuller, 2006). 
The comfort that comes with having explicit documented contracts may be achieved by having 
such flexibility built into the policies provisions and understandings that things can change as 
necessary. There is no universal recipe for the perfect degree of formalization other than to 
suggest that the process itself remain malleable and must not be rendered static. 
 The public safety network study identified maturity as an element for successful public 
safety networks (Williams, Fedorowicz, & Tomasino, 2010). Successful public safety networks 
in that study were identified as having characteristics of having been around for some years, 
showing a certain level of critical mass for participation, and having established funding 
sources resources to sustain themselves. The public safety network study included 
formalization of governance structures and standard operating procedures (SOPs) as elements 
relating to success.  
 The respondents (CNYICC) report that they see a need to be more formalized at some 
point in the future to meet possible government requirements related to funding or to have 
greater impact with vendor relationships and contracts. This is consistent with their correlation 
to professional associations as discussed previously. Professional associations formed to 
address these similar needs and interests. To speak with a greater voice to leverage, contract or 
service is shared by both.  
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 Researchers do not at this point know what the one perfect combination of formal 
structure and flexible and informal structures is that produces the most effective collaboration 
arrangement over the long term. The CNYICC and cases in the public safety network study 
(Sawyer et al., 2007) show that both formalization and flexibility are important factors to 
collaboration. A limitation in the CNYICC study is that it has not yet been around long enough 
to be considered an example of mature or long term collaboration. Researchers here do not 
know exactly when the need changes from one focus to another in the evolution of the 
organization. Future research will focus on further investigating public safety collaborations 
over time to see which ones are surviving and under what conditions. Circumstances to be 
considered include observed changes in formal and informal structures, flexibility, and other 
issues. An important question to be pursued involves understanding what the optimal degree of 
formalization and flexibility is for an organization to be successful under various scenarios.  
 The case study of the CNYICC is ongoing and researchers will continue to observe 
activity over the long term. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
 The case study of the CNYICC provides important insights into human, technical, policy 
and other factors that influence or impact the formation of collaborations, their governance and 
the ways of dealing with technology implementation in the public safety communications arena.  
 This article provides a descriptive account of the CNYICC, its formation, development, 
and operation.  This research has brought out, through interviews and observations, numerous 
factors that are believed to have helped this collaboration and factors believed to be a hindrance 
to such collaboration. This research examined the question of what elements comprise successful 
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collaboration among disparate county government agencies in emergency response preparedness 
and activity. The researchers here found that this collaboration was pursued to provide better 
safety and services to the public, to save lives, to prepare for funding opportunities, to share 
information, to collectively speak to standards issues, and to collectively pool resources for 
leveraging influence on vendors for equipment and services contracts. This was found to be 
similar to the motivation and benefits sought out by professional associations generally. Higher-
order interests were found to be a significant driving influence as reflected through the 
respondents in this study and as observed by researchers. This motivating factor is relatively 
specific to the public safety arena and differentiates the findings from collaborative activity in 
non-public safety oriented contexts.  
 An important contribution in this area comes in the form of describing and framing the 
broader factors surrounding information sharing and collaboration in the public safety area and 
in describing the environment and influences that operate across this community. The case is 
significant in that it is representative of the activities, needs, and concerns of other multi-
jurisdictional law enforcement and emergency services providers across the nation. 
 There are unique features of New York State public safety entities and their environment 
that should be taken in to account when considering broader application of findings. It is a 
strength that the CNYICC faces challenges that make it representative of situations faced by 
other public safety collaborations across the country. New York State, however, is one of the 
most targeted states for terrorist activity.  It has major metropolitan areas, international borders, 
and multiple layers of public safety entities. There are many parts of the country where public 
safety agencies face much less complexity and criticality. These aspects in New York State add 
to the comprehensiveness of the issues raised and understood through the study.  As a case for 
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comparison with other areas of the country and other less complex collaborations the lessons 
learned are argued to be still valid. The success factors identified still apply. 
 The importance of interoperable communications is well acknowledged today.  There are 
federal and local mandates affecting law enforcement and emergency response agencies, driving 
them to change and implement interoperable technology and policies. Financially, economic 
drivers are pushing agencies towards standards-based interoperable equipment and software. 
Agencies across the nation and world are finding that they must work together to effectively 
protect the public and respond to ever-occurring local and large-scale crises. The lessons learned 
here regarding successful collaborations are useful and timely. Lessons learned from this case, 
although it is acknowledged that it is a single limited case in a given environment, have 
applications in other similar public safety environments.   
 This "generalizable knowledge" contributes to the theoretical framework for 
understanding information sharing, described previously, and adds to the established body of 
knowledge relative to factors influencing information sharing and collaboration.  Some of the 
primary beneficiaries of this research are other researchers, scholars, government officials and 
legislators, and practitioners in the field of law enforcement and emergency response.  
 Publication, presentation, or other distribution of the results from this work will inform 
the field. Results are expected to be generalizable to a larger population beyond the site of data 
collection. The case study itself is relevant to understanding other similar coordination efforts in 
this community. Research results are intended to be applicable in other settings, obviating the 
need to constantly reinvestigate or start from the beginning each time something is done. Much 
of what law enforcement and emergency response personnel face is common across the field; 
thus, insight from this study will be relevant to other similar circumstances. 
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 Future work in this area should focus on governance issues such as identifying the 
CNYICC, its formation, proper balance between formal and informal operation in public safety 
and other contexts. It will be important to create models that identify contexts or other events 
that may inform agency heads when more or less governance and what type and form of 
formalization may be needed to improve the success of collaborative endeavors.  
 Governance of collaborative action is an important area of concern that is addressed to a 
limited degree in this study. In regards to information sharing, governance is perhaps an 
undervalued aspect of the larger picture involving collaboration in public safety.  The 
observations and recommendations identified in this dissertation arguable are applicable to 
environments such as the business, not-for profit sectors and even collaborative activities such as 
product development teams and in education. The findings regarding the need for promoting the 
appropriate degree of control, proper motivation and making use of interpersonal skills and 
practices is valuable guidance for virtual or face to face collaboration efforts by involved leaders.   
 Much work remains to be done to fully understand public safety collaboration and 
information sharing generally and as it applies to other geographic areas and types of organizing.   
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V.  CHAPTER - CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the dissertation, highlights the major findings and 
factors, and describes proposed future work. A summary of the three essays is presented first. 
This is followed by a brief summary of the responses to the research questions and propositions.  
Contributions to the field are identified followed by challenges and finally a discussion of 
proposed future work.   
These three essays explore the common theme of information sharing and collaboration 
in organizations with a focus on the law enforcement and emergency response community from 
an insider perspective. The essays include a theoretical piece, research regarding a social 
emergency response paradigm, and technology, with the last essay focusing on elements of 
successful collaboration. The findings contribute to a greater understanding of the forces that 
impact the agencies under consideration in regard to information sharing and thereby leading to 
identifying and implementing solutions to this problem from a new perspective. 
1. Broader Context and Summary 
 
 This dissertation of three essays examined factors related to information sharing in the 
law enforcement and emergency response community. There is ample evidence of the loss and 
damage caused by failures in communication and information sharing in this area as well as the 
obvious value to society of finding solutions to this problem. Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy 
(1992, p. ii) wrote optimistically that, in this area, society has “a chance to forge new attitudes of 
mind and structures of relationships that will help it produce high-quality solutions to society’s 
problems – not just one problem but many problems; not just now but in the future – whatever 
the issues and constraints.”  This dissertation contributes to understanding of the current and 
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future factors, framing them in a way that they may be more constructively discussed and 
debated publicly, considering new technological possibilities and transforming existing social 
and policy paradigms.  The role and contribution of the three papers is provided in the table 
below and described in detail in the following. 
 
 
Figure 28 Summary of Three Essays 
 
Essay #1 
The creation of a framework to understand information sharing was the focus of the first 
essay, which is a theoretical piece identifying the framework and justifying its structure and use. 
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A number of theories were identified and considered throughout this work: General Systems 
Theory (GST), Socio-technical Systems Theory, Stakeholder Theory, and Public Choice Theory. 
Researchers considered the interplay of technology and policy with human systems in the law 
enforcement and emergency response environment. This dissertation proposes that information 
sharing in this environment is affected by social, technical and policy factors as influencers.  
This research contributes to application of GST as well as contributing to the field of 
intelligence informatics, which concerns itself with the study and development of information 
systems and technology for international, national and societal security-related applications and 
for the academic researchers, law enforcement, intelligence experts, and IT professionals (Chen, 
Dacier, Moens, Paass, & Yang, 2009). Topics of interest for intelligence informatics include 
information sharing, infrastructure protection, crisis and emergency response. The model 
described is useful to frame the discussion and research in this area and further proposes 
additional steps towards identifying specific measures and contributions of model elements as 
well as their individual and collective impacts on information sharing behavior. 
 
Essay #2 
The second essay proposed and described a new social emergency response paradigm for 
whole community engagement in crisis response together with a new form of wireless grid 
networking technology. The social emergency response paradigm includes stigmergic 
involvement of both traditional and other non-traditional stakeholders, and entities, not 
previously considered as essential participants in this area. This whole community engagement 
plan is enabled through the promise of new networking technology to connect devices and 
people. Wireless grids "edgeware" technology is identified as one such emerging middleware 
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solution in this space. Social and policy factors that currently impact information sharing in 
public safety emergency response were examined. This work further extends the understanding 
of technical, social, and policy factors in information sharing in the law enforcement and 
emergency response arenas.  
 
Essay #3 
The third essay presented in this trilogy is a case study of the Central New York 
Interoperable Communications Consortium (CNYICC), a five-county collaboration involving 
law enforcement, public safety, government and non-government participants. Human, technical, 
policy, and other factors were examined. Insights and recommendations regarding the formation, 
ongoing governance and strategies for dealing with technology implementation were identified 
and described. This work identified and described important elements of successful 
collaboration. The conceptual framework for information sharing derived in the first essay was 
used to organize the investigation and to verify the utility of the theoretical framework itself for 
describing information sharing factors. 
 
2. Response to Research Questions  
 
 
 In this dissertation, it is proposed that information sharing is affected by factors involving 
social, technical and policy influencers. Steps are suggested that may be taken to overcome the 
internal and external barriers that hinder information sharing among federal, tribal, state and 
local law enforcement agencies and emergency responders.  Social, technology and policy 
factors were identified and investigated in the second essay, which considered use of a 
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transformative edgeware technology that allows for an unprecedented degree of connectivity 
among devices.  Wireless grids edgeware was introduced and, with it, a focus on associated 
emergent social and policy factors that impact information sharing in an environment where all 
technology resources can be readily shared. Use of the framework in considering the factors and 
conducting the investigation proved useful for providing structure to the research and further in 
having the data follow a consistent format. The final essay addressed information sharing 
through collaborative behavior in public safety communications. Important elements to forming 
and maintaining collaborative relationships were identified by members of the law enforcement 
and emergency response community.  
 
Research Proposition - P1 
 The first proposition is related to creation of the larger framework: (P1) Information 
sharing is affected by social, technical, and policy factors, and this conceptualization frames the 
problem of information sharing in such a way that it can be commonly understood by 
government and non-government stakeholders. The created model proved to be useful in 
explaining the literature and real-world issues and problems, and served as a means for framing 
the discussion and investigation. The framework was statistically validated through use of a 
national survey of law enforcement agencies. All three essays involved the use of this model, 
which was shown to be an effective model and tool for conceptualization of the problem factors. 
 
Research Proposition – P2  
The next research proposition involved the role of technology, policy, and social systems 
in information sharing: (P2) Social and policy factors influence information-sharing more than 
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technical factors (assuming that it is physically possible to connect and/or share). The second 
and third essays addressed this proposition. In the second essay, technology is held constant by 
considering the use of edgeware, which allows disparate devices to communicate securely where 
this capability may not have been previously possible.  With the enabling of communication 
between devices and parties, it became apparent that other factors continued to affect the sharing 
relationship beyond the limitations or constraints of technology. Social and policy factors still 
had to be considered even where seamless communication was made possible. In the third essay, 
the CNYICC case study, there is ample evidence provided by informants and through 
observations that the social factors are the major problem in information sharing so long as 
information can be shared technologically. The case study provides support for the claim that 
having the ability to share information technologically does not necessarily cause parties to share 
information with each other. The conclusion drawn is that social and policy factors pose more 
stubborn obstacles to information sharing, though technological factors are by no means of 
minor impact. 
 
Proposition – P3 
The third proposition addressed was as follows: (P3) Social factors play the greatest role 
in the creation and sustaining of information sharing relationships. This is proposed from the 
model and literature of the first essay. Evidence supporting this proposition is available from the 
second and third essays.  The second essay considered the elements of the sharing relationships 
in the absence of limitations that may come from technology, and it was it was corroborated that 
there are stubborn social and policy barriers to be dealt with which interfere with the goal of 
effective information sharing. The final essay, the CNYICC case study, provides the most direct 
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evidence supporting the third proposition. Statements and actions of the informants directly 
indicated that social factors played the most important role in driving and maintaining sharing 
relationships. The generalizability and applicability of the findings here are limited due to the 
fact that they involved an individual case study. The study involved actual county-level 
emergency responder agencies in central New York with some state level participation, and 
included non-government stakeholders. An argument can be made that this instance is unique or 
that the experience of the participants is not common.  Nonetheless, researchers experience and 
observations in this area support the argument that it is representative of other public safety 
collaborations. 
 
3. Contributions and Lessons Learned 
 
Model and Theory Development 
The first essay, “A Framework for Conceptualizing Barriers to Intelligence Information 
Sharing in Law Enforcement: An Insider Perspective,” developed a model and theory of 
intelligence information sharing through literature review, interviews with practitioners and field 
observations.  The contribution in this area comes in the form of describing and framing the 
broader issues and describing the environment and influences that operate across the law 
enforcement community.  A conceptual framework for the examination and study of information 
sharing was developed and utilized to frame the problem and as a means for identifying solutions 
to the problems identified.  This framework was more concise, focusing on three factors, yet 
consistent with elements from other scholars models and frameworks. 
Information systems in business and organizational studies identify information systems 
as comprised of people, procedures, data, software, telecommunications, databases, and 
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hardware used in concert to support a business purpose (Stair & Reynolds, 2011; O’Brien & 
Marakas, 2008). Operations management and information systems similarly identify system 
components such as plants, equipment, control procedures and policies (Lewis & Slack, 2003; 
Gupta, 2000). 
Information sharing research by Dawes (1996) and Zhang et al. (2005) identify three 
primary influential factors as technology, management and policy.  These are similar to the 
framework created in this dissertation; technical, social, and policy. Yang and Maxwell (2011) 
created a model consisting of three identified perspectives (Technological, Organizational and 
Managerial, and Political and Policy) that influence public sector information sharing, see Figure 
8 for additional perspectives and factors.  
Various schemas were considered in consultation with fellow researchers and 
practitioners and ultimately the three factors of Social, Technical, and Policy were determined to 
be inclusive of all system components and descriptive enough to provide for understanding and 
examination of information sharing systems and processes in public safety. 
 
Challenges and New Solutions  
In the second essay, “Towards More Rapid and Effective Communication between 
Responders to Emergency Situations,” challenges in emergency response are identified and 
include both technical interoperability and social factors. Wireless grids edgeware is used as an 
example of a technology solution with the potential capacity to solve technical problems of 
interoperability and control over resources. There has been increasing acknowledgement of the 
nascent growth of wireless grids as a new engineering field of scientific inquiry and innovation 
(Fitzek & Katz, 2007; Manvi & Birie, 2009; Li, Sun, Yu, & Cai, 2009; Birie & Manvi, 2010, 
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2011; Li, Gong, Lai, Han, Qiu, & Yang, 2012; Sun, Mao, Liu, Liu, & Guan, 2012). Wireless 
grids research include works on user and socio-technical perspectives and challenges (McKnight, 
Sharif, & Wijngaert, 2005; McKnight & Howison, 2003), coordination of user and device 
behaviors (McKnight, Lehr, & Howison, 2007), and future internet applications and bridging 
communicative channels (McKnight, Howison, & Bradner, 2004; Dutton, Gillett, McKnight, & 
Peltu, 2004; McKnight, 2007). This technology allows users, in this case those formally and 
informally involved in emergency response, to access programs and data on disparate devices, 
across available wired and wireless networks more readily, allowing greater access to resources; 
however, technology does not resolve all issues as is evident from the research in the second and 
third essays. 
 
Social Emergency Response 
A goal of the project described in the second essay was to “help people help themselves.” 
A social emergency response, together with the use of technology applications, such as wireless 
grids, can empower citizens to contribute to their own whole community response. The 
traditional response agency model, this dissertation argues, is outdated. Furthermore, widely 
disparate groups, including police, fire, EMS, hospitals, municipal services, utilities, gas 
companies, media, and community residents benefit from improved information sharing 
capability in emergencies, and this can be enabled by new social response paradigms and 
technologies, such as wireless grids edgeware. “Edgeware” describes software that resides 
beyond the cloud, across edge network devices, both wired and wireless (Treglia, Ramnarine-
Rieks, & McKnight, 2010). A broader understanding of the nature of the opportunities offered 
by grid computing, virtual environments, and the technologies or standards needed to realize 
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those opportunities is now required (Foster & Kesselman, 2004; Brooks, Caicedo, & Park, 
2012). The fundamental difference between this form of interconnection over traditional 
networking is that it allows for true resource sharing. 
Open source initiatives are proving to be valuable for public warning and commercial 
ICT-based (Information and Communications Technology - based) warning services continue to 
exist as well (Botterell & Addams-Moring, 2007). Emergency management as a complex system 
is studied in the category of resilient ecological systems (Longstaff, 2009). Emergency response 
personnel may need to mix and match other disparate and possibly unfamiliar technologies to fit 
the tasks at hand (Mendonça, Jefferson, & Harrald, 2007). 
The research her provides further evidence that when it comes to emergency response, 
additional requirements need to be taken into account. Social and policy factors remain 
significant and will continue to constrain effective response unless solutions such as those 
suggested here are implemented. 
 
Collaboration and Interoperability 
A case study, “Identifying Factors that Support Collaboration in a Multi-jurisdiction 
Environment: A case Study of the Central New York Interoperable Communications 
Consortium,” was conducted focusing on interagency collaboration and cooperation in the 
emergency services area involving the emergence and activities of a multi-jurisdictional radio 
consortium. The study is significant in that it is representative of the communication dynamics, 
and other issues, of other multi-jurisdictional law enforcement and emergency services providers 
across the nation. The importance of interoperable communications is well acknowledged today. 
There are federal and local mandates affecting law enforcement and emergency response 
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agencies, which are driving them to change and implement interoperable technology and 
policies. Financially, there are economic drivers pushing agencies towards standards-based 
interoperable equipment and software. Agencies across the nation and world are finding that they 
must work together to effectively protect the public and respond to ever-occurring local and 
large-scale crises. Specific recommendations regarding collaboration in this environment are 
provided. The findings from this study are consistent with other case studies and work in this 
area.  Kuenzel and Welscher propose model factors important to ‘Public Safety Collaboration 
Success’ (2009) as: 1. Relevance and Sense of Urgency; 2. Incentives and Benefits; 3. People & 
Roles; 4. Organizational Structure; 5. Reflection & Learning: 6. Skills and Capabilities; 7. 
Resources; and 8. Outside Support & Supervision. They assert that the eight factors must be 
incorporated in a collaboration for it to achieve its desired public safety objectives (Kuenzel & 
Welscher, 2009). Success factors identified in the case study have some common elements. 
Consistent with the CNYICC case study, Brafman and Beckstrom assert that flexibility in 
leadership guided by a shared vision and goal are important aspects of successful governance and 
collaboration models (2008). The contribution of individual leadership characteristics have been 
studied by many (Zhang, Dawes, & Pardo, 2009; Parry, 2009). Also consistent with statements 
from the CNYICC case study, it is internal agency leadership that matters more than external or 
outside political leadership (Vann, 2005). Resources were not identified in the CNYICC case 
study as being an essential element to collaboration.  Members report working with what they 
have for the overall good.  
A best practice example of interoperability principles at work is the European 
Interoperability Framework (EIF) of e-government (IDABC, 2008). There are “Interoperability 
Principles” that can form policy guidelines to make it clear to all participants what is meant by 
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interoperability (Kuehn, Spichiger, & Riedl, 2009). Similar principles could be developed for the 
emergency response sector in the United States. 
The aim of theory is to help explain and understand the underlying conditions and 
causality of an activity or event in order to thereby understand what works well so that it can be 
repeated. The case study provides important insider insights from members of the emergency 
response community themselves.  Going forward, the need for collaboration and integration of 
investigative and response resources across the law enforcement and emergency response 
community will be paramount to successfully achieving public safety goals. Lessons learned 
from the case study of the Central New York Interoperable Communications Consortium 
contribute to this effort and evolution.  This is much like the story of the self-made millionaire 
who went to college only after achieving personal success, returning to school with the 
understanding that if she could not explain her success, she could not effectively repeat it 
(Handy, 1976).  From the CNYICC case studied, researchers are able to report on multiple 
factors that help and hinder cooperation. This research has produced some valuable tools for the 
re-creation of success in emergency response interagency cooperation, and information sharing.  
There is practical benefit in understanding and applying the lessons learned in this study 
regarding successful collaborations between such agencies. The case study itself is relevant to 
understanding other similar coordination efforts in this community. Research results are intended 
to be applicable in other settings as “best practices,” obviating the need to constantly engage in 
trial and error. Many of the situations and challenges that law enforcement and emergency 
response personnel face are common across the field, so insight from this study will likely be 
applicable in other, similar interagency collaborations. 
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This "generalizable knowledge" contributes to the theoretical framework and adds to the 
established body of knowledge concerning the factors that influence information sharing and 
collaboration in public safety, law enforcement, emergency response and the field of information 
science. 
  
3. Reflection 
 
This research involved three stages of model development and included empirical 
investigation, through case study, survey data, and document content analysis over the course of 
several years. This extended and separated research design process changed the focus and 
contribution of the study and findings.  Initially, activities were focused on the law enforcement 
community.  Through participation in the Public Safety Networks Study and involvement with 
the community and public safety focused problems investigated in the Wireless Grids Innovation 
Testbed (WiGiT) a broader and more comprehensive focus on public safety entities, issues and 
concerns evolved.  This expanded the stakeholders and study interests to embrace law 
enforcement and emergency response agencies, and the public as well.  
An advantage of having the separate but related research streams was that it improved the 
accuracy and generalizability of the overall study. The resulting research is more robust, accurate 
and applicable to this broader audience. The use of large national survey data such as the 
national survey of law enforcement agencies and public safety networks study survey together 
with multiple public safety agency after action reports and the in-depth case study of the 
CNYICC provided a broad view from across disciplines.  Limiting the resources available for 
this research (including the availability of insider information) would have reduced the depth of 
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investigation and data available. The results are as accurate and real as they are due to the 
volume and variety of resources involved.  
An alternate means to effectively conduct the research for this dissertation would be to 
work collaboratively across disciplines in parallel with other researchers. Such an approach 
would bring researchers from Sociology, Political Science, Information Science, Criminal 
Justice, the emerging fields of Emergency and Crisis Management, Public Safety and others 
together. Engaging multiple perspectives through this method would lead to robust and 
comprehensive insights, understanding and solutions as well. 
 
4. Future Work 
 
 
Model Refinement 
Future work stemming from this dissertation involves further investigation and 
refinement of the model for information sharing. It also should involve further consideration of 
the implications of edgeware and related wireless grids technology and its utility in this area as 
well as additional work on understanding social, policy and technological barriers to 
collaboration in the emergency response community.    
In this dissertation, these three major areas of influence (Technical, Social, and Policy) on 
information sharing between law enforcement and emergency response entities are identified and 
better understood. The degree of influence of these areas, as well as trust as a factor that cuts 
across all of these areas, should be further investigated to assess their effect on cooperation and 
information sharing activity.  The ultimate aim is to identify and implement actionable solutions. 
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Experience in broader government foreign relations may serve as an example for 
modeling or describing the sharing problems faced here. Foreign relations scenarios and 
hypothetical situations could be investigated that would potentially bring light to different 
aspects of the problem of working with mixed authority and interests as well as varying levels of 
trust. Thus, identifying successful practices and/or policies for information sharing in the 
international relations environment could be adapted to the interagency information sharing 
environment, with models constructed to more readily understand the interplay there. If found 
useful, they could inform future models of interagency information sharing. 
 
 Interoperability and Wireless Grids 
Much research remains to be done on information interoperability in the context of 
emergency response systems.  Technical solutions such as wireless grids edgeware applications 
allow cooperation and resource sharing to occur in the current blended environment. In the 
future, systems will continue to grow and platforms change, but they can retain functionality and 
interoperability through such an intermediary service. Having such a capability (e.g. wireless 
grids) will foster the identification and testing of new solutions and problems in emergency 
services to include technical, social, and policy factors. Issues such as the lack of common 
ontologies or definitions for identifying resources require further investigation. Information 
overload, e.g. having too much or too many resources to effectively manage or use them, is a 
concern. There remains a need for additional work to be done on the filtering of information or 
creation of intelligent dashboards for decision makers in crisis response to reduce information 
overload. 
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Social Emergency Response 
Social emergency response is an emerging area of interest within the government and the 
academic community. The expanded role that non-traditional actors play in a “whole 
community” response to a crisis or emergency is gaining acknowledgement at federal and local 
government levels.  Additional work in the area of social and policy influences is necessary with 
the goal of creating an environment more open to and accepting of these new configurations of 
responders. 
 
Case Study Research 
The case study of the CNYICC provides early insights regarding social, technical, policy, 
and other factors that influence how people form, implement and ultimately cooperate with 
interagency/public safety communications enhancements afforded by advancements in 
technology. This work is a part of other case studies that address collaboration and cooperation 
in this highly technologically infused environment. Future work should include additional case 
studies that involve public safety entities and consideration should be given to the notion of these 
studies including a broader range of stakeholders to further augment the literature and empirical 
data available in this important area. 
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VI. Appendix 
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Appendix 
A.  Federal Initiatives on Information Sharing 
 There are a number of new and ongoing initiatives sponsored by the federal government 
that directly impact information sharing efforts at all levels. A number of these are briefly 
identified here (ISE, 2011). The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created as a 
federal cabinet level department charged with primary responsibilities of protecting U.S. territory 
from terrorist attacks and responding to natural disasters (DHS, 2011). DHS is concerned with 
the civilian sphere. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the 
Information Sharing Environment (ISE), as an approach to sharing terrorism-related information. 
A presidentially appointed Program Manager oversees operations assisted by the Information 
Sharing Council (ISC) consisting of 16 federal agency officials. The current Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE) combines policies, procedures, and technologies linking resources (people, 
systems, databases, and information) at all levels, including tribal entities and the private sector; 
the primary focus is "... any mission process, anywhere, which has a material impact on 
detecting, preventing, disrupting, responding to, or mitigating terrorist activity" (ISE, 2011). In 
2010, the Department of Justice created the National Suspicious Activity and Reporting (SAR) 
Initiative (NSI) to assist participants at all levels in sharing and compatibility. Law enforcement 
information sharing initiatives include the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) 
Division with the following services; National Crime Information Center (NCIC), Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), Uniform Crime Reporting Program, Law 
Enforcement On-line (LEO), six Regional Information Sharing System Network (RISSNET) 
centers, and the National Data Exchange (N-DEX) (ISE, 2011). The private sector is specifically 
addressed through DHS’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) initiatives integrated 
within the ISE. 
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 Appendix 
B.  Case Study Consent Forms 
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Appendix 
C.  Interview Guide 
 
Interview Protocol (IRB# 11-142): "A case study of Central New York Interoperable 
Communications Consortium (CNYICC): Identifying Factors that Support Successful 
Collaboration in Information Technology Implementation." 
 
The goal of the study is to identify information sharing and collaboration barriers as well as 
facilitating factors.  During interviews the goal will be to gather as much data about the person 
and their understanding of their purpose and activities so that patterns or solutions can be 
identified. The Interviewer should allow for broad and open ended questions and permit the 
participants to speak at length and let them move to new directions as well. The expectation is 
that we will not know all of the potential connections, causes and influences in advance and we 
will build on these though successive interviews and investigative research.  
 
General Information 
a. Organization  
b. Location 
c. Interviewee or # 
d. Title 
e. Date Interviewed:  
f. Contact Person: 
g. Contact Person Title: Systems Manager 
 
Interview questions guide: 
 
2. Interviewee background 
a. Title 
b. Your background 
c. Describe role/job 
d. Mission 
e. Who do you report to 
f. How long in this position 
g. How long in company/government in this area 
h. Where have you worked previously 
i. Who did you know here prior to your job here 
j. Do you know people here apart from the job 
 
3. Contacts 
a. What internal departments or divisions do you work with daily 
b. """"weekly, and why 
c. """"monthly, and why 
d. """"yearly, and why 
e. """"Other than yearly, and why 
f. What outside agencies or organizations do you work with daily 
g. """"weekly, and why 
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h. """"monthly, and why 
i. """"yearly, and why 
j. """"Other than yearly, and why 
 
4. Stakeholders 
a. Who are your stakeholders 
b. Who are the most important stakeholders to you, why 
c. What do you have to change an internal policy or procedure? 
 
5. Technology architecture 
a. What Technological means you have for sharing information or collaborating 
with other internal partners? 
b. What Technological means you have for sharing information or collaborating 
with external partners or stakeholders? 
c. How does Technology help with information sharing? 
d. How does Technology hinder sharing information? 
 
6. Cultural environment - perceived 
a. How would you describe the culture of your organization as it related to 
information sharing? 
b. What are the positives of this? 
c. What are negatives of this? 
d. Is culture something you can affect? How? 
 
7. Policy implications & governance 
a. What is the operating or organizational framework here? 
b. How strict is it? 
c. How does department/agency policy affect information sharing here?  
d. How do outside laws/regulation affect information sharing here? 
e. What do you have to change an internal policy or procedure? 
 
8. Competition 
a. Who competes with you for resources or other things? 
b. Who do you compete with for resources or other things? 
c. Does competition for resources affect your decision to share or not share certain 
information? Describe a case of this?  
 
9. Consortium 
a. When did you come in to the Consortium? 
b. How did you come to participate in the consortium? 
c. What about it is working well? 
d. What about it is not working so well? 
e. How do you describe your participation? 
f. Why do you stay in this? 
g. What could be done to improve the effectiveness of the Consortium? 
 
324 
 
 
For collaboration and information sharing it is important to be able to get information from the 
right person at the right time. This can be for a task, procedure, to verify information, 
administrative questions, where or how to request assistance, seeking feedback, advice or general 
information or opinion on position of where things stand or possible implications of a course of 
action.  
 
Please list up to 10 people who you contact, formally or informally, to get information. These 
can be inside or outside the organization and on or off the job, list the most contacted to the least 
contacted (this does not necessarily reflect importance): 
 
Person - Position - Agency - Type of information or Purpose of Contact  
1 
2 
3 
 ...10 
How are these contacts initiated? 
1 
2 
3 
...10 
 
You likely serve as a source of information for others; Please list up to 5 people who have 
contacted you for information, opinion or guidance.   
 
Person - Position - Agency - Type of information or Purpose of Contact  
1 
2 
3 
 ...10 
How are these contacts initiated? 
1 
2 
3 
...10 
 
 
Information Sharing: In one-on-one in-depth interviews with this researcher participants will be 
asked the following base questions, this part focuses on the relationships with law enforcement 
agencies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Describe a situation or experience where you shared information with a law enforcement 
agency, and  
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2. Describe a situation or experience where you did not share information with a law 
enforcement agency. 
3. Repeat 1 & 2 for additional experience or situation. 
4. What do you understand information to include? 
5. What means does your agency have for sharing information with law enforcement 
agencies?  
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
1. We will make our findings public at the end and as milestones are achieved. 
2. We may need to return with more questions or for clarification as we learn more. 
3. Is there something we can do to help you? 
 
 
Impressions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Notes:  
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D.  MOU for CNYICC 
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Appendix 
E.  CNYICC Policy & Procedure Proposed 
 
Regional Authority for Coordination and Assignment of Interoperability Assets 
The Consortium plans to establish a 24/7 team that is given the authority to assign, 
coordinate and respond with regional interoperability assets. This team is expected to include 
operational support, including personnel trained as Communications Unit Leaders (COML), as 
defined in the National Incident Management System (NIMS) model, as well as technical staff 
who are familiar with the detailed operation of interoperable equipment. A Regional 
Interoperability Committee is planned for development and a Regional Communication 
Coordinator will be assigned as a single point of contact for all agencies within the Consortium’s 
jurisdiction.  
Until such time as the Regional Interoperability Committee is developed and a Regional 
Communications Coordinator is assigned, each agency shall maintain responsibility for its own 
assets and contact one another’s designated agency On Call Duty Officer, as annotated in 
Appendix xxx, when interoperability assets are requested. 
 
Governance Structure 
The Governance structure consists of an Executive Board, Administrative Committee, 
Operations, Technology, and Long Term Planning Subcommittees, and additional ad-hoc 
subcommittees including a Grants Subcommittee. An organizational diagram of the structure of 
the governance body follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: CNYICC Governance Proposed 
Agreements regarding position 
capabilities: 
The Executive Board shall consist of 
one member from each of the five 
counties and shall be an elected 
official.  
The Administrative Committee shall 
consist of one member from each of 
the five counties, at the 911 
Director or equivalent level. 
Determination and designation of the 
Executive Board member shall take 
priority over the designation of the 
remaining subcommittee members. 
A designee from New York State 
Police shall serve on the Executive 
Board as an Ad-hoc member, until 
such time that this position requires 
a full member position. 
The Operations, Technology, and Long 
Term Planning subcommittees shall 
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report to the Administrative 
Committee. 
The Grants ad-hoc committee shall 
report to the Long Term Planning 
subcommittee. 
Overall Responsibilities 
The responsibilities of the Consortium’s Governing body include: 
Maintenance and update of the TIC Plan at regular intervals, or as critical updated 
information is identified. 
Dissemination of updated plans to all participating agencies.  
Establishment of training requirements in support of the TIC Plan. 
Promotion of interoperable communications capabilities through trained communications 
personnel.  
Initialization of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and Agreements for interoperable 
communications. 
Promotion of regular interoperable equipment / solutions testing, assist agencies with test 
evaluations, and dissemination of the results. 
Continual re-evaluation of regional requirements as technology evolves and circumstances 
dictate. 
 
Executive Board 
The Executive Board shall consist of a representative from each Consortium member 
agency. This ensures that each agency within the region can maintain control over their 
respective agency operations while meeting the interoperability needs of all local, county and 
regional agencies. Board Members are appointed by their respective County Governing Body.  
 
Until such time that an Executive Board is established, the Administrative Committee 
members will report to their respective local County governing body. 
The responsibilities of the Executive Board include:  
Development and maintenance of a set of Executive Board by-laws governing the Board 
Acceptance and action upon requests for assistance from individual county governance 
boards 
Development, maintenance, and recommendations for local County Governing body 
approval  
o a long-term capital budget to enhance regional interoperability 
o an annual budget to enhance regional interoperability 
Review and action upon Operations and Technology Subcommittee recommendations 
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Allow for the creation of an advisory committee of peers, representative of the membership 
which may include state, regional, county, city and local jurisdictions and/or outside 
disciplines. 
o This advisory committee will act in the interest of the Executive Board and will be 
selected by the membership of the Executive Board, in concert with the Executive 
Board Director 
Member Role 
The role of each Board Member is to represent all public safety jurisdictions and agencies 
within their respective county. This representation, based on County Governing Body approval, 
requires adequate decision making authority and financial commitment authority to facilitate 
regional interoperability. 
 
Member Duties 
The duties of this position include, but are not limited to:  
Conduct its meetings in accordance with Roberts Rules of Order including electing a Chair 
(Convener) that will preside over the meetings. Other officers may or may not be elected 
at the discretion of the Board. 
Adoption or rejection of governance agreements, operational changes, and technical 
modifications or enhancements as developed by the Administrative Committee. 
Adoption or rejection of Administrative Committee’s strategic plans. 
Review policy, operational, and cost sharing matters necessary for the operation and 
maintenance of the Consortium’s system  
Perform any other responsibilities required to implement the agreed upon MOUs 
Each Board Member must designate and name an alternate as a voting member if the Board 
Member cannot attend an Executive Board Meeting 
Support the consensus decisions of the board once adopted by the board. 
 
Member Appointment / Replacement Process 
The process for appointing and/or replacing the Executive Board members include: 
Executive Board members serve at the request of their County governing body and are 
reviewed on a biennial basis at the local level 
Executive Board members may serve consecutive terms as deemed appropriate by the 
respective County governing body   
Should an Executive Board Member be unable to complete a term in office, it is the 
responsibility of the appropriate County governing body to fill this vacancy within 90 
days. Note: This is necessary in order to assure continuity of representation for all public 
safety jurisdictions / agencies within a county and potential disruption of Executive 
Board activities. 
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The Executive Board shall appoint an Executive Director from its membership. The 
Executive Board Director shall: 
o Serve a two year term of office. 
o Speak for the whole governance structure and the Consortium. 
o Provide the opportunity for a united front (e.g., “one voice”) for the governance of the 
Consortium. 
Membership of this board has not yet been determined; once is has been determined, 
membership will be listed in Appendix A.  
 
Administrative Committee 
The Administrative Committee shall consist of a representative from each Consortium 
member agency. This ensures that each agency within the region can maintain control over their 
respective operability while meeting the interoperability needs of all local, county, and regional 
agencies. Committee members are appointed by their respective County Governing Body.  
The responsibilities of the Administrative Committee include: 
Assuring that the Executive Board is kept informed of all regional activities regarding 
interoperability and the impact that these activities will have on the CNYICC. 
Development, maintenance, and recommendations for approval by the Executive Board: 
o A long-term capital budget to enhance regional interoperability 
o When appropriate, an annual budget to enhance regional interoperability 
Development of strategic plans to  
o Ensure regional interoperability, and  
o Migration of radio communications assets to a standards-based-shared system-of-
systems by 2015. 
Review and act upon Operations and Technology Subcommittee recommendations. 
Interface with the Syracuse UASI Director to meet Federal and State interoperability 
requirements. 
Development of governance agreements that provide supervision in the use of appropriated 
money, including money from relevant federal homeland security grants, for the purposes 
of designing, implementing, and maintaining a regional integrated public safety radio 
communications system that provides interoperability between first responders from 
local, state, tribal and federal agencies. 
Oversight of the development, implementation, and training of personnel using a common 
regional SOP, consistent with National Incident Management System (NIMS), National 
Response Framework (NRF) and National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). 
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Appendix  
 
F.  CNYICC Influence and Relationships 
 
 
Source: 
http://www.ok.gov/homeland/Interoperable_Communications/SAFECOM_Interoperability_Cont
inuum/index.html (11/27/2011)
 
Figure 30: Interoperability Continuum 
The goal is to move from the minimal standards, (left side) of the continuum 
advancing to the maximum standard (right side) of the continuum. 
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Appendix 
 
G.  Public Safety Communications Evolution 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Public Safety Communications Evolution 
 
Public safety communications evolution with long-term transition to convergence of 
systems (from NYS DHSES, 2011) 
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Appendix 
 
H.  Events and Activities Impacting CNYICC 
 
Table 9: Events and Activities Impacting CNYICC 
 
Date Federal Level 
Event 
State Level Event Local Level Event Description 
1982 National 
Emergency 
Number 
Association 
(NENA) 
 CNYICC members 
all participate here 
NENA's Mission is to foster the 
technological advancement, 
availability and implementation of a 
universal emergency 911 number 
system;  NENA is widely recognized 
as a standard-setting organization; with 
more than 7,000 members in 48 
chapters in the United States and 
internationally 
1989 Project 25 (P25 or 
APCO-25) 
initiated 
  Suite of standards for digital radio 
communications by federal, 
state/province and local public safety 
agencies to enable interoperable 
communication with other emergency 
response agencies produced by the 
Association of Public Safety 
Communications Officials 
International (APCO), the National 
Association of State 
Telecommunications Directors 
(NASTD), selected Federal Agencies 
and the National Communications 
System (NCS). The published P25 
standards suite is administered by the 
Telecommunications Industry 
Association (TIA Mobile and Personal 
Private Radio Standards Committee 
TR-8). Compliance was limited until it 
was tied to federal funding requests in 
2007. 
1991  911 Wireless 
Surcharge imposed 
Counties not getting 
proposed revenues 
as anticipated 
NYS Government imposes surcharge 
on all cell phones to fund local public 
safety communication costs; over $40 
million annually with only small 
percentage to purpose. 
1995 Project 25 - Phase 
I Completed 
  Defined the common air interface 
standard, which specified an FDMA 
access method, QPSK-C modulation, 
9.6 kb/s data rate and DVSI vocoder 
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with 12.5 KHz channel. 
2001  Statewide Wireless 
Network (SWN) 
RFP initiated 
 In May 2001, NYS Office For 
Technology (OFT) announces 
intention to seek “competitive bids for 
estimated $300 million project to 
construct a statewide wireless 
communications system.” Advance 
notice of future release of SWN 
request for proposals (RFP) printed in 
Procurement Opportunities 
Newsletter/Contract Reporter, May 13, 
2002. 
2001 9/11 Terrorist 
Attack in US 
9/11 Terrorist 
Attack in US 
9/11 Terrorist 
Attack in US 
Terrorists attack World Trade Center 
in NYC, the Pentagon in Arlington, 
Va. and an unconfirmed target in 
Washington, D.C.; lack of 
interoperable communication was an 
issue.  
2003 Next Generation 
911 (NG9-1-1 or 
NG911) 
Next Generation 
911 (NG9-1-1 or 
NG911) 
Next Generation 
911 (NG9-1-1 or 
NG911) 
NINA supported National Initiative  to 
enable public to transmit text, images, 
video and data to the 9-1-1 centers; 
published in NENA's Future Path Plan 
in 2001 
2004 Narrowbanding 
Land Mobile 
Radio (LMR) 
ordered by FCC 
  FCC issues order issued mandating 
business, education, industrial, public 
safety, state and local governments 
VHF (150-174 MHz) and UHF (421-
512 MHz) Private Land Mobile Radio 
(PLMR) licensees to change to 
narrowband (12.5 kHz bandwidth) 
systems by January 1, 2013. 
2005 National Incident 
Management 
System (NIMS) 
use mandated by 
Presidential 
Directive 
States adopt same  National Incident Management System 
(NIMS); Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD5) 
mandated all federal, state, and local 
agencies use NIMS for emergencies to 
receive federal funding. (Began with 
Federal Agencies in 2003) 
2005 Incident Command 
System (ICS) use 
mandated by 
Presidential 
Directive 
States adopt same  ICS is a subcomponent of the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS); 
Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 (HSPD5) mandated all 
federal, state, and local agencies use 
NIMS for emergencies to receive 
federal funding. 
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2005 SAFECOM – 
Interoperability 
Continuum 
  SAFECOM program of Department of 
Homeland Security’s OEC and OIC 
does planning, guidance, and policy 
documents including the  
Interoperability Continuum adopted as 
an organizing structure for DHS 
G&T’s TIC Plan  
& required for funding. 
2005 Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Katrina Hurricane Katrina struck the U.S. Gulf 
Coast destroying towns in Mississippi 
and Louisiana displacing millions; 
responder communication was 
inadequate 
2005  Statewide Wireless 
Network (SWN) 
initiated 
 Statewide Wireless Network (SWN) is 
an effort to replace obsolete 
communications infrastructure in New 
York State with an integrated 
statewide radio network for State and 
local public safety and public service 
organizations. 
2006 
 
  
  CNYICC 
Discussions 
Initiated 
911 Directors meet at 911 association 
events and propose working together 
as consortium for benefit of all. 
2006 Next Generation 
911 (NG9-1-1 or 
NG911) 
  US Department of Transportation leads 
an initiative;  research and 
development project to advance NG9-
1-1 
2007  Statewide Wireless 
Network (SWN) 
reporting required 
 State Technology Law section 403 
enacted, creating new annual reporting 
requirements for costs associated with 
participation in SWN. State agency 
and public benefit corporations 
required to submit SWN-related 
expenditures to Office of the State 
Comptroller (OSC) by January 30, 
2008 
2007 Project 25 
compliance 
verification from 
vendor required 
  2007 SAFECOM federal grant 
guidance recommends applicants using 
funds for Project 25 equipment must 
verify product’s compliance by 
manufacturer. 
2007   CNYICC Formally 
Created (MOU) 
Central New York Interoperable 
Communications Consortium 
(CNYICC) formally created by 
Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) between five central New York 
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counties; Cayuga, Cortland, Madison, 
Onondaga and Oswego 
2008 The National 
Emergency 
Communications 
Plan (NECP) 
  US DHS release National Emergency 
Communications Plan (NECP) to 
improve emergency response 
communications; defining three goals 
that establish minimum levels of 
interoperable communications with a 
deadline for federal, state, local and 
tribal authorities’ compliance attached 
to grants. 
2009  Statewide Wireless 
Network (SWN) 
Cancelled 
 New York cancels the state’s $2.1 
billion contract to build a statewide 
wireless network for emergency 
workers following years of delays and 
technological problems 
2009  Project 25 (P25) 
standards included 
at state level  
 Compliance with Project 25 standards 
is recommended; this is  included in 
State Communications interoperability 
plan 
2010   CNYICC Core 
Membership 
Change 
A core founding leadership member of 
CNYICC left service and new member 
joined.   
2010  911 landline 
Surcharge and  
Mortgage 
recording tax 
blocked by State 
 Additional mortgage recording tax and 
new fees for wireless and landline 
phones are proposed by counties to 
support 911 system upgrades and 
interoperability; denied by state 
legislature. 
2011   911 landline 
Surcharge and  
Mortgage recording 
tax adopted by 
counties 
Additional mortgage recording tax and 
new fees for wireless and landline 
phones are proposed by counties to 
support 911 system upgrades and 
interoperability; denied by state 
legislature. 
Source: (Treglia, 2012) 
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Appendix 
 
I.   External Factors Impacting CNYICC 
 
I.1 Statewide Wireless Network (SWN) 
 
The New York State Statewide Wireless Network (SWN) was a project to replace the 
obsolete emergency communications infrastructure across the State.  The goal was to implement 
a statewide mobile radio network for public safety and public service agencies. The SWN was to 
provide interoperable, interagency and intergovernmental communications allowing emergency 
personnel to communicate with one another. Local governments were allowed to opt into the 
system, but had to purchase their own equipment to do so. Control and governance of the system 
was in the hands of the State Office of Technology. The need for improved radio systems was 
apparent since 1996; however, interest in interoperable emergency communications systems 
heightened in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (OSC, 2006).  
The State attempted to form agreements with private firms to develop such a network 
unsuccessfully two times before initiating a competitive process to select vendor in 2002. The 
communications network, projected to cost $2 billion, would be the largest IT project undertaken 
in the state's history. The State Office for Technology awarded the contract to M/A-COM Inc. 
(Tyco Electronics), in April 2004. In September 2005, the Office for Technology (OFT) 
completed a lease purchase agreement contract to M/A-COM to design and build the SWN. New 
York State went on to spend over $100 million towards developing the statewide wireless 
network it hoped would provide public safety and public service agencies with interoperable 
communications statewide, only to have this effort fail. Following problems in several rounds of 
testing, the state officially terminated the contract with M/A-COM in January of 2009 for failing 
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to deliver a satisfactory and acceptable public safety communications network (McKenna, 2009; 
Mayberry-Stewart, 2008). 
I.2 Project 25 (P-25) 
 
The U.S. Department of Commerce Public Safety Communications Research P25 project 
is a user-driven effort to create a suite of standards for digital land-mobile radio (LMR) systems 
for first responders. By design, practitioners participate in the standards development process 
alongside LMR manufacturers. The P25 began in 1989 to enable public safety agencies to 
communicate with each other, regardless of system manufacturer. It is the only open voluntary 
consensus standards development group focused on digital LMR communications for first 
responders (PSCR, 2011). Open standards in TIA TR-8/Project 25 define how LMR devices 
operate, and how key system interface standards can allow radios and infrastructure from various 
manufacturers to interoperate. This standards development process for congressionally mandated 
interoperability interfaces promotes more vendor solutions being created and offered. The PSCR, 
Public Safety Communications Research Program, ensures that public safety’s technical needs 
are accurately represented with the commercial vendors and in P25 (PSCR, 2011). 
I.3 Next Generation 911 (NG911) 
 
Present day 911 systems in the United States were designed around telephone technology 
and cannot handle text, data, images, or video. Smart phones, computers, and other intelligent 
hand held devices are increasingly common in society and engagement with them by public 
safety communications systems will be essential. The Next Generation 911 (NG911) initiative is 
establishing a strategic foundation for public safety emergency communications services in a 
networked wireless mobile society. The concept of next generation 9-1-1 involves standardizing 
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the technology underlying various 911 systems across the nation, using IP technology and 
Internet-based communication links, which will allow for greater access to databases of 
information to manage incidents and handle calls. Interconnecting the 911 Centers to allow 
unlimited transfers of calls, distribution of overflow 911 calls to other centers, and other call-
handling features has been a long-standing goal. Having capability for the 911 systems to accept 
alternate multi-media information from citizens, including video, photos, and text messages is 
also part of this conceptualization. Additional advances include interconnecting with private 
services, such as for telematics, to handle automatic crash notification (ACN) and similar data. A 
final layer would include advanced features such as automatic routing for languages, mapping, 
and medical information access (USDOT, 2011). 
It should be recognized that current E911 systems no longer meet user needs. The Next 
Generation 911 (NG911) networks will replace existing narrowband, circuit switched 911 
networks, which do not support text messages, images and video, file transfer, and ready access 
to data such as telematics, building plans and medical records over common data networks. 
NG911 is a comprehensive system comprised of hardware, software, data and policies and 
procedures to (NENA, 2009): 
• provide standardized interfaces from call and message services  
• process all types of emergency calls including non‐voice (multi‐media)  
   messages  
• acquire and integrate additional data useful to call routing and  
   handling  
• deliver the calls/messages and data to the appropriate PSAPs and other  
   appropriate emergency entities  
• support data and communications needs for coordinated incident  
   response and management  
• provide a secure environment for emergency communications 
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NG911 can enable substantial improvements in available data and information sharing. 
The NG911 operates as a service system that involves a multitude of human procedures and 
system operations to control and manage additional services. Examples of this include 
establishment and maintenance of databases, IP network operations, security, trouble resolution, 
and auditing and validation procedures. Still, a true "standards based" NG911 system is not yet 
available as necessary standards are still being developed. National public safety organizations 
such as NENA (National Emergency Number Association) work to identify and promote the use 
of these standards in the field. 
I.4 National Emergency Number Association (NENA) 
NENA is an organization chartered to represent public safety and the 911 industry 
nationally. It is comprised of 911 Administrators from across the country. Its mission is to focus 
on development, evolution, and expansion of emergency communications and standards. They 
advise congress and the FCC on policy matters. NENA is responsible to define NG911, and to 
coordinate development and support of this as a system and service to the public, industry, and 
Public Safety entities generally (NENA, 2009). 
I.5 SAFECOM  
SAFECOM is a communications program of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) established in 2001 by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). SAFECOM 
provides research, development, testing, evaluation, guidance, tools, and templates regarding 
issues of interoperable communications to federal, state, local, and tribal emergency response 
agencies. SAFECOM is an emergency communications program of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) and Office for Interoperability and 
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Compatibility (OIC). SAFECOM is stakeholder driven, led by an Executive Committee 
comprised of state and local emergency responders, intergovernmental and national public safety 
communications associations. The SAFECOM Executive Committee (EC) and SAFECOM 
Emergency Response Council (ERC) both work with Federal communications programs and key 
emergency response stakeholders to address problems in multi-jurisdictional and cross-
disciplinary resource coordination and communications (SAFECOM, 2011). SAFECOM was 
instrumental in creating the Interoperability Continuum (IC), the Statement of Requirements 
(SOR), the Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (SCIP) Methodology, and the 
National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) to improve communications and 
interoperability for emergency responder’s nation-wide.  The SAFECOM interoperability 
continuum is shown in the appendix. The Interoperability Continuum was designed as a tool to 
help emergency responders plan and implement interoperability solutions to include: 
governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training and exercises, and use of 
interoperable communications. The tool aids practitioners and policy makers assess and 
implement facets of both short- and long-term interoperability. 
I.6 The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) 
 
The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP), established in 2008, was the 
first strategic plan for improving emergency response communications in the United States, 
complimenting homeland security and emergency communications legislation and activities, 
including Statewide Communication Interoperability Plans. NECP was created by the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Emergency Communications. The NECP sets 
common goals and priorities expected to enhance governance, planning, technology, training, 
exercises, and emergency response communication capabilities, and includes milestones to allow 
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measurement of progress and improvements in emergency communications with a focus on 
operational aspects. The recommendations are meant to guide, but do not dictate, distribution of 
homeland security funds to assist authorities who implement the plan. The plan seeks to achieve 
compliance by all agencies with the guidance by 2013 (DHS NECP, 2011). 
I.7 National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
 
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a standardized model for 
command and control of emergency or crisis incidents proposed by the Federal Government in 
2003. The present-day version provides for shared command structure and acknowledges 
stakeholder autonomy over data and resources. It was created through Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive Number Five (5). NIMS is a comprehensive national framework for 
incident management and New York State adopted the model as the State‘s command and 
control policy for use in coordinating the State‘s response to emergencies. NIMS enables 
responders at various levels to work together to manage crisis incidents of large and small scale 
size, or complexity (FEMA NIMS, 2011). 
I.8 Incident Command System (ICS) 
 
Related to NIMS is the Incident Command Structure (ICS). ICS more specifically 
describes the command and control structure and hierarchy for managing and coordinating 
resources at an incident. The common understanding of defined roles and responsibilities allows 
for more effective and efficient operations where multiple agencies are involved. 
I.9 Narrowbanding 
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On January 1, 2013, public safety and business industrial land mobile radio (LMR) 
systems operating in the 150-512 MHz radio bands must begin operating using at least 12.5 kHz 
efficiency technology. This mandate and deadline is the result of an FCC effort from nearly two 
decades ago to ensure more efficient use of spectrum and provide for greater spectrum access for 
public safety and non-public safety users (FCC, 2011; RadioReference.com, 2011). Migration to 
the 12.5 kHz efficiency previously referred to as “refarming” and now “Narrowbanding” allows 
for the creation of additional channel capacity within the existing radio spectrum, supporting 
more total users. Each of these refers to the 1992 FCC plan to increase available spectrum in the 
VHF and UHF private land mobile bands. After January 1, 2013, licensees not operating at 12.5 
KHz efficiency will be considered in violation of the FCC rules and could face enforcement 
action such as admonishment, fines, or loss of spectrum license. 
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